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English abstract 
This dissertation undertakes an explorative historical analysis of problems associated 
with crowd phenomena in the U.S. financial markets between 1890 and 1940. While a 
study of crowd-related problems in the financial markets invariably involves 
examinations of panics and crises, the dissertation shows that crowds were not 
exclusively seen as crisis phenomena, but were considered by many financial writers to 
be of much broader significance to the organisation and functioning of markets. The 
dissertation claims that it is necessary to explore the close connections between financial 
markets and crowd phenomena in order to fully understand how markets were perceived 
and conceptualised in the given historical period. Inspired by Michel Foucault’s 
reflections on the analysis of problematisations, the dissertation explores how practical, 
academic and popular accounts of financial markets problematised (i.e. reflected upon, 
contested and responded to) various crowd phenomena as they occurred in the markets. 
As part of the historical exposition, the dissertation examines how financial writers 
employed tropes and terminology from late nineteenth century crowd theories when 
describing and seeking to explain the processes and practices of the markets. The 
dissertation argues that the way in which crowd phenomena were problematised as well 
as the attempts to address these alleged crowd problems influenced perceptions of 
financial markets and transformed approaches to market analysis and speculation. 
Drawing on an archive of handbooks on how to become a successful investor or 
speculator, scholarly work on financial markets (from the academic fields of economics, 
sociology and psychology) as well as a range of popular (fictional and non-fictional) 
textual accounts of trading in financial markets, the dissertation offers a broad, yet 
rigorously focused, historical perspective on crowd phenomena in financial markets. 
Furthermore, it explores how ideas about crowd action, imitation, herding and contagion 
were introduced to and became integral parts of the discourses on financial markets. 
Reiterations of such historically formed ideas about crowd phenomena in financial 
markets are still prominent in current discussions and the dissertation thus offers a 
historical contextualisation of a pertinent feature of contemporary debates on financial 
markets.
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Danish abstract 
Denne afhandling foretager en historisk undersøgelse af problemer omhandlende 
massefænomener i de amerikanske finansmarkeder i perioden 1890 til 1940. Selvom 
studier af masseproblematikker i finansmarkeder uundgåeligt vil involvere undersøgelser 
af finanskriser og tilfælde af panik i markeder, så viser afhandling, at masser ikke 
udelukkende ansås for at være krisefænomener. Massefænomener blev, i den pågældende 
periode, derimod tilskrevet langt større og bredere betydning for organiseringen af 
finansmarkeder samt måden de fungerede på. Det hævdes i afhandlingen, at det er 
nødvendigt at undersøge de tætte forbindelser mellem finansmarkeder og 
massefænomener for at få den fulde forståelse for hvorledes markeder opfattedes samt 
hvorledes de blev begrebsliggjort i den pågældende historiske periode. Med inspiration 
fra Michel Foucaults metodologiske refleksioner over begrebet ‘problematisering’ 
foretager afhandlingen en historisk analyse af måder hvorpå massefænomener i 
finansmarkeder er blevet problematiseret (dvs. gjort til genstand for refleksioner, 
diskussioner og løsningsforslag) i praktiske, akademiske og populære tekster. Som en del 
af den historiske undersøgelse, analyseres og diskuteres det i afhandlingen hvorledes 
termer og ideer fra masseteorier (udformet i 1890erne) flittigt blev brugt af 
‘markedsskribenter’ i beskrivelser af og forsøg på at forklare markedspraksisser og -
processer. I afhandlingen argumenteres der ligeledes for, at måden hvorpå 
massefænomener blev problematiseret samt måderne hvorpå disse påståede problemer 
blev forsøgt løst havde stor indflydelse på forskellige iagttageres opfattelser af 
finansmarkederne samt indvirkede konkret på tilgange til visse markedspraksisser. Det 
empiriske materiale, der analyseres i afhandlingen, består af håndbøger til vordende 
finansspekulanter, akademiske tekster (hentet fra økonomien, sociologien og 
psykologien) samt et udvalg af populære tekster omhandlende finanshandel. 
Afhandlingen bidrager med et bredt, men fokuseret blik på massefænomener i 
finansmarkeder samt et perspektiv på hvorledes ideer såsom imitation, smitte, 
flokadfærd og -mentalitet integreredes i markedsdiskursen. Da sådanne historiske ideer 
om massefænomener i finansmarkeder stadig diskuteres i markedslitteraturen, skal 
afhandlingen ydermere ses som en historisk kontekstualisering af et central element i 
samtidige diskussioner af finansmarkeder.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2011, Nature published a paper in their ‘Perspective’ section in which it was claimed 
that the systemic failure of the financial sector during the 2007–2008 global financial 
crisis could be described and explained via an analogy to epidemiological networks of 
the spread of infectious diseases. The authors, the Executive Director of Financial 
Stability in the Bank of England, Andrew G. Haldane and Professor of Zoology at 
Oxford University, Robert M. May, further suggested that there were policy lessons to 
be learned from their ‘deliberately oversimplified’ analytic models of the financial 
‘ecosystem’ (Haldane and May, 2011, p. 351). Essentially, Haldane and May argued that 
in order to develop a ‘realistic caricature of markets’ that could account for the 
interlinkages, dependencies and interaction dynamics in financial systems, it was 
necessary to draw on theories and models from outside the realm of financial economics 
(Haldane and May, 2011, p. 352). Hence, the crisis seemed to have showcased that there 
was an urgent need for new approaches to the study and regulation of financial markets.   
This was not the first time Haldane and May had made the case for an 
epidemiological network-based approach to the study of so-called ‘systemic events’ in 
financial markets. A couple of years prior to the publication of the paper in Nature, 
Haldane gave a speech at the Financial Student Association in Amsterdam during which 
he juxtaposed the SARS epidemic of 2002 and the financial crisis of 2007–2008. He 
argued that ‘the spread of epidemics and the disintegration of the financial system’ were 
essentially different branches of ‘the same network family tree’ (Haldane, 2009, p. 3). 
Congruently, as May et al. asserted in a short ‘News & Views’ piece in Nature, studying 
systemic events in financial markets using epidemiological and ecological network 
models and not exclusively focusing on payment flows (as economists and central 
bankers allegedly have a habit of doing) would render it possible to take into account 
relevant social and political factors such as ‘the spread of rumours’ and ‘the “contagion 
dynamic” of public perceptions’ (May et al., 2008, p. 894). Viewing financial markets 
through the epidemiological network lens illuminates, following this line of reasoning, 
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the ‘contagion dynamics’ that the authors considered to be of such great importance to 
the functioning and malfunctioning of these systems. 
While the deliberate simplicity of Haldane and May’s models and the suggestion that 
policy lessons could be drawn from their work have been met with criticism from 
scholars in a variety of academic fields such as behavioural economics (Lux, 2011), 
physics (Johnson, 2011), the history of medicine and virology (Peckham, 2013) and 
economic sociology (Cooper, 2011), my interest lies in the historical precedent of the 
specific way in which Haldane and May respond to a problem pertaining to the financial 
markets. By ‘respond’ I mean the way they turn to extra-economic terminologies and 
theories, such as an epidemiological conception of contagion, in order to deal with a 
concrete problem, which, in their case, is the alleged inability of the prevailing available 
theories and models to properly grasp the intricate systemic nature of the world of 
finance. Although there is something quite disconcerting about the idea that the most 
accurate way to understand the financial markets should be to compare them to a 
network within which a viral disease spreads, May and Haldane’s attempt to rethink 
prevailing perceptions of financial markets (and therefore how researchers ought to 
approach them and how legislators should intervene in them) is not unprecedented in 
the history of finance.1 Whereas Haldane and May discuss contagion dynamics in 
financial markets on a systemic level, the term ‘contagion’ has historically mostly been 
associated with the concerted action and inter-mental affectation in masses or crowds of 
market actors. The present study explores how collective action and collective emotion 
1 Peta Mitchell (2012) has, for example, shown that even though it was only from around the 1990s 
that the notion of ‘contagion’ found widespread use in economics and finance literature (see, e.g., 
Allen and Gale, 2000; Edwards, 2000; Kolb, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010), the use of the notion in discourses 
on financial markets has a much longer historical trajectory (Mitchell, 2012, pp. 131–132). Along 
similar lines, economist Peter Garber (2000) has criticised the use of notions such as ‘contagion’ (as 
well as the conceptual siblings, ‘irrational exuberance’ and ‘herding’), which, he argues, surface after 
‘particularly volatile periods’ in the financial markets. Garber asserts that these notions are and 
always have been employed in ‘the jargon of economics and finance’ in order to demonstrate the 
supposed irrationality of financial markets (Garber, 2000, pp. 123–126). There is, in other words, a 
long tradition of drawing on an epidemiological vocabulary when analysing financial markets. Apart 
from medical science and biology, other sciences have had a substantial impact on the formation of 
economic science (see, e.g., Mirowski, 1989). 
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in the U.S. financial markets were problematised as contagious crowd phenomena and were 
responded to through the employment of tropes and terminology from crowd 
psychology, a field of sociological and psychological research established in the late 
nineteenth century.  
Objectives and research question 
More specifically, the dissertation undertakes an explorative historical analysis of the 
ways in which crowd phenomena have been problematised and responded to in 
discourses on financial markets in the United States between approximately 1890 and 
1940. Crowds and crowd action in the financial markets have for centuries been 
associated with disorder, instability, irrational social action and impending crisis 
(Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011, pp. 42–43; O’Hara, 2008, pp. 14–15; Poovey, 2008, p. 
218). However, the objective of the dissertation is not to study crowd phenomena in 
markets as inextricably connected to financial crises nor is it to unveil a web of crowd 
dynamics hidden beneath the polished surface of financial markets and thereby assert 
that markets are and always have been influenced by irrational forces. On the contrary, 
the aim is to explore how writers described, sought to explain and proposed solutions to 
market problems that were believed to be somehow related to crowd phenomena. The 
dissertation demonstrates that the way crowd problems were reflected upon and sought 
solved influenced perceptions of financial markets and gave shape to new approaches to 
market analysis and speculation. 
The aim of the dissertation can be narrowed down to the following three overarching 
objectives. First, the dissertation explores different ways in which economists, social 
theorists, financial journalists and authors of books on how to become successful in 
investment and speculation (i.e. how-to books) began to address challenges allegedly 
pertaining to crowd action, the spread of collective sentiment and irrational collective 
behaviour in connection to the financial markets in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. By examining how writers, preoccupied with the processes and 
practices of the markets, dealt with contentious and seemingly contagious developments 
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such as public participation in the financial markets, the mass media dissemination of 
market information and speculative panics, the analysis seeks to unearth how different 
crowd phenomena became objects of concern, controversy and conflict. Second, the 
dissertation studies how writers (from the abovementioned plethora of fields and genres) 
turned to the academic discipline of crowd psychology and the theories subsumed under 
that disciplinary category for theoretical substantiation of their responses to crowd-
related concerns in the markets. In relation to this second objective of the dissertation, 
the analysis attempts to shed light on the socio- or collective-psychological factors 
allegedly influencing financial market processes and practices: These were factors that 
writers described as increasingly important in connection to the functioning and 
malfunctioning of financial markets. Third, the dissertation analyses how the practices of 
‘reading the markets’ (Knight, 2016, 2012) and speculating in them were reconfigured 
and fundamentally altered through the problematisations of crowd phenomena in the 
financial markets. Narrowing the focus to a specific branch of how-to literature from the 
1920s and 1930s, which advocated the so-called contrarian approach, the analysis focuses 
on how practices of speculation and of analysing markets were reconfigured and how 
new rules of conduct were prescribed in the market advice provided in these speculators’ 
manuals. 
In other words, the dissertation examines how crowd phenomena in the financial 
markets were problematised in diverse financial literatures and how these 
problematisations influenced perceptions of the organisation, functioning and practices 
of the financial markets. On that background, the dissertation poses the following 
research question:  
 
How did different crowd phenomena emerge as problems in the U.S. financial markets from 1890 to 
1940, and how and with what means were these market problems responded to? 
 
The research question is explored through an in-depth study of practitioners-oriented, 
academic and popular accounts of financial markets from the given historical period. 
(Later in this chapter, I outline and elaborate on the selection of the textual empirical 
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material analysed in the dissertation.) When I say that the dissertation examines ‘crowd 
phenomena’ I am specifically referring to various physical and psychological phenomena 
involving a collective or a mass of market actors. An example of a crowd phenomenon 
in the financial markets could be the outbreak of a panic among traders densely packed 
on the trading floor of an exchange. It could also be a pure psychological phenomenon 
such as the assumed impact of public opinion on the fluctuations of prices in the 
markets or (somewhat related) it could be collective emotions allegedly shared by and 
affecting the judgement of investors and speculators. However, most of the crowd 
phenomena that are analysed in the dissertation are presented, in the examined 
literatures, as having a physical dimension (e.g. the seemingly frenzied interactions of 
traders during a panic on an exchange’s trading floor) and a psychological dimension 
(e.g. the transmission of emotion, ideas, information and misinformation among the 
traders on the trading floor that, according to some accounts, amplified the panicked 
behaviour). These two dimensions are often perceived as inextricably connected in the 
analysed crowd phenomenon in the markets.  
By studying how crowd phenomena were problematised and responded to, the 
dissertation is shedding light on ways in which the processes, procedures and practices 
of the financial markets were critically assessed and, in some cases, reconfigured during 
the given historical period. Thus, the dissertation claims that in order to provide a 
thorough historical account of how financial markets were perceived in the late 
nineteenth century and the first four decades of the twentieth, it is necessary to consider 
the great influence that different crowd phenomena had on academic, practical and 
popular discourses on markets. From a methodological point of view, the historical 
analysis undertaken in this dissertation is a so-called historical problematisation analysis 
inspired by and reconstructed on the basis of Michel Foucault’s reflections on the notion 
of ‘problematisation’ and on the analysis of processes of problematisations. In the 
following part of the chapter, I will elaborate on Foucault’s notion of ‘problematisation’ 
and sketch out what it entails to carry out, in this dissertation’s case, a historical 
exploration of problematisations of crowd phenomena in the financial markets.   
17 
 
A history of problematisations 
During one out of a series of lectures devoted to the Greek notion parrhesia (meaning 
‘frankness in speaking the truth’) held at the University of California, Berkeley, in the fall 
of 1983, Foucault revealed to his audience that what he had tried to do in most of his 
work, including the ongoing seminar series, was to analyse processes of 
problematisation, i.e. ‘how and why certain things (behaviour, phenomena, processes) 
became a problem’ (Foucault, 2001 [1983], p. 171, italics in the original). A historical 
analysis of problematisations was, Foucault argued, concerned with ‘the way people 
begin to take care of something, of the way they become anxious about this or that’ 
(Foucault, 2001, p. 74). In other words, it is an analysis of how something reveals itself 
as a problem and how people start to reflect upon and possibly respond to the problem 
in question. In hindsight, Foucault argued that the notion of problematisation seemed to 
have given him ‘a better perspective on the way [he] worked’ (Foucault, 1992 [1984], p. 
11). In a 1984 interview with the classical philologist André Berten, Foucault argued that 
he had pursued a ‘history of problematization’, which was, he explained in rather poetic 
phrases, a history that examined the following:  
 
how, within human practices, there is a moment when, in one sense, what is obvious 
becomes muddied, the lights go out, evening comes, and people begin to perceive 
that they are acting blindly and that, as a result, a new light is necessary. A new light is 
necessary, a new lighting, and new rules of behaviour. And here a new object appears: 
an object that appears as a problem. (Foucault, 2014 [1984], pp. 244–245)2 
 
The problematisation process detailed in the quote can be divided into three ‘moments’: 
(1) a practical tension, i.e. the becoming muddied of that which was previously seen as 
obvious; (2) a reflection upon or discussion of this particular tension, i.e. the way in 
which the truth of the matter at hand is brought to question; (3) responses that provide 
2 In his Berkeley lectures, Foucault described the process of problematisation in a similar yet slightly 
less poeticised way, as ‘the way an unproblematic field of experience, or a set of practices, which 
were accepted without question, which were familiar and “silent”, out of discussion, becomes a 
problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously 
silent behavior, habits, practices, and institutions’ (Foucault, 2001, p. 74). 
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insight into the specific problem and suggestions on how to deal with it (Schwartz, 1998, 
p. 21). Thus, a process of problematisation is one through which some form of human 
behaviour, a set of practices or certain phenomena at a given moment become objects of 
reflection, concern and contestation and to which specific ways of responding to the 
problem are suggested.  
Following Foucault’s understanding of the analysis of problematisations, the 
historical analysis carried out in this dissertation should not be mistaken for an 
examination of a general and static problem of the crowd in the U.S. financial markets. 
What is pursued in the present study is rather an analysis of how certain forms of 
collective behaviour and types of market practices were, in certain historical situations 
and contexts, problematised and responded to by market observers and practitioners. To 
put it in problematisation-analytic wording, the dissertation examines how certain crowd 
phenomena in the markets became ‘objects of concern’ for writers occupied with the 
business conducted in the U.S. financial markets during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century and in the first four decades of the twentieth century (Foucault, 1992 [1984], pp. 
23–24). As such, it is an analysis of ‘forms’ of problematisations of crowd phenomena in 
financial markets. 
Though Foucault’s late work encompassed several passages in which he reflects upon 
the notion of problematisation and the writing of the history of problematisations, he 
never made a systematic outline of precisely what an analysis of problematisations 
entailed.3 The closest Foucault came to such an outline is the introduction to The History 
of Sexuality II: The Use of Pleasure (1992 [1984]) in which he made clear that the focus of 
his study was ‘forms of problematization’ of sexual behaviour in Antiquity (pp. 10–13, 
23–24). The somewhat fragmentary nature of his discussions of the notion of 
problematisation and the lack of a more programmatic account of how 
3 Foucault reflected upon and discussed the notion of problematisation and his pursuit of a history 
of problematisations in the following texts: ‘Problematics’ (1996a [1983], p. 418, pp. 420–422); 
Fearless Speech (2001 [1983], pp. 71–74, 169–173); ‘Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations: An 
Interview’ (1991 [1984], pp. 384–390); ‘Interview with André Berten’ (2014 [1984], pp. 244–246); 
The History of Sexuality II: The Use of Pleasure (1992 [1984], pp. 11–13, 23–24); ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’ (1984, p. 49); ‘The Concern for Truth’ (1996b [1984], pp. 456–457).   
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problematisations should be studied is arguably part of the reason why the approach has, 
compared to other analytic notions from Foucault’s oeuvre such as genealogy and 
archaeology, only attracted moderate scholarly attention. In the few but insightful studies 
that explicitly commit to the historical problematisation analysis, the authors stress that 
their analytic approaches are ‘reconstructed’ or ‘distilled’ from Foucault’s work in the 
1980s (see Borch, 2012, 2015; R. Johnsen, 2009; Lopdrup-Hjorth, 2013).4 Apart from 
the studies that actually undertake a historical problematisation analysis, Foucault’s 
elaborations on problematisations and his approach to the study of them have not gone 
completely unnoticed in philosophy and social theory (see Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011; 
Bacchi, 2012; Barnett, 2015; Burchell, 1993; Castel, 1994; Deacon, 2000; Frederiksen, 
Lomborg and Beedholm, 2015; Hodges, 2002; Koopman, 2011; Lemke, 2011; Lopdrup-
Hjorth, 2013, 2015; T. May, 2014; Osborne, 2003; Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer and 
Thanning, 2016; Schwartz, 1998).  
One confusing aspect among some scholars is whether the notion of 
‘problematisation’ should be understood as the object of analysis or as an analytical 
process through which something is problematised – or perhaps even both. In an effort 
to clarify what Foucault actually meant when he talked about problematisations, 
Gudmand-Høyer (2009) argues that many of the studies that discuss Foucault’s notion 
of problematisation tend to ‘misconstrue the problematization and take it to account for 
what is acted out through the analytical process’ (pp. 4–5, italics in the original).5 Instead 
of an analytical process, a problematisation is, Gudmand-Høyer adds, the object of 
4 It should be noted that the cited studies that undertake the historical problematisation analysis are 
all, to some extent, influenced by Marius Gudmand-Høyer’s painstakingly matriculate 
reconstruction of Foucault’s historical problematisation analysis (see Gudmand-Høyer, 2009, 2013). 
The same counts for the present study. 
5 Thomas Lemke (2011), for instance, argues that ‘problematization’ is both an object of analysis 
and a practice of self-transgression by which a person problematises her or his experiences ‘in order 
to move beyond the limits they impose’. In the second understanding of the term, a 
problematisation is thus, Lemke notes, ‘no longer the object, but rather the objective of the critical 
investigation’ (Lemke, 2011, p. 32). Roger Deacon (2000) ascribes the same ambiguous double 
meaning to the notion of problematisation which, he argues, ‘refers both to the way in which 
specific historical practices give rise to or condition the emergence of objects of analysis, […] as 
well as to the ways in which genealogists are able to transform a “given” into a question and, in so 
doing, require the rethinking of politics, philosophy, and ethics’ (p. 140).  
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analysis, and the analysis of this object is one that ‘operates essentially by means of 
historical exploration given that problematizations themselves consists of historical 
processes’ (Gudmand-Høyer, 2009, p. 5). In the present analysis of problematisations of 
crowd phenomena in financial markets, I subscribe to the abovementioned 
understanding of a problematisation as the object of an exploratory historical analysis 
and refrain from entering into any form of self-transgressional practices of critique such 
as those Lemke (2011) and Deacon (2000) suggest that Foucault was also referring to 
when he discussed problematisations. This obviously does not mean that an analysis of 
problematisations, including the one undertaken in the present study, is not concerned 
with ‘practices of the self’ (Foucault, 1992, p. 13). The practices of the self in question 
are, however, the ones that pertain to the specific ‘field of experience’ that is being 
explored and not those of the examiner, i.e. the researcher (Burchell, 1993, p. 277). 
Instead of focussing on the alleged ambiguities of the notion of problematisation, I 
perceive and conduct the problematisation analysis as a critical history of thought that 
seeks to explore ‘how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed; but 
also how these different solutions result from a specific form of problematization’ 
(Foucault, 1996a [1983], p. 422). Another dimension central to the present analysis is 
therefore the configuration of responses to certain problems allegedly connected to 
crowd behaviour in markets. How were the responses to crowd-related problems in the 
markets formulated and by whom, and what effects, if any, did they have on market 
practices? It is thus a study of the relation between processes of problematisation and 
that which is being problematised as well as the attempts (responses) made to address 
the problems. 
A study of problems and responses 
Exploring problematisations of crowd phenomena in financial markets means inquiring 
into how and why crowd phenomena appeared as problems or sets of problems to 
various observers and stakeholders. However, the way something emerges as a problem 
is only one aspect of the process of problematisation. Another indispensable moment is 
the way particular problems are being addressed and responded to. Responses or 
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proposed ‘practical solutions’ are, according to Foucault, directed towards something 
that has been problematised – i.e. something (behaviour, phenomenon, process) that has 
been identified as a problem by and for someone (Foucault, 1996a, p. 421). Though 
there is a relation between the thing that has been problematised and the efforts made to 
try to deal with the problem, the relation between problem and response is not causal. A 
response is, according to Foucault, ‘original, specific and singular’ and it is made by 
‘definite individuals’ to a particular set of difficulties or challenges occurring in a certain 
situation or context (Foucault, 1996a, p. 421; 2001, pp. 172–173). An important aspect 
of a problematisation analysis is to explore the various responses made to a specific set 
of difficulties in order to attain a better understanding of how the particular difficulties 
were problematic to different people in a variety of ways (Foucault, 1991 [1984], p. 389).   
Take, as an example of the asymmetric (non-causal) relationship between the thing 
being problematised and the variety of responses, the problem of public participation in 
financial markets (a problem I analyse in Chapter 3). In short, public participation 
became a heated issue among financial writers in the late nineteenth century and in the 
beginning of the twentieth century when an increasing number of people from the 
American middle-class began to take an interest and actively take part in the business 
conducted in the stock and commodity exchanges. The increased attention and gradual 
increase in public participation raised concerns as to whether the markets could and 
should allow what many writers described as a class of amateurs to partake in a business 
that had been more or less exclusively for rather affluent professionals. Additionally, the 
various possible consequences of public participation were perceived as threats to the 
functioning, status and reputation of the U.S. markets. Many different responses were 
made to alleviate or completely prevent the alleged problem of public participation and 
the problematic consequences that several observers thought it could potentially 
engender. Some writers suggested that the public should be kept out of the markets, 
while others proposed that the speculating public should be taught how to conduct 
themselves as market actors (which, they believed, would mitigate the risk of, e.g., 
irrational collective behaviour in the markets). The responses to the problem of public 
participation thus varied markedly, and some responses were, in fact, each other’s 
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diametrical opposites. (Some, for example, saw regulation as the solution, while others 
pleaded for deregulation.) The point here is that the responses given were original, 
singular and from definitive individuals or groups of individuals who had specific 
affiliations and opinions that were, to some extent, reflected in their proposed problem 
responses. By analysing the responses to a specific problem such as public participation 
in financial markets, it is therefore possible to gain better understanding of how certain 
actors in or associated with the markets perceived the problem and furthermore how 
their specific responses reflected a more general normative perception of what the 
financial markets ought to be.6 
 
When Foucault talks about the history of problematisations as the analysis of how 
something became a problem to someone through a process of problematisation, it gives 
rise to a question about the status of the ‘real’ – of reality – and whether processes of 
problematisation are in fact social constructs. Specifically relating to the questions of 
reality and construction, Foucault’s approach has encountered criticism from historians 
who claim that he was simply ‘fetishizing a culture’s representations of the world’ and tended to 
forget the world itself (Osborne, 2003, p. 11, italics in the original; see also Castel, 1994). 
Defending Foucault’s approach against this type of criticism, Thomas Osborne (2003) 
has stressed that Foucault was analysing the way behaviours, processes and phenomena 
had been rendered problematic and therefore not simply depicting representations of 
attitudes and mentalities (p. 11). Hence, Foucault was not attempting to write ‘real 
history’; however, that did not mean that he neglected the ‘real’. He was deeply 
concerned with the ‘real’ effects that the programmes or theoretical schematisations he 
6 As Gudmand-Høyer (2009) has argued, there is always ‘embedded normativity’, or ‘imperative 
discourse’ as Foucault called it, in processes of problematisation that informs the specific responses 
to given problems (Foucault, 2009, p. 3; Gudmand-Høyer, 2009, p. 7). The embedded normative 
perspectives were, I will argue, thinly veiled in the heated debates on public participation that 
unfolded during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first couple of decades of the 
twentieth century (see Chapter 3).  
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studied – one of the most famous being Bentham’s Panopticon – actually had on 
individual behaviour, the formation of institutions, etc. (see Borch, 2015b, pp. 7–8).7  
Although Foucault notes that ‘a problematization is always a kind of creation’, he 
stresses that studying the problematisation of something is not a ‘way of denying the 
reality’ of a particular phenomenon and adds that ‘[t]he problematization is an “answer” 
to a concrete situation which is real’ (Foucault, 2001, pp. 171–172). Thus, 
problematisation addresses real conditions, real behaviours, real practices, etc. The 
process of problematisation relates thought to reality, in the simple sense that it is 
difficulties connected to concrete situations that become objects of reflection, debate 
and contestation. It is in this relation between reality and thinking that the process of 
problematisation becomes concerned with truth and falsity at a particular moment in 
history. Foucault describes this as the way something becomes an object of thought: 
 
Problematization doesn’t mean the representation of a pre-existent object, nor the 
creation through discourse of an object that doesn’t exist. It’s the set of discursive or 
nondiscursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and 
false, and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether under the form of moral 
reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.). (Foucault, 1996b, pp. 456–
457) 
 
As something enters into the play of true and false, as Foucault puts it, it becomes an 
object of reflection, debate and contestation. It evokes a variety of responses that 
propose different ways to deal with this contentious object of thought. The 
problematisation of something and the responses made in order to somehow deal with 
7 Besides emphasising that he was not concerned with ‘real’ history, in the classical understanding of 
the term, Foucault also stressed that his aim was not to pursue ‘a critical history which has as its aim 
to demonstrate that behind this so-called knowledge there is only mythology, or perhaps nothing at 
all’ (Foucault, 1996a, p. 418). He further noted that the history of problematisations is not a history 
of ideas or concepts. A history of ideas involves, he expounded, ‘the analysis of a notion from its 
birth, through its development, and in the setting of other ideas which constitute its context’ 
(Foucault, 2001, p. 74). A historical analysis of the concept of ‘the crowd’ in the context of financial 
markets would therefore be a different analysis than an analysis of problematisations of crowd 
phenomena in the markets, which does not have the concept as its object of inquiry but instead the 
problematisation of a particular historic phenomenon. It is in this sense that a problematisation 
analysis differs from the history of concepts (see, e.g., Koselleck, 2002).  
24 
 
                                                   
the problem in question affects practices. When, for example, public participation in 
financial markets was being problematised and diverse solutions were proposed 
(advocating regulation, deregulation, heightened individual capital requirements, public 
enlightenment, etc.), it had direct and indirect influences on institutional practices in the 
stock and commodity exchanges and on (academic, popular and practical) perceptions of 
markets. The problematisation of public participation, to adhere to that example, 
arguably informed and gave shape to perceptions of as well as approaches to market 
analysis and speculation in the U.S. financial markets during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  
The performative dimension in processes of problematisation 
In an interview conducted in November 1983, Foucault argued that a problematisation 
‘conforms to the objectives which it presupposes’ (Foucault, 1996a, p. 418). To think 
that problematisations and responses create effects that influence real practices and that 
the problematisation conforms to its own presuppositions is an idea that is quite similar 
to the assumption that theories or models have performative effects on the context in 
which they are employed.8 The performativity perspective has become tremendously 
popular among contributors to the Social Studies of Finance (SFF) literature, especially 
due to the influential work of sociologists Michel Callon and Donald MacKenzie (see 
Callon, 1998, 2007; Callon and Muniesa, 2005; MacKenzie, 2003, 2004; 2006; 
MacKenzie, 2008; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; Muniesa, Millo and Callon, 2007). 
According to Callon (1998), the idea of the performativity of economics rests on the 
assertion that ‘economics, in the broad sense of the term, performs, shapes and formats 
the economy, rather than observing how it functions’ (Callon, 1998, p. 2). Along similar 
lines, MacKenzie (2008) notes that performativity occurs when the academic discipline 
of economics does not ‘stand outside the economy’, but is rather becoming an ‘intrinsic 
8 As Borch (2015) has noted, Foucault’s emphasis on the prescriptive dimension pertaining to the 
objects he analysed and the examples he used is aligned with the performativity perspective, in the 
sense that the emphasis is on the way in which something gives shape to and evokes certain 
practices and modes of thinking about a particular phenomenon (pp. 7–8).     
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part of economic processes’ (p. 16). In its strongest expression, performativity occurs 
when ‘[p]ractical use of an aspect of economics makes economic processes more like 
their depiction by economics’ (MacKenzie, 2008, p. 17, 19).  
The central difference between the analysis of problematisations and that of the 
performativity of economics is that the latter has ‘the calculative tools’ (Callon, 1998) – 
the models, equations, technical apparatuses, etc. – as its objects of inquiry, whereas the 
former has a given problematisation of something as its object of analysis. From a 
performativity perspective, it is the calculative tools and their effects on processes, 
practices and procedures, in the given context in which they are brought to use, that are 
important to examine. A problematisation analysis is, on the other hand, concerned with 
the relation between the process of problematisation and that which is problematised as 
well as the responses to the problem. In other words, the analysis of processes of 
performativity is focused on the way a certain material configuration (tool, model, 
apparatus, etc.) affects processes in a certain context, whereas the analysis of processes 
of problematisation is predominantly occupied with the way certain challenges or 
difficulties evoke reflection and responses. Thus, identifying effects and transformations 
of practices, procedures and processes is the main objective of a performativity analysis. 
An analysis of problematisations does not carry the same burden of proof pertaining to 
the effects of a particular model or apparatus, since the emphasis is simply on something 
else, namely the way a phenomenon is rendered problematic and sought dealt with.   
The performativity perspective as advanced in the SSF literature has been criticised in 
various ways but in particular for arguably having too narrow of a focus on a specific 
model, technology or calculative tool to be able to adequately account for the broader 
sociological and political implications of a particular performativity process.9 Along 
9 Performativity studies in the SSF literature have been met with criticism from various angles: 
Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2007) have criticised the performativity perspective for being blinded by 
its fascination with economic engineering; Felin and Foss (2009) have argued that the 
performativity perspective, by rendering the content of theories ‘arbitrary ex ante’, has made it 
impossible to assess the truth or falsity of other theories (p. 676); Riles (2010) has problematised the 
performativity perspective’s ‘narrow focus on trading practices and technologies’ and asked whether 
‘SSF [Social Studies of Finance] is too tethered to its roots in the sociology of science to serve as an 
overarching framework for understanding markets in the first place’ (pp. 795–796). 
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somewhat similar critical lines, Marion Fourcade (2007) suggests, in an attempt to point 
at future directions for the sociology of markets, that the ‘performative analysis in the 
sociology of markets’ could be inscribed in a broader historical context that would 
enable it to take into account ‘the modern form of social regulation, whereby persons 
and entities (e.g. organizations, nation-states) are governed “at a distance,” by calculable 
agencies that rate, rank, divide them up, and recombine them’ (Fourcade, 2007, p. 1026). 
In the context of such an analysis, the important question is not so much how certain 
performative technologies function but rather, as Fourcade notes, questions such as the 
following:  
 
What kinds of meanings, sentiments, moral predicaments, and social bonds are these 
performative technologies intertwined with? How do economic artifacts connect to 
human relations – how do they change them, how are they changed by them, and 
what do they say about them? What kind of political representations are the discourse 
and social technologies of the market entangled with? (Fourcade, 2007, p. 1027)   
 
Fourcade points to MacKenzie’s ‘rich descriptions’ and historical contextualisation of his 
analyses as examples of ‘exactly where the [performativity] theory needs to be going’ 
(Fourcade, 2007, p. 1027).10 Hence, Fourcade argues for a broader, ‘neo-Foucauldian’ 
approach to the study of performativity in the social studies of markets, which would 
more thoroughly explore the socio-economic and political contexts in which these 
alleged performativity processes are situated.11 
10 MacKenzie is not the only one in SSF who has made ‘rich’ historical descriptions in analyses of 
the performativity of particular economic models or market devices. Preda (2006) has, for example, 
examined the stock ticker as a technology or calculative device that intervened in, i.e. had 
performativity effects on, market transactions and the dissemination of price quotations from the 
exchanges. Another example of a historical study employing performativity theory is Knight’s 
(2012) study of representations of the market in American magazine literature in the late nineteenth 
century. In his study, Knight examines the American magazine Town Topics as a ‘performative 
technology’ that arguably contributed to the ‘normalization’ as well as the ‘questioning’ of the 
market as an ‘autonomous, coherent and depersonalized realm’ (Knight, 2012, p. 1059). 
11 In relation to this, it is worth noting that there are scholars who have managed to combine a 
Foucauldian approach (although not the analysis of problematisation as such) with performativity 
theory and thereby have proven that it is not a matter of mutual exclusion. For example, in her 
book Virtue, Fortune and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance (2005), Marieke De Goede has convincingly 
shown that it is possible to merge a Foucault-inspired genealogical analysis with a study of 
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This brief discussion of performativity theory and the problematisation analysis 
should not be read as a dismissal of the performativity literature in SSF (which is, as an 
aside, more diverse than I have presented it here). Though there clearly are differences 
between analysing problematisations and adopting the performativity perspective, there 
seems to be a point where the two approaches intersect. This intersection point is, I will 
argue, a shared focus on the alterations of, in this case, market practices brought about 
or provoked by some sort of market intervention, be it regulatory, a technological 
improvement, the an introduction of a calculative tool, etc. Both approaches analyse 
how practices and perceptions are altered and moulded by something, such as a 
problematisation (e.g. a market difficulty of sorts) or a device (e.g. an economic model). 
As such, a problematisation analysis does not focus on a particular calculative tool (the 
material level) in order to detect how and to what extent it is performative and what the 
sociological and economic consequences of the performativity effects might be. Rather, 
a problematisation analysis, as already mentioned, is concerned with the way difficulties 
become objects of thought.  
 
Before I turn to a discussion of the contributions of the study, I will briefly recapitulate 
on the methodological approach of the dissertation. In exploring forms of 
problematisations of crowd phenomena in markets, the analysis draws attention to the 
way market difficulties and challenges, i.e. problems, have been problematised by various 
performative practices. Drawing on Judith Butler’s and J. L. Austin’s notion of performativity 
instead of the technology- and model-centric performativity theory dominating the SSF literature, 
De Goede perceives finance as ‘a discursive domain made possible through performative practices’. 
‘Understanding finance as a performative practice suggests’, she adds, ‘that processes of knowledge 
and interpretation do not exist in addition to, or of secondary importance to, “real” material 
financial structures, but are precisely the way in which “finance” materializes’ (De Goede, 2005, p. 7, 
italics in the original). By perceiving finance as ‘rendered possible through performative practices’, 
De Goede shifts the emphasis away from images of finance as a ‘rational and coherent whole’ and 
unto ‘the weaknesses, contingencies, and contradictions’, which are exactly what is attended to in a 
genealogy (De Goede, 2005, p. 13, 19). Like De Goede, Paul Langley (2008) has combined the 
performativity perspective with, in Langley’s case, a Foucault-inspired analysis of power relations. 
What Langley does more specifically is to draw on a conception of financial networks grounded in 
actor-network-theory (and in performativity theory), while using Foucault’s notion of power in 
order to ‘make explicit the power relations and politics at play as market networks are constituted 
through calculation and calculative tools’ (Langley, 2008, p. 27, pp. 22–35).  
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financial writers. To this end, the study examines the variety of proposed practical 
solutions, i.e. responses, to certain crowd-related problems in the markets. Concomitant 
with the analysis of responses, the study investigates the means employed in the attempts 
to identify and propose the best possible solutions to the given problem at hand and the 
specific contexts in which the problems have arisen and in which the responses have been 
made. The examination of how crowd phenomena became financial market problems is 
therefore contingent on the analysis of specific responses to the difficulty or set of 
difficulties in question, the means employed in the problematisation process and the 
contexts in which these processes took place.  
Contribution: Studies of markets and of crowds 
The dissertation is situated where studies of the history of financial markets and studies 
of (the history of) crowds coincide. In studying problematisations of crowd phenomena 
in the financial markets and analysing them, primarily, through practical texts prescribing 
best practices and rules of conduct (i.e. how-to books), the contribution of this 
dissertation is its novel perspective on the study of both the history of the U.S. financial 
markets as well as the history of crowds. The novelty of the perspective lies in the way 
the study takes crowd phenomena in the markets seriously by exploring the central role 
such phenomena had in discussions of what the financial markets were, what they ought 
to be and what they risked becoming insofar as these alleged crowd-problems were not 
addressed in a proper way. The main contribution of the dissertation is that it shows that 
discussions of crowd phenomena greatly influenced the ways in which ideas, 
assumptions, perceptions and approaches to the financial markets were formed. Hence, 
it claims that it is impossible to give a thorough account of the U.S. financial markets, in 
the given historical period, without taking crowd phenomena into account. With respect 
to specific research literatures, the dissertation contributes (as I shall elaborate on below) 
to (a) the limited number of studies of crowds in financial markets; (b) studies of the 
cultural history of financial markets; (c) studies of the history of crowds, crowd 
phenomena and crowd psychology. 
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First, the study is influenced by but also contributes to the existing though limited 
research literature on crowds in financial markets. Most historical studies of crowds in 
financial markets focus on the relationship between crowd behaviour and panics and 
crises (see Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011; Preda, 2009, ch. 8; Zimmerman, 2006). The 
present dissertation is not an analysis of crowds and market panics, although panics and 
crises do receive significant attention because financial writers often perceived crowd 
behaviour as a cause or an effect of such market phenomena. David A. Zimmerman’s 
Panic! Market, Crisis & Crowds in American Fiction (2006) is an example of a study that 
explores popular perceptions of the U.S. financial markets with a specific focus on the 
relation between crowds and panics. Zimmerman’s exploration of the markets is carried 
out through a close reading of American fiction from the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries. As a central part of his study, Zimmerman examines how the 
terminology and central ideas from the then-budding research field of crowd psychology 
(as well as psychic research and psychology) came to play a prominent role in fiction 
writers’ accounts of markets in the given period of U.S. financial market history. Urs 
Stäheli is another scholar who has explored crowds in markets through popular 
discourses on speculation in his book Spectacular Speculation: Thrills, the Economy, and 
Popular Discourse (2013). In his matriculate study Stäheli addresses the incipience of the 
concept of the crowd in the popular discourse on speculation in financial markets. He 
demonstrates how crowd theories were debated in the market context and how ideas 
and tropes from such theories were drawn upon in discussions of the regulation of 
markets and in the conceptualisation of investment strategies (Stäheli, 2013). When 
examining how the circulation of ideas from crowd theory in the popular discourse 
shaped investment strategies, Stäheli is particularly attentive to certain ‘techniques of the 
self’, which were formulated by members of ‘the contrarian school of investment’ as 
remedies against the alleged contagiousness of ‘the market crowd’ (Stäheli, 2013, ch. 5). 
(I will return to Stäheli’s work in Chapter 5, when examining the emergence of the 
contrarian market philosophies.)  
With respect to the choice of the empirical material and object of analysis, this 
dissertation’s analysis coincides, to certain degrees, with the work of Zimmerman (2006), 
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Stäheli (2013, see also 2006) and Preda (2009). However, unlike Stäheli’s study, the 
present study is not a history of popular representations of crowds or crowd semantics 
in financial markets. Rather, it is a historical analysis of the processes by which crowd 
phenomena became objects of concern to financial writers and other observers of 
financial markets. In other words, it is a study of how these problematisations of crowd 
phenomena in the markets have altered perceptions of and approaches to certain market 
practices in the U.S. financial markets. Contrary to Zimmerman’s analysis of crowds in 
American fiction, the present study is not merely a study of crowds in the markets 
understood as a panic phenomenon. Concerns about crowds and crowd behaviour in 
markets were, I argue, expressed in other and broader contexts than those of panics and 
crises. Additionally, the present study explores markets through a more diverse body of 
textual material than the one Zimmerman examines. Although Zimmerman focuses on 
what he terms ‘panic novels’, it is worth noticing that he does draw on other texts, 
including magazine and journal articles and handbook literature (Zimmerman, 2006, p. 
1). The panic novel is, nevertheless, the primary lens through which he observes the 
markets. 
Second, apart from being a historical study of crowd phenomena in financial markets, 
the present study is an examination of a specific period in the history of the U.S. 
financial markets. As an inarguably unorthodox history of financial markets, the 
dissertation is situated at the fringes of broader and arguably more conventional research 
literature on the cultural history of financial markets (see, e.g., Cowing, 1965; Fraser, 
2005; Knight, 2016). One of the primary broad historical developments examined in the 
present dissertation is, as already mentioned, the popularisation of and public 
participation in financial markets, which made concerns about problems associated with 
mass participation in markets and the mass dissemination of market information in the 
media highly pertinent to financial writers. Several studies have examined the 
popularisation of speculation and investment in financial markets from different foci 
such as the issuing of war bonds during WWI (Ott, 2011), the emergence of bucket shops 
(Fabian, 1999; Hochfelder, 2006), the introduction of the stock ticker and the proliferation 
of its use (Hochfelder, 2006; Knight, 2013; Preda, 2006; Stäheli, 2003), the ambiguous 
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relationship between speculation and gambling (Banner, 2017; Brenner and Brenner, 1990), 
the popular financial press and magazine literature (Knight, 2012, 2016) and speculative 
(in)competence among amateur market actors (Cowing, 1958). All of these studies provide 
information about how speculation and investment in financial markets were subjected 
to and influenced by mass participation, mass mediation and public conversation. Other 
studies have examined cultural and popular cultural representations of finance and 
financial markets in broader genealogical analyses of how modern finance have been 
shaped in various ways during different epochs in an interplay between the material (the 
concrete structures, practices and procedures of finance), cultural (the vernacular, public 
opinions, etc.) and academic (the abstract, theoretical) aspects of finance (see De Goede, 
2005; Vogl, 2015). The present study contributes to the literature on the popularisation 
of finance and public participation in financial markets in the late nineteenth century and 
in the first decades of the twentieth century by exploring how these contentious 
developments were related to and expressed in the problematisations of crowd 
phenomena. 
Third, the present study is also informed by literature on the history of crowd 
psychology. There exist several thorough and engulfing historical studies of the 
emergence and proliferation of the academic field of crowd psychology (see Barrows, 
1981; Borch, 2012; McClelland, 2010 [1989]; Moscovici, 1985; Nye, 1975; van Ginneken, 
2006 [1992]). Additionally, other scholars have examined the history of crowds and 
crowd psychology in connection to broader historical developments such as ideas about 
democracy in interwar Austria and Germany (Jonsson, 2013); ideas about democracy in 
the United States (Frezza, 2007); in connection to American social thought (Leach, 1986, 
1992); the influx of French sociological and socio-psychological theory in the U.S. 
academic milieu in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Leys, 1994); the role 
of crowd psychology in connection to the problem of personality in individual 
psychology (Blackman, 2012, ch. 2); crowd psychology in the context of the making of 
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the modern subject (Lawtoo, 2013).12 The present study contributes to the research 
literature on crowds and crowd psychology in two ways: First, it provides a different 
perspective – the market perspective – on the ‘migration’ of French and Italian crowd 
theories to the U.S. academic milieu and social thought more broadly (see Frezza, 2007; 
Leach, 1986, 1992; Leys, 1994). A part of the present study focuses on how crowd 
theory was introduced into academic, practitioners-oriented and popular discourses on 
financial markets from the very beginning of the twentieth century onwards. Examining 
the employments of ideas from crowd theory in financial writing draws attention to an 
instrumental and often also strategic use of crowd theory in practice. Additionally and 
related, the analysis elucidates that crowd theory was used for a prescriptive purpose, i.e. 
to delineate what market actors should or should not do in situations where markets 
were dominated by crowd psychology. Second, in exploring how financial markets were 
perceived and analysed in work done by crowd theorists (see Chapter 2), the analysis 
attends to a theme that has not been touched upon in the research literature on late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century crowd psychology. The crowd theorists’ 
application of their own ideas in critical reflections on situations in the financial markets 
discloses a critical stance towards economic rationality and a shift in attention away from 
the individual market actor to the relations between market actors.   
 
Apart from contributions to the aforementioned research literature, the dissertation 
offers a perspective on the use and circulation of extra-economic terminology and tropes 
in discourses in investment and speculation in financial markets.13 As part of the 
examination of the problematisations of crowd phenomena in the financial markets, the 
dissertation explores how crowd theory was employed in various types of literature that 
were in one way or the other concerned with markets. The dissertation thus provides a 
12 Furthermore, there are some studies of contemporary phenomena that draw on ideas from crowd 
psychology, including studies of crowds, contagion and imitation in the digital age (Parikka, 2007; 
Sampson, 2012) and crowd psychology and media studies (Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001). 
13 The way economics and finance have historically borrowed heavily from other academic 
disciplines such as mathematics, physics and computer science have been thoroughly examined by 
Philip Mirowski (see Mirowski, 1989, 1991, 2002). 
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perspective on the way in which crowd psychology has informed practical, academic and 
popular views of the financial markets as well as how these crowd psychology-informed 
articulations of certain market phenomena have circulated between different genres of 
financial writing. Hence, the dissertation contributes to a broadening of the 
understanding of what “counts” as market knowledge, of how it has been construed and 
from which sources it originates (cf. De Goede, 2005; Zimmerman, 2006; Preda, 2009; 
Stäheli, 2013; Vogl, 2015).  
Historical delimitation of the study 
Although the fear of unrestrained crowd action has been expressed in writings about 
financial markets for centuries, this dissertation’s analysis is specifically concerned with a 
50-year period in which certain market problems were increasingly being interpreted, 
described and explained as caused by or as the effects of crowd behaviour and crowd 
dynamics.14 The analysis commences in the late nineteenth century (at the end of the so-
14 As early as the late seventeenth century, the Portuguese merchant and poet Joseph De La Vega, in 
his book Confusions de Confusiones (1688), described how trading in the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
was conducted in crowds. The trading often involved, as De La Vega noted, ‘violent gestures’ on 
the part of the speculator, whom he referred to as a ‘toreador’; the practice did all in all involve a 
fair amount of ‘absurdities’, ‘confusion’ and ‘madness’ (De La Vega, 1957 [1688], pp. 10–11). One 
of the most cited works dealing with the theme of crowds in markets or rather crowd behaviour in 
connection to speculative crazes and bubbles is the Scottish journalist Charles MacKay’s Memoirs of 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, I–II, which was first published in 1841. (In 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, I return to a couple of reiterations of MacKay’s accounts of outbursts of 
crowd behaviour during speculative manias.) It was, however, not exclusively in the popular 
discourse that articulations of crowd problems in the markets were found prior to 1890. Another 
example is found in the historian Martha Joanna Reade Nash Lamb’s book Wall Street in History 
(1883). In a historical recollection of the events unfolding during the ‘Black Friday’ panic on 24 
September 1869, Lamb explained how the unruliness of the market propagated to the masses 
gathering in Wall Street. The abstractness of the market panic received a concrete manifestation in 
Lamb’s description of the physical masses gathering in and around the Stock Exchange stirring up 
excitement, which translated into outbursts of violence: ‘In Wall Street masses of men gathered, and 
riots were anticipated. […] The Stock Exchange was suspected of weakness for a time, and throngs 
crowded its corridors, and overhung the stairway for a glimpse of the commotion, but could hear 
only the roar of the biddings. The run upon the banks in the street, the assaults of angry brokers, 
the threats of violence against those who were suspected of treachery, and wild outbreaks of despair 
from such as had been ruined, will never be obliterated from the memory of those who witnessed 
the scenes’ (Lamb, 1883, p. 89). Therefore, collective action presented a threat to the stability and 
order of the markets long before the last decade of the nineteenth century. 
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called Gilded Age), which was a tumultuous period for the U.S. financial markets 
(Fraser, 2005, pp. 98–99). It was a time during which Americans increasingly began to 
take interest in the business conducted in and around the stock and commodity 
exchanges – a popularisation of finance that was propelled by the increasing attention 
given to financial markets in the press, in magazines as well as in fiction (Knight, 2016; 
Zimmerman, 2006). As Steve Fraser eloquently yet somewhat polemically writes, in the 
late nineteenth century, ‘Wall Street had become a zone of frenzied speculation, of 
monomaniacal exaltation and panic: a hypnotic spectacle of moneymaking and money 
losing watched by millions’ (Fraser, 2008, p. 30). The popularisation of and public 
participation in financial markets, gaining momentum in the late nineteenth century, 
made problems associated with mass action, the malleable public sentiment and crowd 
behaviour appear more pertinent to financial writers concerned with investment, 
speculation and the overall wellbeing of the financial markets.  
Another development, which constitutes another reason why the present study 
commences around 1890, was the emergence of the academic field of crowd psychology in 
French and Italian academic milieus during the last decade of the nineteenth century. 
Most crowd theories contemplated during that particular decade suggested that the 
crowd possessed a collective mind that worked in a fundamentally different way than the 
mind of an individual. Crowd behaviour was generally perceived as irrational and often 
described as determined by the processes of imitation, suggestion, sympathy and contagion. 
The most prominent crowd theorists in these formative years of the theoretical field of 
crowd psychology were the Italian criminologist Scipio Sighele, the French sociologist 
and criminologist Gabriel Tarde and the latter’s countryman, the polymath Gustave Le 
Bon (see Borch, 2012; McClelland, 2010; Moscovici, 1985; Nye, 1975).15 The crowd 
15 Le Bon’s book Psychologie des foules (The Crowd: A study of the popular mind), published in 1895, was 
the book that more than any other defined the academic field of crowd psychology. It played on the 
fear of crowds by drawing on examples from the French Revolution, workers’ uprisings and, 
relatedly, the spread of socialism. Crowd problems were, however, not problems of the past, as Le 
Bon made clear in the introduction to the book when stating that ‘[t]he age we are about to enter 
will in truth be the ERA OF CROWDS’ (Le Bon, 1896 [1895], p. xv). It is important to note that 
the academic interest in crowds did not begin with the emergence of crowd psychology in the late 
nineteenth century. In fact, as John S. McClelland (2010) has shown, political philosophy, in 
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theories of the likes of Le Bon, Tarde and Sighele quickly stirred debate among scholars 
outside of France and Italy. In the United States, the crowd-psychological perspective 
was received with some scepticism and apprehension in academic circles. Nevertheless, 
the theories gained a significant amount of attention because of their supposed ability to 
explain social processes connected to the great changes which American society 
underwent at that time (Frezza, 2007; Leach, 1992; Leys, 1994). The emergence of this 
type of crowd theory provided a vocabulary for and a particular way of viewing 
collective action and expressions of collective sentiment that made it possible to describe 
crowd problems pertaining to financial markets. In addition to serving as a descriptive 
tool, crowd theory also provided the theoretical means to explain or at least identify 
probable causes of certain collective dynamics in markets.  
Thus, the analysis commences at a moment in history when the masses – due to the 
increased popularity of and public participation in markets – came to be seen as 
imminent threats to the stability and order of the markets. This coincided with the 
emergence and popularisation of academic studies of the psychology of crowds – 
theories that managed to put into words many of the collective psychological 
characteristics and problems that seemed to cling to the era’s mass phenomena. Crowd 
theory not only described crowd behaviour in different contexts but also explained why 
normally reasonable people could act in the irrational and vile ways, as was often the 
case when brought together in dense crowds. In other words, crowd theory provided 
scientifically based accounts of irrational collective behaviour that could be used to 
explain why, e.g., a speculative panic could erupt on an exchange’s trading floor and why 
the people involved acted the way they did. 
At the other end of the historical delimitation of the study (i.e. 1940), it is the 
decreasing influence of sociological and psychological theories on economics that 
constitute the primary reason why the historical analysis ends around 1940. The turn 
particular, has been concerned with crowds since antiquity. However, the emergence of crowd 
psychology did mark a radical shift not only in the conception of the social but also of the 
individual; furthermore, it shaped sociology and psychology, which were still nascent disciplines in 
the late nineteenth century (Blackman, 2012; Borch, 2012; Leys, 1994).   
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away from rendering social and psychological factors important in the field of economics 
has been touched upon by Nobel Laurate Robert J. Shiller, who has strongly advocated 
that economists ought to take insights from sociology and, in particular, psychology 
seriously (see, e.g., Shiller, 2005). In his seminal article ‘Stock Prices and Social 
Dynamics’ (1984), Shiller controversially claimed that ‘mass psychology may well be the 
dominant cause of movements in the price in the aggregate stock market’ (p. 459). Shiller 
made this bold claim knowing full well that he aimed to revitalise a branch of academic 
research – ‘research on market psychology’ – that had been untouched for several 
decades: 
 
Academic research on market psychology… appears to have more or less died out in 
the 1950s, at about the time the expected-utility revolution in economics was born. 
Those who write about financial markets today are usually very careful to dissociate 
themselves from any suggestion that market psychology might be important, as if 
notions of market psychology have been discredited as unscientific. (Shiller, 1984, p. 
458)16 
 
A transformation process in the American business schools and corresponding research 
communities, which began in the 1950s, propelled the ‘expected-utility revolution in 
economics’ that, according to Shiller, coincided with the disappearance of academic 
research on market psychology. The development has been described as the 
‘scientification’ or the ‘academicization’ of business and finance teaching and research in 
the United States (MacKenzie, 2008, p. 244; Whitley, 1986, p. 172). This development 
16 The disappearance from the realm of academic economics of crowd theory-informed market 
psychology was arguably part of a larger story of the diminishing academic influence of crowd 
theory in general (see Borch, 2012). From its inception but particularly from the 1920s onwards, 
crowd theory was criticised by sociologists and psychologists alike for its apparent lack of scientific 
stringency and rigour (see, e.g., Barnes, 1920). In the opening sentence of his article ‘The Group 
Fallacy in Relation to Social Science’ (1924), the American sociologist Floyd H. Allport stated that 
‘[t]he theory that a crowd possess a mental life resulting purely from aggregation and superadded to 
the mental processes of its members seems to have perished at the hands of progress in social 
science’ (p. 688). In the intersection of economics and sociology, Allport’s colleague and compatriot 
Talcott Parsons, a decade later, argued that using crowd psychology (crowd theory) to explain 
market phenomena such as a bank run entailed a complete repudiation of the ‘rôle of rationality’ in 
economic life (Parsons, 1935, p. 440).  
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was accompanied by a broader ‘mathematicization’ of economics that took place both in 
the academic realm and in the practical world of ‘real’ finance (MacKenzie, 2008, pp. 8–
12). The discipline of financial economics emerged from these developments. After 
WWII, academic studies of finance refrained, for the most part, from resorting to 
“softer” fields such as psychology, social psychology and sociology when searching for 
ways to address challenges and issues in the financial markets and instead leaned towards 
the hard sciences such as math and, later on, computer science (MacKenzie, 2008; 
Mirowski, 2002; Whitley, 1986). The analysis therefore ends when economists’ academic 
interests in market psychology and hence in crowd theory dwindled.   
While the academic interest in market psychology diminished in the middle of the 
twentieth century and, with it, the preoccupation with crowd dynamics in markets, 
authors of practical how-to handbooks continued to emphasise the importance of 
market psychology and of crowd psychology (see, e.g., Neill, 1975; Pring, 1993). 
Additionally, various quasi-scientific approaches to market analysis and speculation 
remained relatively popular in the handbook genre from the middle of the twentieth 
century onwards.17 Therefore, it would have been possible to follow the 
problematisations of crowd phenomena in practical and popular discourses on financial 
markets beyond 1940. However, that would entail a shift away from the joint focus on 
practical, academic and popular accounts of market phenomena to only focussing on 
one strand of financial writing, namely practical literature. Since one of the dissertation’s 
aims is to explore problematisations of crowd phenomena across discourses, meaning 
how crowds at a given moment have been problematised and responded to in various 
genres of writing, I refrain from extending the study any further than 1940.  
To further elaborate on the delimitation of the study and in order to clarify what the 
body of empirical material under scrutiny consists of, the following sections of the 
chapter will provide an overview of the different types of textual empirical material 
17 For example, the contrarian approach to speculation and investment, which was developed in the 
how-to literature in the 1920s and 1930s (I return to this topic in Chapter 5), remained a somewhat 
popular niche among writers of practitioners-oriented financial writing throughout the second half 
of the twentieth century as well as into the twenty-first century (see Cortes, 2011; Dreman, 1998; 
Futia, 2009). 
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analysed in the dissertation. Hence, I briefly discuss the form of knowledge about the 
financial markets that was produced in the practical or so-called how-to genre of 
financial writing.  
Practical texts and other genres of financial writing 
 
The documents I will refer to are for the most part “prescriptive” texts – that is, texts 
whose main object, whatever their form (speech, dialogue, treatise, collection of 
precepts, etc.) is to suggest rules of conduct. […] The domain I will be analyzing is 
made up of texts written for the purpose of offering rules, opinions, and advice on 
how to behave as one should: “practical” texts, which are themselves objects of a 
“practice” in that they were designed to be read, learned, reflected upon, and tested 
out, and they were intended to constitute the eventual framework of everyday 
conduct. These texts thus served as functional devices that would enable individuals 
to question their own conduct, to watch over and give shape to it, and to shape 
themselves as ethical subjects […]. (Foucault, 1992, pp. 12–13) 
 
With these words, Foucault describes the domain of texts through which he examines 
forms of problematisations of sexuality in Antiquity in The History of Sexuality II: The Use 
of Pleasure. The body of texts that constitutes the main part of the empirical material 
analysed in this dissertation, the so-called how-to books, share the conduct- and 
reflection-inducing characteristics of the texts that Foucault categorise as ‘prescriptive’ or 
‘practical’. How-to books are types of texts located in the threshold between the 
stringency of a manual and the self-care and self-moulding impetus of self-help 
literature.18 The how-to genre constitutes a particular form of market knowledge that is 
less preoccupied with describing and explaining how the markets work than with 
explaining how people should act and behave in them. As mentioned the following 
sections of the chapter, I provide an overview of the empirical material analysed in the 
dissertation. I begin by outlining the characteristics of the main source of empirical 
18 Although I refer to the practical texts analysed in the dissertation as ‘how-to books’, I am aware 
that market advice was disseminated in a range of different outlets besides the book format 
including magazine articles, booklets by investment service firms and in market letters. I do draw 
upon these additional textual formats, yet I predominantly examine how-to books. 
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material, i.e. the how-to book, and briefly explain how the texts were identified, selected 
and collected. Thereafter, I describe the additional textual sources of empirical material, 
i.e. other genres of ‘financial writing’, that were analysed in the dissertation.19  
The how-to book: Between a manual and a self-help book 
The genre of texts that is captured by the term ‘how-to’ are, according to Christina 
Garsten and Christopher Grey (1997), texts ‘which aim to provide practical guidance 
towards the achievement of certain goals’ and furthermore texts which offer 
‘prescriptive expertise’ in the form of ‘techniques and programs for creating a coherent 
narrative of the self’ (pp. 216–217). This definition of the how-to genre is almost 
identical to Foucault’s description of practical texts: It highlights the relationship 
between prescriptive expertise and the moulding of the self, i.e. the ambiguous relation 
between the advice provided in the text and the action of the reader. While the genre of 
management how-to or self-help, which is the genre Garsten and Grey examine, has 
attracted a significant amount of scholarly attention, texts offering advice on how to 
succeed as an investor or speculator in the financial markets are more understudied.20  
How-to books and other kinds of financial writing targeting the middle-classes began 
to circulate during the 1840s and became increasingly popular towards the end of the 
19 I subscribe to Mary Poovey’s (2008) broad understanding of ‘financial writing’ which 
encompasses: pricelists and indices; standalone volumes of political economic theory; financial 
journalism in newspapers and in magazines; investment advice in (how-to) books and financial 
newspapers; scientific journals (pp. 30–35). I furthermore have to note that my definition of a how-
to book is rather broad and encompasses handbooks, primers, manuals, brochures, etc. insofar as 
they are prescribing advice and/or rules of conduct.  
20 For critical inquiries of management handbook, how-to and self-help literature, see, e.g., Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2005 [1999]), Thrift (2000) and Johnsen (2015). Though I argue that how-to and 
handbook literature on speculation and investment is an understudied genre of financial writing, a 
range of studies of financial markets exists that draws upon that particular type of empirical data. 
Examples of historical studies drawing on this literature include Preda (2009), Stäheli (2013) and 
Knight (2016). Christian Borch and Ann-Christina Lange (2016) and Charles W. Smith (1999) have 
also referred to how-to literature in their studies of contemporary financial markets. Smith’s book 
Success and Survival on Wall Street: Understanding the mind of the market is a curious hybrid case 
comprising an ethnographic study of securities markets with an entire section of the book providing 
practical advice to individual investors. Smith thus merged a research and a how-to agenda in a 
sociological publication.  
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nineteenth century (Preda, 2009, pp. 88–89). The late-nineteenth-century popularisation 
of how-to texts on investment and speculation coincided with the inception and 
proliferation of the self-help genre in the United States (Woodstock, 2005, 2006). How-
to texts on investment and speculation incorporated the self-transformational and -
disciplining dimensions associated with the self-help genre and combined them with 
more basic knowledge about the markets in the form of price charts, graphs as well as 
explanations of technical terms. How-to books therefore typically consisted of a 
descriptive as well as a prescriptive dimension.  
The “archive” of how-to books that I have pieced together consists of more than 230 
books published between 1890 and 1940. In assembling the archive of how-to books, I 
used a “snowballing” strategy. I first retrieved how-to books that were examined in 
contemporary academic studies of markets (see Arnoldi and Borch, 2007; Borch, 2007; 
Stäheli, 2006, 2013; De Goede, 2005; Knight, 2016). I then collected additional work by 
the books’ authors and examined these books for references to work done by their 
peers.21 One of the how-to book authors whose name appears the most in academic 
studies of the contrarian approach to investment and speculation is Humphrey Bancroft 
Neill (see Arnoldi and Borch, 2007; Borch, 2007; Stäheli, 2006, 2013). In August 2014, I 
visited Neill’s home in Saxtons River, Vermont (which now belongs to his daughter-in-
law Dolapo Adeniji-Neill) and was allowed to search through his private library. While 
there, I also obtained access to personal correspondences and early issues of Neill’s 
market letter Neill Letters of Contrary Opinion which I had not been able to retrieve from 
the library at the University of Vermont.  
21 It has to be noted that applying such a “snowballing” method to searches in this type of literature 
is difficult, since it was not customary for authors of how-to books to use citations or make 
reference lists. However, some authors of how-to books did refer to the work of peers, and some 
even recommended books that they found particularly worthwhile reading. Furthermore, it was not 
uncommon to find advertisements for other how-to books published by the same publisher on the 
final pages or the back covers of the books. Besides browsing through libraries, many of the 
literature searches occurred in digitised online archives such as hathitrust.com, archive.org and 
gutenberg.org. While conducting these literature searches, I came across two massive bibliographies 
of business books – 2400 Business Books and Guide to Business Literature (Morley and Knight, 1920) 
and Bibliography of 2700 business books (Smitley, 1922) – from the 1920s. The bibliographies have 
given me an indication of how many how-to books were written in the late nineteenth and in 
beginning of the twentieth centuries. 
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Although it would be incorrect to say that every how-to book published from the late 
nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century is identical, I will argue that 
there are some general characteristics that can be found in most how-to books from the 
given period. Apart from being prescriptive, and in addition to being objects of a specific 
practice or practices, most of the how-to books examined in the dissertation share some 
common characteristics with regards to purpose, content and the targeted readership. In 
order to illustrate what these common characteristics are, I use the financial writer 
Maurice Cowen’s how-to book Common Sense in Stock Speculation: a treatise on stock 
speculation and investment, including the experiences of successful traders (1922) as an exemplar (see 
Figure 1.1). It almost goes without saying that only retrospectively has it been possible to 
carve out the following general characteristics of the how-to books examined in the 
dissertation. Although it may appear premature to state these considerations prior to the 
actual analysis of the texts, the reason why I nevertheless do so is that it gives an 
impression of the composition and the type of knowledge being disseminated in this 
rather unorthodox genre of financial writing.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Cover page of Maurice Cowen’s Common Sense in Stock Speculation, 1922. 
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Cowen opened Common Sense in Stock Speculation, as authors of how-to books had a 
habit of doing, with an explanation of the purpose of the book. ‘This book is not written 
as a defence of stock speculation,’ Cowen plainly stated, adding that it was instead aimed 
to expose the ‘virtues and faults’ of speculation ‘in order to guide those who intend to 
speculate, through the dark forest of speculative activities and safely past the rocks and 
quicksands [sic] of ignorant, stupid and blind ventures’ (Cowen, 1922, p. 5).22 The book 
was intended for the ‘average speculator’ who was either a complete ‘novice’ to the trade 
or who was not yet a professional speculator (Cowen, 1922, p. 23, 27). Since professional 
speculators and investors made a living off their investments, they were generally not 
perceived of as being in need of guidance and basic advice on how to prevent losses and 
increase the possibility of profits. It was therefore the small investors and speculators 
and not experts who were thought of as the beneficiaries of the advice disseminated in 
the how-to literature.23   
Another characteristic of the how-to books examined in the dissertation lies in the 
kinds of advice they offered. Much of the advice was supposed to help readers avoid the 
many pitfalls of speculation. One of the simple pieces of advice Cowen offered was that 
people ought to abstain from speculating on margin (a purchase where only a percentage 
of the asset price is paid by the purchaser and the rest is covered by the broker in the 
form of a loan), since, according to Cowen’s estimates, approximately 98% of all margin 
speculators eventually lost their money (Cowen, 1922, p. 23). This straightforward type 
of advice, common in the how-to literature, consisted of a simple rule of thumb and an 
22 As with many other contributions to the how-to genre, Cowen’s short book was also a somewhat 
subliminal advertisement of an investment advisory firm of sorts. In Cowen’s case, it was the stock 
trading advisory firm Compass Advisory Bureau. On the final page of the booklet, Cowen briefly 
outlined the services the Compass Advisory Bureau provided. Before expounding what services the 
firm actually provided, Cowen explicated that the firm did not ‘furnish glittering generalities’ and 
‘ambiguous suggestions as to what to do’. Instead, it allegedly offered expert opinions on specific 
stocks, and it had a standing rate of one dollar for an opinion on one stock, and fifty cents per 
opinion on additional stocks (Cowen, 1922, p. 28). 
23 In an early how-to book “Points” for 1885: Being a collection of facts and figures for small speculators 
(1885), Horace A. Chipman explicated that his market advice was intended ‘for the benefit of that 
class of small speculators outside the “charmed circle,” who, having no definite plan or theory of 
their own, have adopted a sort of a go-as-you-please system in betting, and one which invariably 
produces a profit on the wrong side of the ledger’ (p. 3). 
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equally simple assertion about market behaviour. Additionally, the how-to literature 
encouraged its readers to build, nurture and preserve an adamant character. Having the 
right character was often considered as being as important as possessing in-depth 
knowledge of the functioning of the financial markets and the practices of investment 
and speculation. Basic personal traits were crucial, Cowen argued, when the market actor 
sought to evade the many pitfalls of the trade: 
 
It is rather difficult matter to discover a cure-all for every kind of bad speculation, yet 
by the application of a little common sense, courage and patience a way out can be 
found for practically any dilemma or bad situation into which a speculator may have 
placed himself. (Cowen, 1922, p. 18) 
 
Hence, the problems associated with the practice of speculation and more generally with 
the business conducted in the financial markets were often described as entangled with 
the personal traits of the individual market actor. The people to whom the how-to book 
was intended were, to use Cowen’s words, ‘gullible near-investors’ who lacked the 
market knowledge and poise required in order to become successful speculators (Cowen, 
1922, p. 22, 5). In the how-to literature, speculation was construed as a practice 
involving individual emotional restraint in addition to knowledge about the functioning 
of the markets. The individual’s ability to temper emotions and detect the factors in the 
markets that instigated excitement was highlighted as essential characteristics of the 
prolific speculator. When reduced to a practice of following advice in a book, 
speculation was a completely individualised practice, but it was an individualised practice 
that often was aimed at not becoming swayed by the acts and ways of thinking of others, 
i.e. the public, the majority and the crowd. As Cowen proclaimed, speculation was ‘a 
battle of wits, whether in Wall Street or elsewhere; the majority lose, the minority win’ 
(Cowen, 1922, p. 28). 
Regardless of the topic or practice, how-to, self-management and self-help literatures 
are characterised by I-centrism. (The fundamental premise of the how-to and self-help 
book is that the individual who shall aid her- or himself by following the precepts of the 
book at hand, which makes it a profoundly individualised process.) The idea of the 
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individual and individual action found in these types of practical literature has often been 
formulated in opposition to an idea of the crowd and crowd action. A crowd was the 
antithesis to individuality but in many cases also the benchmark against which the 
strength and appreciation of individuality was measured.24 In many how-to books, 
individual success was conveyed as not imitating the actions of everyone else. This 
rationale made perfect sense in the context of financial markets, as represented in the 
how-to literature. Stock and commodities markets were, as mentioned, mostly presented 
as places where a minority were successful, while the great majority were not. With 
trading basically being regarded a zero-sum-game, it was clear that profits in speculative 
markets were made at the expense of others, i.e. the majority.  
Apart from having the characteristics of a manual, the how-to texts had, as described, 
a self-help dimension. The very idea of self-help was discussed as early as the mid-
nineteenth century in the book Self-help; with illustrations of character and conduct (1859) 
authored by the Scottish reformist Samuel Smiles. Smiles opened Self-help with a 
description of ‘the spirit of self-help’: 
 
24 In her management handbook The Psychology of Management: The functioning of the mind in determining, 
teaching and installing methods of least waste (1914), published in the slipstream of Frederic Winslow 
Taylor’s iconic The Principles of Scientific Management (1911), Lillian M. Gilbreth prescribed ways to 
optimise work through the study of psychology as it applied to the work of ‘the manager and the 
managed’ (p. 4). Although this is not an analysis of the psychology of management, it seems 
worthwhile pausing for a moment with Gilbreth’s definition of individuality. Gilbreth defined the 
individual as ‘a single thing’ and ‘a unit’ (Gilbreth, 1914, p. 21). This mechanistic perception of the 
individual was in complete accord with Taylor’s perception of the worker. However, apart from 
defining the individual as a unit, Gilbreth defined the individual as ‘opposed to the crowd’; 
individual action as ‘opposed to associate action’; and individual interests as ‘opposed to common 
or community interests’ (Gilbreth, 1914, p. 21). This notion of individuality also ran through much 
of the how-to literature on speculation and investment in the financial markets. It furthermore 
reflected a lingering fear of and contempt for crowds and the infectious madness allegedly 
emanating from them. Unearthing the qualities of the individual in contrast to the inferiorities of 
crowds was ingrained in American cultural history of the nineteenth century. In the essay Self-
Reliance (1841) Ralph Waldo Emerson described how the greatness of individuality was best 
measured up against the crowd: ‘It is easy in the world to live after the world’s opinion; it is easy in 
solitude to live after our own; but the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with 
perfect sweetness the independence of solitude’ (Emerson, 1928 [1841], p. 39). This idealised 
description of the ‘great man’ as someone who remain independent in a crowd was the epitome of 
the successful trader, investor or speculator who was often presented as an aspirational figure yet 
also often as an unattainable ideal in the popular and practical literature on financial markets.  
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[…] the root of all genuine growth in the individual; and, exhibited in the lives of 
many, it constitutes the true source of national vigour and strength. Help from 
without is often enfeebling in its effects, but help from within invariably invigorates. 
(Smiles, 1859, p. 1) 
 
According to Smiles, self-help required the cultivation of a ‘self-culture’ (consisting of a 
perpetual self-training of the moral, intellectual and physical ‘parts of a man’s nature’) as 
well as individual exercising of self-control and self-discipline (Smiles, 1859, p. v, 240). 
The essence of self-help was that an improvement of the self was achieved through a 
process of introspection and not through reliance on external guidance (Woodstock, 
2005). For Smiles, self-help was a practice and a moral and political imperative, yet as 
self-help became a practice prescribed in the textual form, it became a fundamentally 
paradoxical phenomenon.  
In a study of contemporary self-help literature, Heidi Marie Rimke (2000) defines 
self-help as ‘an individualized voluntary enterprise, an undertaking to alter, reform or 
transform the self, or some ‘intrinsic’ aspects of it, which is contingent upon a person’s 
seeking of some external form of authoritative assistance’ (p. 62).25 Hence, the textual 
form has made the ‘enfeebling’ help from without a prerequisite of the practice of 
helping oneself from within. The very practice of self-help rests upon the paradox that 
‘reading a self-help book is characterised as the single requirement for its readers to fulfil 
their quest for self-help, while… that invocation of reading is in itself insufficient for 
25 In the article titled ‘Governing Citizens Through Self-Help Literature’, Rimke argues that self-
help literature appropriates neoliberal conceptions of individuality and the social. The self-help 
literature describes the self, according to Rimke, ‘as a unified centre of personal agency which can 
act upon itself, others and the world. This conception presents the individual as the sole ontological 
pivot of experience. Further, the self is conceived as possessing an inner reservoir of power that can 
be accessed. This suggests an intense accountability, responsibility and sense of obligation that can 
be enlisted for choices and decisions’ (Rimke, 2000, p. 64). Several Foucault-inspired studies of self-
help literature, including Rimke’s, have made the argument that self-help is essentially an 
affirmation of a neoliberal rationale (see Hazleden, 2003; Salmenniemi and Vorona, 2014; Bröckling 
, 2005; Blackman, 2004; Gregg, 2015). This dissertation’s analysis shows that even though self-help 
and how-to literature may accentuate neoliberal rationalities, they are not products of neoliberalism, 
since the literatures in themselves predate the emergence of neoliberalism. That being said, there is 
a strong libertarian impetus in many books in the genre, which is arguably a vestige of classical 
liberalism and, in the American context, the intellectual individualism advanced by transcendentalist 
writers such as Emerson, Henry David Thoreau and Walt Whitman.  
46 
 
                                                   
self-help’ (Cherry, 2008, p. 337). Another paradox or arguably another way of phrasing 
the same paradox that seems to cling to self-help literature lies in the way self-help is 
being communicated and essentially the way it is advertised to readers. The author of a 
self-help book has to appear as an authority and expert, while simultaneously creating 
doubt as to whether external guidance plays any productive role in the subjectification 
process encouraged by the self-help book (Bröckling, 2005, p. 9). These paradoxes are 
also found in many of the how-to texts analysed in the present dissertation. For example, 
in How To Invest and How to Speculate: Explanatory of the details of stock exchange business, and 
the main classes of securities dealt in together with a glossary of terms in common use (1901), C. H. 
Thorpe stressed that market actors should seek out the challenges they encountered in 
the markets themselves and avoid taking advice from others because such advice almost 
always veiled an ulterior motive to somehow scam the receiver of the advice: 
 
The investor must use no inconsiderable amount of common sense, he must be able 
to work out the problems himself, and only when he has a primâ facie case for or 
against a stock need he trouble to hunt information on the point. As a rule, the 
gratuitous is not worth having, and journals which devote much space to the writing 
up of various more or less gambling securities are often not to be trusted. Half the 
“tips” to buy originate from quarters in the City which are interested in selling to the 
public. (Thorpe, 1901, p. 27, italics in the original) 
 
The paradox obviously consists in the fact that Thorpe was offering advice on how to 
invest and speculate, while reminding readers not to trust ‘tips’.26 In spite of or perhaps 
26 Another aspect of how-to literature that was perhaps not a paradox but at least something that 
critics found perplexing was the fact that the authors of how-to books were willing to share their 
advice. It puzzled critics that someone who claimed to have a recipe for success in speculation and 
investment did not keep it a secret and followed it her- or himself. Being able to state that they had 
practised what they were preaching was one of the most effective responses how-to book authors 
could give to this kind of criticism. For example, the introduction to the speculator turned financial 
writer Victor de Villiers’ Financial Independence at Fifty (1919) directly addressed the ‘argument that so 
many sceptical persons make against the using of advice given by financial writers, namely, that 
most of them cannot make their theories and advice applicable in their own cases’. To refute the argument, 
the author of the introduction (who was not the author of the book) noted that de Villiers’ book 
‘puts at your command the principles and methods employed by the author in accomplishing a feat 
in which he has admirably succeeded’ (Villiers, 1919, p. 7, italics in the original).  
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because of its paradoxical genus, the how-to book represents an intriguing entry into the 
complex and often mystified realm of finance. It produced a type of market knowledge 
that was non-academic, practical and often supplemented by normative and moralistic 
considerations about certain market practices. Before addressing the specific form of 
market knowledge being produced in the how-to literature, I will briefly outline the 
additional textual sources analysed in the dissertation.  
Additional textual material: Magazines and academic literature 
In addition to the practical how-to literature, the dissertation utilises other types of 
textual empirical material, namely magazine articles as well as academic journal articles 
and monographs.27 In the late nineteenth century, it had become common to see market 
reports as well as articles on and fictional short stories about finance circulating in 
newspapers and popular magazines. These types of texts were the American public’s 
primary source of information about the markets, and it was through these channels that 
the public became attracted to and to some extent familiarised themselves with the 
business carried out in financial markets (Knight, 2016, pp. 24–28). While I refrain from 
examining the financial pages of newspapers, I do draw upon articles from a range of 
different magazines (presented below). The magazine literature on finance was the face 
of the market as presented to the literate public, and it played an important role in 
shaping the popular perception of financial markets. It is therefore also a crucial part of 
how the public and financial markets intersect (a relation I will thoroughly examine in 
Chapter 3). 
There were many different American magazines publishing articles and stories on 
finance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Magazines such as The 
27 Besides using practical, academic and popular texts on financial markets, investment and 
speculation, I also utilise (though only in Chapter 4) reports drafted by federal regulatory agencies. 
More specifically, I examine reports on the state of the U.S. futures markets drafted by the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Grain Trade Administration published in the 1920s. I draw on these 
regulatory reports because they ascribed significance to the psychology of crowds in the futures 
markets (and in connection to specific events or phenomena in the futures markets). Crowd 
psychology and market psychology had not been attended to in reports by these agencies prior to 
the ones published in the 1920s, which I examine in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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Atlantic Monthly (later renamed The Atlantic), The Forum, Munsey’s Magazine, The Century 
Magazine and Harper’s Monthly (later renamed Harper’s Magazine) focussed on a broad 
spectrum of topics such as literature, politics, culture, the arts and finance.28 Apart from 
the aforementioned outlets, there were also more exposé and reform oriented magazines 
such as McClure’s Magazine (Munsey’s arguably also fell into that category) that had a highly 
critical view on financial markets. Finally, there were specialised outlets such as The 
Ticker (later renamed The Ticker and Investment Digest and later again The Magazine of Wall 
Street) and The Bankers Magazine directed towards those who were active or planning to 
become active investors and who therefore were in need of practical knowledge on 
specific issues and practices pertaining to investment and speculation.29  
Whereas the how-to book was a source of accessible practical knowledge about the 
markets that was easily converted into actual action on the part of the reader, the 
magazine stories and articles on finance provided the American public with a 
combination of often dramatised and politicised depictions of events that had unfolded 
in the exchanges and more sober yet still straightforward descriptions of financial 
markets and the actors operating in them. I draw on magazine stories and articles on 
finance and more specifically financial markets in order to identify how crowd-related 
problems such as mass participation, crowding on the exchanges’ trading floors and 
mental contagion in the marketplace were described in the popularised discourse.30  
Another source of empirical textual material drawn upon in the dissertation is 
academic literature (both journal articles and standalone monographs) on economics and 
28 During the first decade of the twentieth century, The Forum, for instance, had a series of articles 
entitled ‘finance’ written by the renowned financial journalist Alexander Dana Noyes in which 
topics such as banking, investment and speculation were analysed and explained in an accessible yet 
thorough manner. Similarly, Munsey’s Magazine ran a segment called the ‘financial department’ 
between 1910 and 1913, which was written by another prominent financial journalist, John Grant 
Dater. 
29 This is not an exhaustive list of magazines publishing articles on finance in the late nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century. Other magazines (such as, e.g., Town Topics) 
existed that also covered the topic of finance (see Knight, 2012, 2016, ch. 1). 
30 The majority of the magazine articles utilised in the dissertation have been retrieved from the 
digitised online archive unz.org – a website that digitally reproduces, inter alia, articles from 
American magazines.  
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finance as well as on collective and crowd psychology. The academic monographs 
utilised in the dissertation are works in the fields of political economy, business and 
economics as well as in social psychology and sociology. Pertaining to the same scholarly 
fields, the academic articles drawn upon as empirical material were predominantly 
retrieved from journals such as Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics and 
American Journal of Sociology. I selected the academic work from the fields of sociology and 
social psychology based on the following three criteria: (a) their status in, contribution to 
and influence on crowd theory; (b) if the texts attended to crowd phenomena in the 
market sphere and in economic life; (c) if the theories presented in the texts were 
explicitly employed in the practical or the academic literature on financial markets. As 
the third criteria implies, the relevance of work in the crowd-theoretical tradition has not 
been determined concurrent with the collection of the primary empirical material (the 
how-to literature). The academic journal articles and monographs utilised in the 
dissertation were selected on the basis of the second and third of the abovementioned 
criteria.31 
I draw upon academic literature for two reasons. First, I turn to theoretical texts for 
conceptual clarification. Here, I specifically think of the clarification of concepts deriving 
from crowd theory. When, for instance, terminology from crowd theory is deployed in a 
how-to book, I resort to the crowd theoretical tradition in order to theoretically situate 
the term or concept being used. The purpose of this theoretical contextualisation is not 
to reconstruct what the author of a given how-to book actually meant when she or he 
employed notions such as, e.g., ‘contagion’, ‘imitation’ or ‘sympathy’. On the contrary, 
the purpose is to illuminate the theoretical vestiges that are implicitly or explicitly posited 
in the discourse when such terminology was employed. Second, I resort to academic 
texts in order to locate academic responses to problems associated with crowd behaviour 
31 I conducted a keyword search in the jstor.org online archive in order to find articles in finance 
and economics journals published between 1890 and 1940 that attend to crowd problematics. The 
keywords used in the search were as follows: ‘crowd’, ‘crowd psychology’, ‘the psychology of 
crowds’, ‘mob’, ‘mob psychology’, ‘the psychology of mobs’, ‘contagion’, ‘contagious’, ‘epidemic’, 
‘infection’, ‘infectious’, ‘imitation’, ‘imitative’ and ‘sympathy’. Articles (and book reviews) from 
sociology journals such as American Journal of Sociology are mainly drawn upon in order to account for 
the reception of the French and Italian crowd theory traditions in the American academic milieu.  
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and crowd psychology in the context of financial markets. The academic literature is 
furthermore examined in order to find out how and to what extent debates pertaining to 
crowds in markets took place in and across different literatures and if, for example, the 
practical literature informed the academic and/or vice versa. If, for instance, a how-to 
book articulated mental contagion as a concrete threat to the efficiency of trading in the 
stock and commodity exchanges, locating similar problematisations of mental contagion 
in other genres of financial writing, such as in texts from the fields of political economy, 
business and economics, can tell something about the prevalence of the 
problematisation.  
Vernacular market knowledge 
The form of knowledge generated in practical texts such as the how-to book is, as I have 
already touched upon, different from the knowledge produced in academic texts 
concerned with financial markets. How-to books offered practical knowledge intended 
for people who were or had an ambition of becoming practitioners. Theorising was in 
itself seldom an aim in this genre of financial writing. Whereas the academic literature 
was predominantly focussed on describing, analysing and explaining, the primary 
objective of the how-to book was prescriptive. (Describing market conditions and 
practices were a means to a prescriptive end.) I will argue that the practical texts 
examined in the present dissertation adhere to a category of economic knowledge that 
has been designated ‘vernacular economics’ (Preda, 2004, 2009), ‘vernacular finance’ 
(Knight, 2012, 2013; Poitras, 2011), ‘everyday economic discourses’ (Ruccio, 2008) or 
‘grassroots economic theory’ (Knight, 2012). According to Preda, vernacular economics 
is understood to do the following:  
 
comprise heterogeneous sets of practices, know-how techniques, and rationalization 
procedures that help social actors make sense of their economic environment and the 
economic consequences of their own actions. Rather than a body of homogeneous, 
abstract, and formalized explanations of economic processes, vernacular economics is 
grounded in tacit, commonly shared assumptions and knowledge about economic 
processes. (Preda, 2004, p. 354)  
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Hence, the purpose of vernacular economics is to enable the individual social actor to 
comprehend the economic context, i.e. environment, she or he is in and to make the 
right decisions in that particular situation. Being concerned with heterogeneous forms of 
vernacular economics or finance does not provide explanations as to the assumptions 
made about market processes and practices. Forms of vernacular finance make an 
otherwise seemingly abstract financial market seem mundane and more tangible by 
presenting market activities as well as market success as accessible to a much larger part 
of the public (Knight, 2012, p. 59).32 
Preda outlines three ways in which vernacular economics can be conceptualised in 
relation to academic economics: (a) as a less rigorous and frivolously formulated version 
of academic economics; (b) as a form of economic knowledge that seeks to solve 
everyday problems (and that is not concerned with the ‘unified conceptual frame’ as the 
academic counterpart is); (c) as a form of knowledge that is radically different from 
academic economics in terms of aims and principles (Preda, 2004, p. 354). What is 
lacking in these conceptualisations of vernacular economics is, according to Preda, the 
possibility that vernacular economics actually can inform and influence academic 
economics. Preda argues that ‘vernacular knowledge actively influences academic 
theories’, pointing out that ‘it provides them with rationalization devices, formulates 
competing explanatory models, and articulates interests that are later integrated into 
academic theories’ (Preda, 2004, p. 355). Since vernacular knowledge arguably can have 
performative effects on academic theories, Preda further claims that studying the 
connections between the two forms of knowledge can ‘lead to a better understanding of 
32 Besides being perceived as a practice-oriented and practice-regulating source of financial 
knowledge, vernacular finance has also been identified as a source of financial market knowledge 
that challenges prevailing perceptions of what finance is and how financial markets should be 
perceived. David Ruccio (2008) argues that ‘everyday economic discourses’ are at one and the same 
time ‘stylized parodies’ of academic economics as well as ‘conceptual strategies’ that pave the way 
for ‘alternative economic practices and institutions’ (p. 897). Along the same lines, Stäheli (2008) 
has argued that heterodox forms of market knowledge meddle with the boundary between what is 
considered to be ‘the economic’ and ‘the non-economic’ and thus ‘create a realm of economic 
possibilities and impossibilities, that also defines the limit of financial economy’ (p. 244). 
52 
 
                                                   
the cognitive, cultural, and social processes that acted as a background for the scientific 
approach to financial market operations’ (Preda, 2004, p. 356).  
Along similar lines, I argue that the vernacular knowledge produced in the how-to 
literature examined in the dissertation dealt with market problems that were also being 
addressed in the academic literature. One of the aspects explored in the analysis is how 
the problematisations of crowd phenemena in markets in one genre of financial writing 
were echoed in another, e.g. how the issue of mental contagion in market crowds were 
often similarly touched upon and presented in how-to books and in academic texts. 
Examining financial markets through how-to books can thus provide a different 
perspective on how popular perceptions and shared assumptions about market processes 
were turned into new rules of market conduct and thereby arguably shaped concrete 
market practices. 
Structure of the dissertation  
As presented in this chapter, the present dissertation examines the problematisations of 
crowd phenomena in the U.S. financial markets between 1890 and 1940. The aim of the 
study is to (a) shed light on how crowds and crowd-associated phenomena became 
problems in markets during the given historical period; (b) explore what characterised 
these crowd problems in the markets and to whom they were problematic; (c) discuss how 
the problematisations of crowd phenomena in the financial markets informed 
approaches to certain market practices such as speculation and market reading. These 
three dimensions of the problematisations of crowd phenomena in markets are attended 
to in the dissertation’s analysis. The dissertation is structured as follows. In addition to 
the present chapter, it consists of four analytical chapters and a sixth and final chapter 
comprising concluding remarks and two contemporary perspectives on the study of 
crowd phenomena in financial markets.  
Chapter 2 introduces central concepts from late nineteenth century crowd theory 
such as imitation, contagion, suggestion and sympathy and engages with problems pertaining to 
collective action and mental contagion in financial markets, as examined and critically 
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discussed by crowd theorists Gustave Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde and the lesser known Boris 
Sidis. Financial markets were not the most frequently used examples in late nineteenth 
century crowd theory, yet in work by the aforementioned crowd theorists, markets were 
reflected upon and analysed as sites where crowd dynamics and crowd behaviour 
thrived. I argue that the crowd theorists, in their elaborations on finance and speculation, 
tended to conflate market and crowd problems and thereby made it more or less two 
sides of the same coin. What they did was to analyse market practices and malfunctions 
as socio-psychological processes specific to their particular perception of collective 
behaviour.  
Chapter 3 examines how the notion of ‘the public’ in the financial markets came to 
be considered a problematic class of market participants towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and in the first couple of decades of the twentieth century. With the 
business conducted in the stock and commodity exchanges becoming gradually more 
popular among people from the American middle-class, concerns grew over what should 
be done, if anything, about public participation in the markets. What role should and 
could the ‘newcomers’ play in the markets, and, more importantly, what problems were 
associated with letting ‘amateurs’ trade in markets that had until then primarily been sites 
occupied by affluent financiers? The concern with the market public and thus with 
public participation was expressed as a concern with the public’s alleged (a) lack of 
competencies and qualifications, (b) misconceptions about the functioning of markets and (c) 
suggestibility and lack of mental tenacity. The public was perceived as a unified mass of more 
or less equally inexperienced, incompetent and underqualified persons who tended to 
follow the crowd, because they were incapable of exercising independent judgement 
when it came to market matters. Consequentially, more financial writers across genre 
boundaries began to account for and elaborate on the importance of the psychology of 
the public, which was in close accord with, in particular, Le Bon’s characterisation of the 
psychology of the crowd.  
Chapter 4 engages with the idea of the psychological moment in connection to what I have 
termed the psychologisation of discourses on financial markets in the second and third 
decades of the twentieth century. The psychologisation process is explored in three 
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different strands of financial writing: practitioners-oriented how-to books, academic 
literature as well as reports from federal regulatory agencies. With increased attention 
given to the allegedly whimsical market public in discourses on financial markets, more 
financial writers began to argue that studying the psychology of the market was a 
prerequisite for obtaining a comprehensive understanding of how markets functioned. 
The ability to anticipate when prices were about to fall or rise was increasingly being 
articulated as a matter of detecting the psychological moment, which was the transient 
moment when the market was about to change direction. The chapter examines the 
increased importance ascribed to the psychological factors that, according to several 
writers, influenced the actual formation of prices in financial markets made ideas and 
theories from the academic fields of (crowd and social) psychology explanatorily, 
descriptively and prescriptively relevant in the analysis of financial markets.  
Chapter 5 examines contrarian approaches to speculation formulated in how-to 
books from the 1920s and 1930s. Contrarian approaches were based on the assumption 
that the majority of people in the markets tended to follow the crowd, especially at times 
when it was least favourable to do so. Drawing on precepts from crowd theory, the 
contrarians provided their readers with advice on how to read the crowd psychology 
inherent in market processes and offered techniques for how to prevent the incipient 
influence of the crowd from contaminating their minds. It is examined how contrarian 
market philosophies attempted to alter the practices of the market actor: From the 
contrarian point of view, market action involved the analysis of the psychology of 
market crowds (either exclusively or in conjunction with the analysis of technical and 
fundamental conditions). Apart from the reorientation of the market analysis, the 
contrarians drew at least as much attention to the element of individual self-preservation 
and self-mastery. Whereas the general idea of the successful investor or speculator was 
someone who had in-depth knowledge of the fundamental conditions of the markets 
and/or excelled as a technical analyst, the contrarian speculator or investor was someone 
who was primarily an apt student of crowd psychology. 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 6, summarises the arguments and findings 
associated with the exploration of problematisations of crowd phenomena in markets 
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carried out in the preceding analytical chapters. Additionally, it points to two discussions 
of crowds in contemporary discourses on investment and speculation in financial 
markets: (a) the wisdom of crowds argument and (b) crowds and herding in behavioural 
finance. Arguments and elements of this chapter have formerly been published in 
Hansen, K. B. ‘Contrarian investment philosophy in the American stock market: On 
investment advice and the crowd conundrum’, Economy and Society, 44(4) (2015). 
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Chapter 2: Crowds and financial markets 
 
The center space should be about five feet in diameter, or as large as may be, without 
admitting enough to crowd. 
 
Rueben S. Jennings, ‘Improvement in trading-pits’, 1878 
 
On 19 December 1877, Rueben S. Jennings filed a patent application titled 
‘Improvements in trading-pits’ to the United States Patent Office (Jennings, 1878). The 
invention was supposed to improve the open-outcry trading of commodity futures 
conducted at The Chicago Board of Trade.33 Jennings’ improved pit was an octagonal 
trading platform placed upon or sunk below the floor, with steps on the inside toward 
the centre and on the outside to ease the passage to and throw the pit (see Figure 2.1). 
Each step in the construction was wide enough to allow ‘one person passing behind 
another without serious inconvenience to either’, and the height difference between the 
levels permitted ‘a man of ordinary height to see over the heads of those in front of 
him’. Furthermore, cold and hot air pipes were fitted into the platform in order to 
provide proper heating and ventilation of the trading environment (Jennings, 1878). The 
advantages of the structure were, according to Jennings, that it made trading more 
convenient for the traders: It increased their manoeuvrability and visibility as well as 
improved their access to the pit. The primary inconvenience that Jennings’ pit promised 
to eradicate was ‘crowding’ (Jennings, 1878). Besides being inconvenient to the traders 
who spent their workdays on the floor of the exchange, crowding could render the 
communication between buyers and sellers difficult. The hampering of the 
communication between traders could ultimately diminish the efficiency of the trading. 
Hence, Jennings’ pit was an architectural response to the problems of inconvenience and 
33 Open outcry trading was a form of trading carried out on the floor of the stock or commodity 
exchanges. Buying and selling was made on a face-to-face basis with ask and bid prices being 
communicated orally or by a system of hand signals. Open outcry trading was the dominant form of 
financial transaction from the inception of the organised modern financial markets up until the 
computerisation of markets gained momentum from the 1970s onwards (MacKenzie, 2004, pp. 86–
87; see also Borch, Hansen and Lange, 2015). 
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trading inefficiency that occurred when the trading floor at an exchange was over-
crowded with traders.  
 
Figure 2.1: Rueben S. Jennings’ drawing of his improved trading pit, patented on 21 May 1878. 
 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century, crowds and the calamities they 
allegedly were causing in modern societies became a tremendously popular research 
topic, especially among French and Italian sociologists, criminologists, physiologists and 
psychologists. These were the formative years of crowd psychology or crowd theory. 
One of the most prominent figures in the crowd theoretical tradition, Gabriel Tarde, 
claimed that crowds facilitated a rapid spread of ideas, beliefs and emotions as well as an 
intensification and harmonisation of beliefs and emotions among the people gathered in 
them. These characteristics of crowds were, Tarde stressed, reflected in a range of 
‘epidemics’ prevalent in modern societies, such as epidemics of ‘luxury’, ‘gambling’ and 
‘stock-speculation’ (Tarde, 1903, pp. 145–146, n. 1). Hence, the intensification, spread 
and harmonisation of emotions, desires and beliefs that tended to happen when people 
were closely gathered in crowds were, according to Tarde, potential problems in all social 
settings, including financial markets. In financial panics and speculative crazes, among 
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other market phenomena, Tarde and other social theorists and psychologists identified 
some of the same socio-psychological dynamics they attributed to the psychology of the 
crowd. Viewed from a crowd theoretical perspective, Jennings’ pit presented a response 
to the corporeal and physical dimension of the problem of crowding of the trading floor. 
However, it also presented a possible solution to the aforementioned socio-
psychological dimension of the crowd problem. The relation between the physical and 
the psychological dimensions of crowd phenomena was central in problematisations of 
collective action in the financial markets: The bodily impact of crowding has often been 
perceived as inextricably related to the mental discomfort allegedly caused by crowding. 
In this chapter, I examine financial markets through the lenses of late nineteenth 
century crowd theorists. As I will argue, exploring the financial markets through 
sociological and social psychological crowd theories of the late nineteenth century reveals how 
market behaviour and phenomena could be perceived in socio-psychological terms. 
Similar in many respects, to the conservative crowd theories that emerged as a response 
to an instable and rapidly changing modern society, the crowd theorists’ accounts of 
markets were responses to the panic- and manipulation-ridden U.S. financial markets 
that did not appear to be serving the common good. I argue that in applying their crowd 
theoretical framework to market phenomena, the crowd theorists conflated market and 
crowd dynamics, rendering it possible for them to describe how non-economic factors 
such as (a) the atmosphere on the floor of the stock or commodity exchange; (b) the 
leader-follower dynamic and (c) the emotions of market actors played crucial roles in the 
functioning or malfunctioning of markets. Another layer in this exploration of the 
entanglements of crowds and markets consists of examining how ideas developed in, 
and the terminology associated with, crowd theory were deployed and resuscitated in 
discourses on financial markets. Some scholars from the field of economics, for instance, 
found in crowd psychology a vocabulary and a set of notions with which they attempted 
to explain market phenomena that seemed to defy economic laws. While the latter layer 
in the analysis will primarily be unfolded in the chapters to come, I do give one example 
of how crowd theoretical ideas and the associated vocabulary have been utilised to 
describe as well as explain the dynamics of the trading floor of the exchange.   
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The chapter is divided into three parts. I begin by examining and discussing a critique 
of late nineteenth century financial capitalism advanced by Gustave Le Bon in The 
Psychology of Socialism (1898, Eng. tr. 1899). Le Bon’s critique revolves around what was, in 
his opinion, a particularly contemptuous and scandalous event – an attempt to corner 
the wheat market at the Chicago Board of Trade during the late 1890s – from which he 
reads all the alleged problems of financial capitalism. I argue that the problems Le Bon 
associated with the financial markets coincided with the problems he associated with 
crowds, which collapsed or at least blurred the boundary between purposeful and 
supposedly calculable market action on one hand, and the ephemeral and unruly 
behaviour of crowds on the other. For the purpose of clarification, I infer a subsection 
in the first part of the chapter in which I briefly expound two of the most influential 
crowd theorists’ – Le Bon’s and Tarde’s – views on crowds, crowd psychology and 
crowd emergence. The second part of the chapter deals with the social psychological 
theory of the (compared to Le Bon and Tarde) lesser-known scholar Boris Sidis, who 
perceived financial markets as socio-psychological phenomena and therefore studied 
them as so. I examine Sidis’ theory of suggestion, which was both an individual 
psychological theory and a social or crowd psychological theory, and discuss how his 
perception of financial markets was shaped in its image. The third and final part of the 
chapter discusses the concrete socio-psychological processes that some crowd theorists 
assumed were unfolding on the exchanges’ trading floor. In the analysis, I zoom in on 
one particular trading floor on one particular day, namely the trading floor of the New 
York Stock Exchange during the panic on 9 May 1901. I explore Tarde’s assessment of 
the event in his Psychologie Économique (1902) and in connection to this examine his idea 
of stock exchanges as ‘laboratories of collective psychology’ (1902a, p. 225). Tarde’s 
analysis of the stock exchange did conclude that markets were subjected to the same 
socio-psychological processes and dynamics that he perceived as the fabric of the social 
as such. Consequentially, I argue, it was impossible, following Tarde, to fully grasp the 
functioning of financial markets if the psychological and social dimensions of market 
actions and relations were not studied.  
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The overall argument in the chapter is that crowd theory tended to conflate crowds 
and markets – or perhaps rather study market phenomena as if they were crowd 
phenomena. Crowd theory also provided a vocabulary and a set of notions that appeared 
well suited to describe market phenomena which did not resonate with the dictates of 
economic theory and which countered the idea that financial markets were ordered 
institutions serving the interests of society at large. Furthermore, conflating market and 
crowd phenomena (market and crowd behaviour) supposedly rendered it possible to 
identify the probable causes that occasionally destabilised markets and threw them into 
panics and crises.  
The crowd problem of late nineteenth century financial capitalism  
 
What shall we say of speculations like that of the young American millionaire who, at 
the time of the Spanish-American war, bought at one stroke all the wheat [blé] 
obtainable in almost all the markets of the world, to re-sell it only when the 
commencement of the scarcity he had provoked had greatly increased the price? The 
affair should have brought him in four million pounds; but it provoked a crisis in 
Europe, famine and riots in Spain and Italy, and plenty of poor devils died of hunger. 
Are Socialists really in the wrong when they compare the authors of such 
speculations to common pirates, and declare that they deserve the hangman’s rope? 
(Le Bon, 1899, p. 16, translation corrected)34 
 
The unnamed young American millionaire whose speculative venture Le Bon was 
referring to in this excerpt from The Psychology of Socialism (1899) was none other than ‘the 
Napoleon of Wheat’, Joseph Leiter. In April 1897, at the age of 29, Leiter, the son of the 
Chicago merchant and multimillionaire real-estate owner Levi Zeigler Leiter, began to 
buy up all the cash wheat as well as the wheat futures he could get his hands on at the 
Chicago Board of Trade (Marcosson, 1909b). Even though he refused to admit it, what 
34 In the English translation of Psychologie du Socialisme the French word ‘blé’ was translated into 
‘corn’. However, the correct translation of ‘blé’ is ‘wheat’ and not ‘corn’. The reason why I have 
corrected this seemingly puny translation error is that, in this particular case, it is of major 
importance. Since Le Bon did not disclose the name of the ‘young American’ in question, it is 
crucial to know whether he bought up all obtainable ‘corn’ or ‘wheat’. 
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Leiter commenced in the spring of 1897 was an attempt to ‘corner’ the wheat market.35 
Leiter swept the market of physical (cash) wheat, which gave him an advantage over the 
short sellers who did not own the physical equivalent to the wheat they were selling 
short. Thus when the short sellers had to meet their obligations in their futures deals and 
deliver the physical crop, they were in need of the wheat that Leiter now owned. They 
therefore suddenly found themselves completely at Leiter’s mercy. The prospect of 
falling short on their commitments generated a sense of panic among the short-sellers, 
who, as a consequence and out of pure necessity, started to run up the price on wheat to 
the benefit of Leiter (Marcosson, 1909b, pp. 874-876; R. E. Smith, 1901, pp. 26-30).  
As with most attempts to corner the market, Leiter’s efforts proved futile. Regardless 
of whether it was due to overconfidence, recklessness, greed or simply bad timing, what 
happened was that he ‘overstayed the market’ and ultimately lost control of it 
(Marcosson, 1909b, p. 875).36 Although he did not succeed, Leiter’s audacious 
speculative endeavour did not pass unnoticed. On the contrary, it attracted a great deal 
of popular interest, mainly due to the extraordinary scale of the operation and its 
worldwide repercussions. The story of the Leiter corner became the subject of many 
magazine and newspaper articles and furthermore served as the main source of 
inspiration for novelist Frank Norris when he was writing his bestselling novel The Pit 
35 A corner was created when one speculator or a syndicate of speculators had acquired sufficient 
control of a particular security that allowed the speculator or syndicate to manipulate prices. Futures 
markets had, historically, been subjected to the most corners. The reason for the prevalence of 
corners in the futures markets was that futures trading allowed traders (short sellers) to sell what 
they did not own (with the promise of delivering at the terminal date of the futures contract). 
Consequently, if the majority of the particular commodity was owned by one or a group of 
conspiring speculators, this individual or group of individuals could dictate the price that the short 
sellers had to pay in order to fulfil their delivery commitment inscribed in the futures contract. The 
successful corner was thus often at the expense of the short sellers, who either had to buy the 
quantity needed to settle their commitment at an unprofitably high rate or simply default and risk 
prosecution. It was a popular saying at the time that ‘[h]e who sells what isn’t his’n Must buy back 
or go to prison’ (Lefèvre, 1901b, p. 431). These were the facts that short sellers had to face when 
trading in futures. ‘The cornerer’ was described as ‘the deadly enemy of the “bears”’, i.e. the short 
sellers (Marcosson, 1913, p. 5).  
36 Leiter’s and other daring financiers’ mostly unsuccessful attempts to corner the commodity and 
produce markets are thoroughly depicted in a quartet of articles written by Isaac Frederic 
Marcosson in Munsey’s Magazine titled ‘The Perilous Game of Cornering a Crop, I–IV’ (Marcosson, 
1909a, 1909b, 1909c, 1909d). 
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(1903). Although the novel was inspired by Leiter’s story, Norris took certain artistic 
liberties and deviated from the actual events for drama’s sake (Biers, 2011; C. Kaplan, 
1953). Norris depicted the Chicago wheat pit – while the corner was a sparking, 
tremendous trading activity – as a place occupied by a ‘vehement crowd of white faces 
and glittering eyes’ stupefied by an untamed ‘infinite immeasurable power’ able to deafen 
the ears, blind the eyes and numb the mind (Norris, 1920 [1903], p. 387). Norris’ 
dramatic portrait of trading in the Chicago Board of Trade during the years 1897 and 
1898 were filled with descriptions of ferocious crowds of traders struggling to secure the 
best deals in the ‘whirlpool’ of the pit and of the sublime force of the market 
overpowering and ultimately crushing individuals, as it happened to the novel’s 
protagonist and Leiter’s fictive counterpart Curtis Jadwin (Biers, 2011; Zimmerman, 
2006, Ch. 3).  
Contrary to Norris’ dramatic depiction in The Pit, the break of the Leiter corner, 
which happened on 13 June 1898, was considered by financial journalists and by Leiter 
himself to have been a rather undramatic event. The renowned financial journalist and 
editor Isaac Frederick Marcosson recalled that there had been no tumultuous scenes in 
the Chicago wheat pit that day, since Leiter, who was well-aware that his luck had run 
out, simply gave up and handed over his cash holdings of wheat to his creditors 
(Marcosson, 1909b, p. 876). Perhaps wanting to defuse the debacle surrounding his 
corner attempt, Leiter, denying that he had cornered the market, told the Associated 
Press that what had happened was simply ‘a case where the tail has begun to wag the 
dog’ (cited in Los Angeles Herald, 15 June 1898). He explained that he had been caught 
off guard by the rapid fall in wheat prices as so many speculators had experienced before 
him. The so-called break of the corner had not, according to Marcosson and Leiter, 
caused or been accompanied by vile and irrational crowd behaviour in the wheat pit of 
the Board of Trade as Norris had envisioned it in The Pit. Even though the culmination 
of Leiter’s corner might not have been as spectacular as Norris had portrayed it, the 
repercussions of the corner were as palpable as they were pervasive.  
In The Psychology of Socialism, Le Bon noted that the corner had provoked a crisis in 
Europe, and Marcosson argued that the ramifications were felt as far away as Argentina, 
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India and even Russia (Le Bon, 1899, p. 16; Marcosson, 1909b, p. 876). To Le Bon, 
Leiter’s attempt to capitalise on the hunger of populations was an emblematic example 
of a general ‘demoralisation of the upper strata of society’ and an ‘unequal and often 
unequitable partition of wealth’ in society (Le Bon, 1899, p. 16). As a consequence, the 
masses were, Le Bon argued, growing increasingly discontent and irritated with the 
manipulative games of these ‘common pirates’ (Le Bon, 1899, p. 16).37 The corner 
symbolised to Le Bon the unbridled greed and lack of morals of the bourgeoisie 
financiers that tended to push the masses towards socialism (the propagation of 
socialism in the late nineteenth century was the dominant theme in The Psychology of 
Socialism). Though Le Bon emphasised the unequal distribution of wealth in society, to 
which the manipulations of financiers contributed, his debunking of the financiers’ 
schemes should not be read as if he sympathised with the deprived masses.38  
37 Like Le Bon, the author of a Munsey’s Magazine article covering Leiter’s shenanigans, Rollin E. 
Smith, had no great enthusiasm for corner-instigators. As a member of the Chicago Board of Trade 
and the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, Smith had experienced cornering at close quarters. 
Apart from his commercial activities, Smith wrote magazine articles and books on investing and 
speculation. In one of his books, Wheat Fields and Markets of the World (1908), Smith used unflattering 
wording when describing the speculators who instigated corners. Corner instigators and other 
manipulators were, Smith stated, ‘men who ignore commercial ethics, defy trade opinion, and who 
endeavor to draw the public in to the market and finally, during the excitement of the bull market, 
sell out and let the public “hold the bag”’ (R. E. Smith, 1908, p. 261). The cornerers gave futures 
trading a bad reputation and discredited the grain trade as a whole. Even worse, Smith argued that 
they inflamed the public’s ‘passion for gambling’ in order to profit from it. The historical equivalent 
of these manipulating speculators was, he thought, the ‘buccaneer’. What differentiated the 
‘modern-day manipulator’ from the scrupulous pirate was, Smith noted, that the former did not 
force his victim to walk the plank (R. E. Smith, 1908, p. 261). Although corners were damaging to 
the markets in various ways, Smith did not encourage legislative intervention against cornering. He 
instead believed that members and directors of the exchange should show the sufficient moral 
courage to supress the financial buccaneers (R. E. Smith, 1908, p. 261). It was not uncommon for 
speculators to be associated with or referred to as buccaneers or pirates such as Le Bon and Smith 
did. For example, the then famous wheat trader B. P. Hutchinson (‘Old Hutch’), who engineered a 
corner of the wheat market a decade before Leiter, in 1888, went by the nickname of ‘the Pirate of 
the Pit’ (Marcosson, 1909b, p. 873). 
38 There was no Marxian romanticising of the working class in Le Bon’s work. Unlike in Marxian 
thought, Le Bon did not think that the working class possessed any ‘dignity, autonomy and 
revolutionary creativity’ (Leach, 1992, p. 13). Instead, when flaunting their alleged riotous 
inclination the working class was, according to Le Bon, primitive, violent, destructive and 
completely devoid of autonomy (Leach, 1992, p. 13). Although Le Bon feared the uprising of 
socialism and devoted an entire volume to the examination of the problems associated with it, he 
did not regard crowd behaviour as solely being a class phenomenon. In fact, everyone was, Le Bon 
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The ‘polymath prophet of Western decadence’, as historian Eugene E. Leach (1986, 
p. 101) fittingly calls Le Bon, foresaw great societal calamities associated with the 
increasing power of financial capitalism. ‘One of the great problems of the future will 
be’, Le Bon prophesied, ‘to find the means of escaping from the sovereign and 
demoralising powers of the cosmopolitan financiers’ (Le Bon, 1899, p. 82). Le Bon 
characterised this limited yet immensely powerful group of cosmopolitan financiers as 
‘masters of public opinion’ who extended the scope of their manipulation of the public 
by ceasing control of newspapers and journals and by anonymously shaping public 
opinion to their liking (Le Bon, 1899, p. 82).39 By swaying the sentiments of the masses, 
financiers such as Leiter were assuming the role of the crowd leader that Le Bon had 
thoroughly described in his seminal work on crowds, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular 
Mind (1895, Eng. tr. 1896 book II, Ch. 3, §1). Le Bon arguably boiled the problem of 
financial markets down to an asymmetrical and unidirectional relationship between 
powerful financiers and the rest, i.e. the masses. The latter group was, as described, 
completely subjugated to the former group’s will, which meant that much if not all of 
the business conducted in the markets was perceived as involving some element of 
manipulation and exploitation. Thus, the problem of late nineteenth century financial 
assumed, susceptible to crowd behaviour. It was not only the proletariat that possessed the 
inclination to end up in a violent, unthinking crowd (Borch, 2012, p. 41). Even the bourgeoisie 
could become swept away by emotional contagion, which was what happened when the French 
nobility, in the wake of the French Revolution, renounced all their privileges on 4 August 1789. 
According to Le Bon, this would never have happened had they not been in a state of excitement 
(Le Bon, 1896, p. 14).    
39 The press’ moulding of public opinion was a frequently discussed topic in crowd theory as well as 
among social scientists more broadly. In the essay ‘Opinion and Conversation’ from 1898, Tarde 
discussed how public opinion and thus sociality in itself was being created and shaped through the 
press (pp. 297–318). Years later, another prominent social scientist Max Weber suggested that the 
press’ influence on the modern individual as well as on modern society and culture ought to be the 
subject of an independent sociological inquiry. In a proposal for a ‘Sociology of the Press’ outlined 
in a report presented to the German Sociological Society in Frankfurt in October 1910, Weber 
suggested that the press played a major role in creating ‘the great cultural problems of the present’ 
(Hennis, 1998, p. 107; Weber, 1998, p. 111). The press was one of the ‘means of moulding the 
subjective individuality of modern man’ through the ‘psychic means of suggestion’ (Weber, 1998 
[1911], p. 111, italics in the original). Weber furthermore noted that the newspaper was the most 
important determinant of public opinion, which made the press ‘a component of the objective 
individuality of modern culture’ (Weber, 1998 [1911], p. 111, italics in the original). 
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capitalism, as identified by Le Bon in The Psychology of Socialism, essentially coincided with 
what he perceived as the overarching problem of the present age and the coming ‘era of 
crowds’ – namely, the problem presented by crowds (Le Bon, 1896, p. v, xv).  
Crowds, contagion and imitation 
While Joseph Leiter’s failed attempt to corner the wheat market in 1897–98 shrugged the 
financial markets and added fuel to an already fiery criticism of the speculation 
conducted on the U.S. stock and commodity exchanges, the publication of The Crowd 
stirred controversy in its own right. Several allegations of plagiarism were, for instance, 
directed at Le Bon (Borch, 2012, p. 34). Some of the harshest accusations came from the 
Italian criminologist Scipio Sighele, who claimed that Le Bon had stolen ideas from 
other scholars – including Sighele himself, who had dealt with masses and crowds in La 
Foule Criminelle (1891) – and used them in The Crowd as if they were his own.40 Plagiarism 
40 Le Bon later responded to Sighele’s allegations with a very cunning and snide attack on the 
Italian. In a lengthy footnote in The Psychology of Socialism, Le Bon referred to The Criminal Masses as a 
book hardly containing any traces of ‘personal thought’ (Le Bon, 1899, p. 100, n. 1). He then went 
on to accuse Sighele of having started the plagiarism rumour in order to make his own book known 
among his compatriots. After complaining about having grown accustomed to having his own 
books unscrupulously used as a ‘public mine’ of ideas for other people to shamelessly dig into, Le 
Bon finished his counterattack by claiming that it was in fact Sighele and not him who was the 
actual copycat: ‘I am happy, therefore, to see Signor Sighele profit from the perusal of my books, 
and will confine myself to asking him to observe that before complaining so loudly of French 
writers who, for the greater part, do not know his name, he should have refrained from availing 
himself of so many loans, and above all of such dissimulated loans such as that which figures on 
page 38, lines 12 et seq., of his little work on The Psychology of Sects, in which, after a quotation 
between inverted commas, taken from one of my books, the author gives as being his own, 
changing only a few words, a passage copied directly out of my Psychology of Crowds, page 8 lines 4 et 
seq. (3rd edition). Otherwise I can say with pleasure that Signor Sighele’s last work is not nearly so 
mediocre as his preceding one’ (Le Bon, 1899, p. 100, n. 1, italics in the original). Sighele was, as 
noted in Chapter 1, not an unimportant figure in the nascent crowd theory tradition. He had been a 
student of another Italian criminologist, Enrico Ferri, who was one of the central figures in the 
Italian School of Positivist Criminology. The founding father of the positivist school was the 
criminologist Cesare Lombroso. Whereas Lombroso was predominately preoccupied with the 
individual criminal and the possibility of identifying him or her on the basis of particular 
characteristics, Sighele was more interested in the crimes committed by collectives (Borch, 2012, pp. 
37–38, 2015, pp. 23–29). Sighele’s work had, according to Lombroso, shown that ‘[t]hough the 
majority of the crowd may be good, the crowd itself may be converted into a cruel beast’ 
(Lombroso, 1895, p. 43). Some argued that the members of the Italian School played an important 
role in developing several of the ideas that later came to define French crowd theory (Chamberlain, 
1900, p. 275; Lea, 1894, p. 671).  
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allegations aside, The Crowd contributed to the manifestation of the psychology of 
crowds as a legitimate and important field of scientific inquiry. Besides being immensely 
popular and heatedly debated in the academic milieu, the book also gained significant 
popularity with the literate public. It established the crowd as a crisis phenomenon and 
as an omen of an impending breakdown of order, and crowd psychology as a field of 
research that demystified crowds and made them less intangible (McClelland, 2010, p. 
196, 199). The book brought about a different and very timely perspective on the 
relation between the individual and the social that emphasised the fragility of the 
former’s autonomy in certain excited and unruly social formations. Le Bon’s crowd 
theory furthermore brought to the surface the malevolence of modernity. Instead of 
lauding the proliferation of technologies for mass communication and transportation as 
well as developments towards democratisation and urbanisation, Le Bon emphasised the 
tenuousness of these developments.  
What intrigued Le Bon was not any type of gathering of people that could, in lay 
terms, be designated as a crowd. He instead took interest in the mental specificities of 
the ‘collective mind’ of the so-called ‘psychological crowd’. A psychological crowd, 
according to Le Bon, could be described in the following way: 
 
[a] provisional being formed of heterogeneous elements, which for a moment are 
combined, exactly as the cells which constitute a living body form by their reunion a 
new body which displays characteristics very different from those possessed by each 
of the cells singly. (Le Bon, 1896, p. 6)  
 
A main characteristic of the psychological crowd was, as implied in the quote, that it was 
different from the elements that constituted it and furthermore that the individual 
elements changed when they were brought together in a crowd. To crowd theorists such 
as Le Bon, crowds constituted ‘a particular mode of individuation’ (Blackman, 2012, p. 
27). When being part of a crowd, people were, according to Le Bon, unable to think for 
themselves, and they unwittingly lost their sense of personal responsibility. Le Bon also 
noted that people in a crowd were unable to exercise emotional restraint and, as a 
consequence, became entirely subjected to collective emotions and interests. The 
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intellectual faculties of people in a crowd were paralysed, and individual discernibility 
was essentially suspended (Le Bon, 1896, pp. 9–11). It was, Le Bon thought, the 
suggestibility and credulity of the people gathered in a throng combined with the 
powerful force of contagion that caused this transformation of selves (Le Bon, 1896, pp. 
22–24).41  
In order for a crowd to form, some sort of idea, cause or opinion had to be instilled 
in the minds of people, and it was the crowd leader – an often passionate, charismatic 
and eloquent orator – who aligned the minds of the mass. Like the metropolitan 
financiers, whom Le Bon so fiercely criticised in The Psychology of Socialism, crowd leaders 
(e.g. revolutionary, religious, political and military leaders) manipulated the gullible 
masses without asking for their consent (Le Bon, 1896, book II, Ch. 3, §1). The crowd 
leader’s as well as the manipulative financier’s sole aim was to set in motion and give 
direction to the rambunctious physical and emotional force that crowds assumedly 
possessed. The leader-follower dynamic was at the very core of Le Bon’s crowd theory; 
according to him, it was a configuration that explained crowd emergence and 
concretised where the apex of power was located in the crowd-marred Western societies 
(that was with the leader-figures who were able to seduce crowds). Furthermore, it was a 
dynamic that, following Le Bon, seemed prevalent in most social processes, including 
financial markets. The broad applicability of Le Bon’s ideas was exactly one of the 
distinctive characteristics of his crowd theory and a possible reason for its popularity. Le 
Bon convincingly explained how the fundamental psychological traits of crowds could 
be identified in a wide array of societal, political, religious and economic phenomena. 
The seemingly omnipresence of crowd phenomena and omnipotent explanatory power 
of his crowd theoretical framework made Le Bon’s ideas appear pertinent in a range of 
different contexts and easy to apply to these individual contexts or phenomena. 
Although Le Bon’s study of crowds was accessible, novel and, in parts, disturbingly 
insightful, it was also criticised for being incoherent and methodologically 
41 Le Bon furthermore perceived crowds to be impulsive, irritable, unable to reason, without 
judgement and critical spirit and responsible for an exaggeration of the sentiments (Le Bon, 1896, p. 
17). 
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underdeveloped (Barnes, 1920, pp. 333–334). In the journal Science, the American 
sociologist Franklin H. Giddings argued in a review of The Crowd that it was a major 
shortcoming of the work that Le Bon had ‘not acknowledged, as he should have, his 
very obvious indebtedness to the greatest living social psychologist, M. Tarde’ (Giddings, 
1897, p. 735).42 Compared to Le Bon’s eloquently formulated yet also extremely 
conservative and somewhat repetitious ideas about the psychology of crowds, Tarde’s 
work on imitation and crowd emergence had a different academic weight and theoretical 
sophistication to it. I will not elaborate on the myriad of complex reflections on various 
forms of imitation that Tarde made in his undoubtedly most influential work, The Laws of 
Imitation (1890, Eng. tr. 1903), but I will instead discuss Tarde’s view on crowds and his 
understanding of how they emerge in the social realm. This, however, does not mean 
that Tarde’s theory of imitation is not of importance to his understanding of crowds or 
vice versa.43  
42 To be fair, it is not true that Le Bon completely refrained from acknowledging Tarde’s work, as 
Giddings claimed. At one point in The Crowd, Le Bon stated that the ‘research on the crimes of 
crowds’ made by ‘[a] learned magistrate, M. Tarde’ had verified the assumption that a person’s 
‘intellectual standard is immediately and considerably lowered’ when forming part of a crowd (Le 
Bon, 1896, p. 38). However, it would arguably be an overstatement to refer to this isolated example 
as Le Bon’s recognition of his own indebtedness to Tarde. On the other hand, Giddings was 
arguably somewhat biased when it came to Tarde, whom he was very fond of. He was one of the 
scholars who introduced Tarde’s ideas to an American audience and used them in his own work 
(he, among other contributions, wrote the introduction to the English translation of The Laws of 
Imitation). Apart from Giddings, several other American-based sociologists, psychologists, 
philosophers and anthropologists were influenced by Tarde’s imitation theory, including James 
Mark Baldwin, Franz Boas, Charles Horton Cooley, Morton Prince, William McDougall, Robert E. 
Park, Elsie Clews Parsons (who translated The Laws of Imitation), Josiah Royce, Boris Sidis, William 
Isaac Thomas, William James and George Herbert Mead (Leys, 1994). Some but not all of these 
scholars will be discussed in this chapter or in the following chapters.  
43 In The Laws of Imitation, Tarde developed an ambitious theory of the social that was very different 
and in clear opposition to the dominant theory of the father of sociology Auguste Comte as well as 
the immensely influential and popular evolutionary sociology of Herbert Spencer (Park, 1921; Tosti, 
1897). Tarde’s ambition was to examine ‘the psychological aspects of social phenomena in their 
simplest forms’ and the simplest form – the ‘elemental social fact’ – was, according to Tarde, 
‘imitation’ (Giddings, 1896, p. 349, 1903a, p. v). Even though Tarde did not exert a great amount of 
energy discussing the notion of the crowd in The Laws of Imitation, some scholars argue that crowds 
did constitute an integral part of Tarde’s theory of imitation. Anthropologist William Mazzarella 
(2010) argues that Tarde’s sociology of imitation is in fact essentially ‘a theory of crowd emergence’ 
(p. 723). In the same vein, Borch (2012) asserts that ‘Tarde’s general sociology of imitation is 
modelled, in essence, around the notion of suggestive crowds’ (p. 55). 
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One aspect that Le Bon and Tarde had in common was an interest in and 
indebtedness to their compatriot, the critic and historian Hippolyte Taine (Borch, 2012, 
pp. 29–32; Leach, 1986, p. 101). In The Origins of Contemporary France (1873), Taine had, 
according to Le Bon, ‘perfectly observed the facts’ about the allegedly ‘bloodthirsty, 
anarchic, and ferocious’ crowds that had, during the Revolution, acted as ‘horde[s] of 
epileptic savages abandoning themselves without restraint to their instincts’ (Le Bon, 
1896, p. 68). Tarde also praised Taine’s work, which he believed had ‘sufficiently brought 
before our eyes that river of crimes which the French Revolution let loose’ (Tarde, 1968 
[1890], p. 481). Hence, the violence, the crime and the virulence of crowds that Taine 
had so vividly described had made an indelible impression on Le Bon and Tarde, which 
is evident in their work. Tarde and Le Bon were, in the wording of the English social 
psychologist Graham Wallas, ‘brought up on vivid descriptions of the Revolution’ 
(Wallas, 1914, p. 137).44 
In his seminal work in criminology and penology, Penal Philosophy (1890), Tarde 
emphasised the violent and destructive sides of crowds and described the crowd in 
phrases similar to those Le Bon would make use of in his (quoted earlier) definition of 
the ‘psychological crowd’ half a decade later in The Crowd. Tarde presented this 
description of a crowd:45  
 
[A crowd is] a gathering of heterogeneous elements, unknown to one another; but as 
soon as a spark of passion, having flashed out from one of these elements, electrifies 
44 Wallas’ statement about Tarde’s and Le Bon’s influences was by no means value neutral. Though 
Wallas acknowledged that The Laws of Imitation had profoundly influenced ‘sociological speculation’ 
in Europe and was increasingly influencing it in America, he noted that he had difficulties 
understanding how it had ever acquired such great influence. He even added that it was ‘one of the 
most baffling and unsatisfactory books’ he had ever read (Wallas, 1914, pp. 119–120). He was 
equally critical towards Le Bon’s crowd psychology, which he believed was nothing more than a 
popularised reiteration of Tarde’s views (Wallas, 1914, p. 121, pp. 133–135).    
45 In the English translation of Penal Philosophy, the French word ‘foule’ is, in most cases, translated 
to ‘mob’ (there are instances where it is translated to ‘crowd’). I choose to use the term ‘crowd’. In 
Boris Sidis’ theory of suggestion, which I will examine later in this chapter, a qualitative distinction 
is drawn between the crowd and the mob. In that case, it is obviously necessary to differentiate the 
two terms.  
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this confused mass, there takes place a sort of sudden organization, a spontaneous 
generation. (Tarde, 1968 [1890], p. 323) 
 
If an individual wanted to oppose the force of the crowd, she or he would thus almost 
instantly be swallowed by the crowd and would align with its goals. Tarde exemplified 
this by stating that the ‘man who had come running to oppose the murder of an 
innocent person is one of the first to be seized with the homicidal contagion’, and he 
added that the most astonishing part of this sudden reversal of intentions was that it 
happened unconsciously (Tarde, 1968, p. 323). In the essay ‘The public and the crowd’, 
published almost a decade after Penal Philosophy, Tarde reflected on the negative 
stigmatisation of crowds to which he had himself contributed (Tarde, 2013, p. 233, 
1969).46 In the essay, Tarde emphasised that besides criminal and violent crowds ‘incited 
by hatred’, there existed crowds that were, as he expressed it, ‘motivated by devotion’ 
(Tarde, 2013, p. 232). According to Tarde, the devotion-motivated crowd, such as a 
‘festival crowd’, played a ‘critical and beneficial social role’ and counteracted ‘the 
wrongdoing of other collectives’ (Tarde, 2013, p. 233). Ultimately, Tarde argued that 
crowds were ‘much more beneficial than harmful in displaying sociability’ (Tarde, 2013, 
p. 233). On the question of crowds and sociability, Tarde’s views markedly differed from 
Le Bon’s. The latter did not think that crowds could display sociability or in any other 
way be socially edifying. On the contrary, Le Bon was certain that crowds were morally 
and socially corruptive. Tarde, however, insisted that not all crowd configurations were 
exclusively capable of creating social havoc. According to Tarde’s sociology, crowds 
were thus not a neutral but a less stigmatised socio-psychological formation than was the 
case in Le Bon’s crowd theory. This meant that the notion could be evoked without 
automatically implying that some sort of problem had occurred or was about to occur.  
Whether violent and criminal or devotional and joyous, crowds had, according to 
Tarde, some common characteristics. Physical proximity was one of them. Unlike Le 
46 ‘Le public et la foule’ was published as an essay in La Revue de Paris in 1898, and then later became 
a part of the book L’opinion et la Foule from 1901. The first half of the essay was translated into 
English by Terry N. Clark in 1969, while the second part was not published in English until 2013 
with the title ‘Conviction and the crowd’ (trans. by Dana Milstein). 
71 
 
                                                   
Bon, who did not think that physical contact was required in order for a crowd to take 
form, Tarde saw it as a necessity and as something that distinguished crowds from other 
social formations, such as the public.47 Crowds were confined to the limited area in 
which they were formed. If a crowd tried to extend beyond the limited area it occupied, 
the leader would cease control of it simply because her or his voice would be impossible 
to hear beyond certain distances. As a result, the crowd would disperse (Tarde, 1969, p. 
278, p. 281). Similar to Le Bon’s notion of the crowd leader, Tarde believed that the 
leader of a crowd had the ability to entrance or mesmerise people. The leader was a 
‘magnetiser’ who captivated the masses by the sheer imitation-inducing force of 
‘prestige’ (Tarde, 1903, pp. 78–79).48 Prestige was, as Le Bon eloquently stated, ‘the 
mainspring of authority’; a ‘mystical force […] of domination exercised on our mind by 
an individual, a work, or an idea’ (Le Bon, 1896, p. 133). Tarde did, however, stress that 
47 Le Bon stressed that the psychological crowd did not require physical presence, but only mental 
unity. Contagion was, he underlined, not restricted to a specific spatial location: It could be ‘felt at a 
distance’ (Le Bon, 1896, p. 3, 128). In ‘The public and the crowd’, Tarde examined both the crowd 
and the public. Unlike the crowd, the public was, according to Tarde, not bound to a specific 
physical space but was a solely mental collective. Tarde furthermore described the public as ‘the 
social group of the future’ and thus opposed Le Bon by stating that the age that they were standing 
on the verge of would be an era of publics and not of crowds (Tarde, 1969, p. 278, p. 281). Tarde’s 
emphasis on the public as the social group of the future has been interpreted as Tarde’s attempt to 
distance his thinking from crowd theory and from Le Bon who had become the popular figurehead 
of crowd psychology. Professor of Communication Elihu Katz, for instance, argues that Tarde, in 
his later work, ‘moved from trickle-down imitation to greater mutuality of influence, and from 
crowd to public’ (Katz, 1999, p. 149, 152, 2006, p. 267). However, I will argue that Tarde’s notion 
of the public should not be regarded as a superior and necessarily more desirable social formation 
than that of the crowd. On the contrary, Tarde emphasised in the latter part of ‘The public and the 
crowd’ (‘Conviction and the crowd’) that publics could be as violent and criminal as crowds (Tarde, 
2013, p. 237).  
48 Originally, magnetism was a type of therapy developed by the German physician Franz Anton 
Mesmer. (It was also called ‘mesmerism’ after its inventor.) In the late eighteenth century, Mesmer 
claimed that he had discovered a very fine fluid that surrounded and floated through all (divine, 
human and animal) bodies. Any imbalance in the fluid levels would cause illness, so the therapy had 
as its objective to secure the constant flow of the fluid through the body. Mesmer had furthermore 
discovered that magnets were good conductors of the fluid. Therefore, an important element of the 
therapy was massaging the body’s ‘poles’, one of them being the nose (Darnton, 1968, pp. 3–4; F. 
Kaplan, 1974, pp. 692–693). Mesmer performed his magnetism therapy in a quite extravagant 
manner. At times, he wore a cape and used a wand during the session. Using these theatrics 
unquestionably added to the aura of mystique and flamboyance that surrounded Mesmer, but it 
arguably also damaged his scientific integrity (Woodstock, 2005, pp. 161–162).  
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a leader-figure was not a prerequisite for crowd emergence. Crowds could just as well be 
swayed by some sort of object, performance or spectacle that could attract the attention, 
feed the imagination, and speak to the desire of the masses. In ‘The public and the 
crowd’, Tarde described how a crowd could suddenly emerge in the cityscape: 
 
Passers-by in the streets, each one going about his own business, peasants assembled 
at a fairground, people out walking, may form a dense mass, but they are merely a 
throng until they have a common faith or a common goal that moves them, and 
moves them as one group. As soon as a new spectacle demands their attention, an 
unforeseen danger or sudden indignation orients their hearts toward the same desire, 
that begin to aggregate docilely, and this first degree of the social aggregate is the 
crowd. (Tarde, 1969, p. 288) 
 
The fixity of the attention on a single object entranced the crowd members and made 
them enter into what Tarde termed a ‘collective trance’ or ‘hypnotic state’ (Tarde, 2013, 
p. 236). At that point, the crowd would be gullible and completely susceptible to any 
suggestion imposed on it. This meant that even the smallest affectation could lead to 
extreme emotional fluctuations such as panic and depression as well as ‘collective 
hallucinations’ (Tarde, 2013, p. 236).   
By describing crowds as a ‘hypnotic state’ or ‘collective trance’, Tarde alluded to a 
research tradition that had grown tremendously influential and popular in France in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, namely research in hysteria and hypnotism. Both 
Tarde’s and Le Bon’s work was inspired by and even imbued with ideas from this 
research tradition.49 Experimentation with hypnosis had, according to Tarde, shown that 
49 There existed two prominent camps in French hypnosis research in the late nineteenth century: 
the Paris and the Nancy Schools. The Paris School was located at the famous Salpêtrière hospital in 
Paris and had France’s foremost neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot as its unifying figure. The Nancy 
School was based at the University of Nancy in the eastern part of the country and was headed by 
another renowned neurologist, Hippolyte Bernheim. The point of contention between the two 
opposing schools of hypnosis was the phenomenon of hypnotism in itself. The Paris School 
scientists were convinced that there was a close link between hysteria and hypnosis. Charcot and 
other members of the Paris School used hypnosis as an investigative tool, with which they tried to 
identify different phases of hysteria in patients. Members of the Nancy School, on the contrary, 
argued that it was not merely pathological subjects who could be subjected to hypnosis. They 
believed that every person, pathological or normal, were suggestible to hypnotism, and therefore 
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a mind (the hypnotiser’s) could act upon another mind (the hypnotised subject’s). Tarde 
saw it as the primary objective of his ‘sociological psychology’ to explain this ‘inter-cerebral 
action at a distance’ (Tarde, 1903, p. 204, italics in the original). This connection between 
individual and collective hypnotism and suggestibility was very clearly stated in the work 
of the Harvard psychologist Boris Sidis. Sidis quite effortlessly moved between the 
individual and social mind in his theory of suggestion by basically extrapolating findings 
made in the psychological laboratory to the societal level. Mob violence, mental 
epidemics as well as financial panics and crazes – which were among the socio-
psychological phenomena Sidis examined – were essentially, according to Sidis, social 
equivalents of states in the individual mind. Understanding the notions of suggestion 
and suggestibility was, in Sidis optics, the key to understanding most socio-psychological 
phenomena including financial markets and the forms of collective behaviour that they 
induce and are fundamentally influenced by.  
As I will discuss in the following part of the chapter, the significance of Sidis’ 
psychological and social psychological theories lies in his focus on the moments of 
individual and social transformation. As an experimental psychologist preoccupied with 
suggestion and hypnosis, Sidis was highly attentive to the moment of individual 
there was no direct connection between hypnosis and neurosis (Maehle, 2014, pp. 4–5). It should be 
noted that hysteria was, at the time, one of the most common nervous disorders and the most 
common among females, which arguably explains Charcot’s interest in investigating the disorder 
and why his subjects were predominantly female (Foucault, 1998, pp. 111–113; Micale, 1993, p. 
497). Contrary to Charcot, Bernheim used hypnotic suggestion not with an aim of identifying 
pathological states, but as a form of therapy (Lerner, 1998, pp. 81–82). Le Bon was one of the 
regular attendees at Charcot’s lectures at the Salpêtrière during the last third of the nineteenth 
century. Charcot’s work on hysteria and particularly the work of Charcot’s Paris school disciple 
Théodule Ribot inspired Le Bon, who used ideas about unconscious and automatic action in his 
theory of the psychology of crowds (Nye, 1975, pp. 28–31). Taine, who described his own work as 
‘applied psychology’, also had an affinity for Charcot. Allegedly, Taine should have encouraged a 
young Oxford historian to begin his training under Charcot at the Salpêtrière rather than under the 
philologist Paul Meyer at the École des Chartes (also in Paris), even though the latter would have 
been a more obvious choice for a historian (Fisher, 1908, p. 61). Finally, it should be noted that 
Tarde’s understanding of the social as imitation and imitation as somnambulism or hypnotism was 
particularly influenced by the work of Bernheim (Leys, 1994, p. 211). As outlined, the work of the 
Paris and Nancy School scholars had a great influence on French social psychology and sociology in 
the late nineteenth century (but it also influenced scholars elsewhere in Europe as well as in 
America). 
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transformation, when the subject of experimentation passed from one mental state into 
another. The same was true on the social psychology plane where crowds were, 
according to Sidis, always seemingly on the verge of erupting into a vile mob state. It was 
the same kind of inherent disruptive germ that could suddenly cause fundamental 
destabilisation, which Sidis identified in the financial markets.  
Social suggestibility and crazed markets 
In December 1894, the Atlantic Monthly published an article titled ‘The new criticism of 
genius’, which dealt with human degeneration in modern society. In the article, ‘the 
psychology of crowds’ was described as a newfound interest of ‘Italian and French 
psycho-physiologists’ and as a field of research destined ‘to throw a great deal of light on 
the far-reaching results of every personal state of mind’ (Gorren, 1894, p. 800).50 Three 
months later, in March 1895, the magazine published a piece titled ‘A Study of the Mob’, 
written by a then little-known doctoral student at Harvard: Boris Sidis. The piece is 
considered to be one of the first contributions to crowd psychology written in America 
(Frezza, 2007, p. 108; Leach, 1992, p. 11). Sidis had emigrated from the western part of 
the czar-ruled Russia (now Ukraine) in 1887. After arriving in New York, he went to 
Boston to study at Harvard, where he received his PhD in 1897 (Leach, 1992, p. 14). 
Sidis was known, in posterity, for being extremely ambitious, intellectually 
uncompromising and highly productive (Bruce, 1923, p. 274). In an article in American 
Journal of Sociology, George Edgar Vincent, a sociologist at the University of Chicago, 
listed Sidis alongside Edward A. Ross, Tarde, Sighele and Le Bon as one of the 
important contributors to the ‘morbid psychology of the group, as displayed in mental 
epidemics and mob violence’ (Vincent, 1904, p. 152). Sidis’ contribution to crowd 
50 The article critically assessed the Austrian Zionist, physician and social critic Max Nordau’s 
controversial book Degeneracy (also translated to Degeneration (1895) from the German title Entartung 
(1893)). In his book, Nordau blamed a long line of prominent nineteenth century thinkers, 
novelists, poets and composers such as Tolstoy, Zola, Ibsen, Nietzsche and Wagner for the 
degeneration of the public by adding ‘to the hysteria of the mass by the potent spell of artistic 
suggestion’ (Gorren, 1894, p. 796). Nordau characterised the ‘superior degenerates’ as ‘brilliant and 
erratic workers with pen, word, and pencil’ who rapidly gathered a following and inferred ideas into 
the minds of the masses, which affected them emotionally (Gorren, 1894, p. 796).  
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psychology is found in the aforementioned article ‘A Study of the Mob’, in a Century 
Magazine article titled ‘A Study of Mental Epidemics’ (1896) as well as in his dissertation 
The Psychology of Suggestion: A Research into the Subconscious Nature of Man and Society (1898). 
In the introduction to The Psychology of Suggestion, William James, who was Sidis’ teacher 
and mentor at Harvard, wrote that Sidis had treated the very important yet, in the Anglo-
American context, minimally researched topic of crowd psychology in a ‘highly 
suggestive’ manner (James, 1919 [November 1, 1897], p. vii).51 
Whereas Le Bon and Tarde found inspiration in the psychological experiments 
conducted by members of the Paris and Nancy schools of hypnosis, Sidis’ theory of 
suggestion was mainly based on experiments he had done himself in the psychological 
laboratories at Harvard. Sidis’ notions of the social and psychological characteristics of 
collectives were hence extrapolated from findings he had made in the laboratory. The 
Psychology of Suggestion was thus a continuation of the experimental psychology and 
physiological psychology traditions to which the members of the Nancy and Paris 
(Salpêtrière) Schools as well as James adhered. What Sidis wanted to add and what he 
thought that the discipline of psychology lacked was a ‘strict definition’ of the notion as 
well as a ‘rigorous study’ of the phenomenon of ‘suggestion’ (Sidis, 1919 [1898], p. 5). 
Reducing suggestion and suggestibility to ‘mere symptoms of hysterical neurosis’, as the 
adherents of the Paris School had done, was, Sidis believed, too narrow a definition. 
51 Though James rightly stated that not a lot had been written about crowd psychology in English 
before Sidis’ rather comprehensive study was published, he himself had actually touched upon the 
topic in the second of his ground-breaking two-volume work The Principles of Psychology (1890). For 
example, James pointed out that the audiences at boxing matches were influenced by ‘the contagion 
of a crowd’ and ‘the impulse to imitate and undo’. The excitement surrounding such events was, 
James thought, immensely contagious (James, 1890, pp. 413–414). In the same chapter, in a section 
on ‘play’, James argued that ‘the excitement of concerted action’ during some games was 
comparable to action in ‘an organized crowd’. According to James, in games as in crowds, action 
was for the most part dependent ‘on the initiative of individuals, fixed by imitation and habit’ 
(James, 1890, p. 428). Although James did not pursue the topic of crowd psychology in a systematic 
and methodological manner, the notions of imitation, contagion and suggestion underpinning 
crowd theories of French origin clearly inspired him. In a letter to Graham Wallas, written in 1908, 
James made it clear that he had an affinity for Tarde’s ideas. He wrote that ‘I myself see things a la 
Tarde, perhaps too exclusively’ (Wallas, 1914, p. 121). Whereas James admitted to being greatly 
influenced by Tarde’s ideas, he was, as were many of his colleagues, critical towards Le Bon’s crowd 
psychology (Leach, 1992, p. 26).   
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However, to define suggestion as the cause of a ‘peculiar state of mind in which the 
phenomenon of suggestibility become especially prominent’, as the Nancy School had 
done, was simply too vague (Sidis, 1919, p. 5). Although Sidis thought that both the 
Paris School’s and the Nancy School’s definitions of suggestion and suggestibility were 
either too narrow or too vague, he sided with the ideas of the latter school.    
Aligned with the ideas of the Nancy School, Sidis wanted to prove that it was not 
exclusively pathological subjects who could be subjected to suggestion. On the contrary, 
he insisted that ‘healthy and normal subjects’ who had never been hypnotised and who 
had never dealt in ‘crystal-gazing, shell-hearing, [and] automatic writing’ were also 
suggestible (Sidis, 1919, p. 158). That was what he tried to prove in the three thousand 
laboratory experiments he performed, out of which eight hundred were performed on 
himself and two thousand two hundred on fifty subjects (Sidis, 1919, p. 158). From his 
experiments, Sidis learned that suggestion and suggestibility were fundamental traits of 
not only the subject but also the social. Man was a suggestible animal per excellence, he 
claimed (Sidis, 1919, p. 44). Not unlike Tarde’s claim about imitation being the elemental 
sociological fact, Sidis proposed that suggestibility was the main characteristic of the 
social as such. He defined ‘suggestion’ as ‘the intrusion into the mind of an idea; met 
with more or less opposition by the person; accepted uncritically at last; and realized 
unreflectively, almost automatically’ (Sidis, 1919, p. 15).52 This intrusion of an idea into 
the mind was, Sidis claimed, caused by an imbalance between the conscious and the 
subconscious selves of which the human mind was constituted. 
From psychologists Alfred Binet, Pierre Janet and James, Sidis borrowed the idea of 
‘dual consciousness’, which meant that the mind consisted of two co-existing selves: a 
primary or waking self and a secondary sub-waking or subconscious self. The sub-
waking self should not be mistaken for an unconscious self, because the former was not 
a ‘physiological automatism’. Rather, it was a ‘secondary consciousness, a secondary self’ that 
possessed ‘memory, and even rudimentary intelligence’ (Sidis, 1919, p. 91, 106, 128, 
52 In ‘A Study of Mental Epidemics’, Sidis defined ‘suggestion’ in a slightly more straightforward 
manner, as ‘the impressing on the mind of an idea, image, movement, which the person reproduces 
voluntarily or involuntarily’ (Sidis, 1896, p. 849). 
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italics in the original). The two selves were connected and had the ability to 
communicate, but they occasionally became disaggregated. When a disaggregation of the 
two selves occurred, the individual mind became, Sidis asserted, a ‘highway to 
suggestion’ (Sidis, 1919, p. 179).  
According to Sidis, one of the conditions that most effectively triggered the 
disaggregation of the two selves was a limitation of voluntary movements (Sidis, 1919, p. 
49). James had argued in The Principles of Psychology (1890) that the feeling of individuality 
derived from the ability to move freely and that any limitation of voluntary movements 
would decrease the feeling of individuality (Ch. 26). Neither Sidis nor James saw the 
limitation of the freedom to move as a mere abstract condition to which subjects of 
psychological experimentation were subjected. On the contrary, Sidis believed that the 
limitation of voluntary movements was a regularly occurring social problem that was 
particularly pronounced in modern Western societies: 
 
The individual’s relations in life are fixed for him; he is told how he must put on his 
tie, and the way he must wear his coat; such should be the fashion of his dress on this 
particular occasion, and such should be the form of his hat; here must he nod his 
head, put on a solemn air, and there take off his hat, make a profound bow, and 
display a smile full of delight. Personality is suppressed in the individual by the 
rigidity of social organization; the individual becomes an automaton, a mere puppet. 
Under the enormous weight of the sociostatic press, under the crushing weight of 
economical, political, religious, and social regulations, there is no possibility for the 
individual to determine his own relations in life, to move freely; voluntary 
movements are suppressed, and a limitation of voluntary movements produces that 
peculiar hypnotic state of fascination which is so highly favorable to the formation of 
mobs. (Sidis, 1895, pp. 194–195) 
 
Whenever the controlling primary self was absent, the subject’s self became identical to 
the hypnotic self (Sidis, 1919, p. 180). Hence, being in the state of suggestibility was 
similar to being in a state of hypnosis, as both Le Bon and Tarde had also stressed. As 
already mentioned, this was not merely an individual state. Just like the subject of 
psychological experimentation was brought into entrancement through hypnosis, groups 
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of people could be brought into a similar state of suggestibility through the force of 
fascination (fascination being Sidis’ equivalent of what Le Bon and Tarde called 
‘prestige’). Fascination was, Sidis noted, a tactical means used by crowd leaders (‘heroes’ 
or ‘ringleaders’) in order to plant ‘the seed of a possible mob’ in a crowd of people (Sidis, 
1895, p. 190).  
In ‘A Study of the Mob’, Sidis explained how the bodily squeeze of the physical 
crowd (qua the limitation of the ability to move freely) led to a squeezing of the 
individual mind. The sensible self of the individual seemed, he noted, ‘to get submerged 
in the fermenting spirit of the possible mob’, a spirit that becomes ‘stronger the more it 
consumes of the individual self’ (Sidis, 1895, p. 190). The transformation of the crowd 
into a mob was characterised by this transition from rationality to irrationality, from 
consciousness to sub-consciousness. In essence, Sidis proclaimed, ‘a mob is a 
hypnotized crowd’ (Sidis, 1895, 191). In order to capture the transition from crowd to 
mob, Sidis resorted to the literary work of his compatriot Leo Tolstoy, who, in his 
masterful novel War and Peace (1869), described what Sidis believed was the critical 
moment when the somewhat ordered crowd was about to turn into an unreasoned 
mob:53 
 
The crowd remained silent, and only pressed on one another closer and closer. To 
bear the pressure of one another, to breathe in this stifling, contagious atmosphere, 
not to have the power to stir, and to expect something unknown, incomprehensible 
and terrible, became intolerable. (Tolstoy in Sidis, 1895, p. 191, 1919, p. 301) 
 
Tolstoy’s eloquent description of the moment when mob energy was accumulating in a 
crowd to the point that it was on the verge of boiling over in rampant behaviour is a 
fitting image of the crowd problem on the trading floor of the exchanges.  Jennings’ pit 
(to return to the example used in the opening of the present chapter) was designed to 
prevent scenes such as the one described by Tolstoy, where the bodily pressure from the 
53 Sidis’ way of drawing on Tolstoy’s descriptions of crowd behaviour from War and Peace was 
similar to the ways in which Tarde and Le Bon were influenced by Taine’s vivid portraits of the 
rampaging crowds roaming the Parisian streets during the Revolution.  
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crowd had restricted the individual’s visibility and ability to move voluntarily. (I will 
return to this the bodily dimension of crowd phenomena in the exchange in a moment.)  
The relation between crowds (and their pathological incarnation, the mob) and 
markets was, as already mentioned, explicated by Sidis, who argued that one of the 
places where collective suggestibility was expressed in its most extreme form was in 
financial markets during panics and crazes (Stäheli, 2013, pp. 122–127; Zimmerman, 
2006, pp. 134–135). Stock speculation was, Sidis stressed, an illness ingrained in society, 
particularly in American society, which he perceived as being in a permanent state of 
‘circular insanity’ oscillating back and forth between ‘acute financial mania and attacks of 
religious insanity’ (Sidis, 1919, p. 362). According to Sidis, speculative manias and panics 
that were haunting the U.S. financial markets were amplified by the high suggestibility of 
the American people and the structure of the American society (Leach, 1986, p. 102; 
Sidis, 1896, p. 853).54  
In the chapter ‘Financial Crazes’, in The Psychology of Suggestion, Sidis examined 
different historical speculative manias and epidemics, all of which were taken from 
Charles MacKay’s Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of the Crowd 
(MacKay, 1852a, 1852b [1841]). Out of the three financial crazes examined (the Dutch 
Tulip mania, the South Sea Bubble and John Law’s Mississippi Company Scheme), the 
Tulip mania is arguably the most famous.55 Since he dealt with the cases chronologically, 
54 In an article in The Forum with the title ‘Sociological Questions’, Giddings advanced a somewhat 
similar argument stating that certain sociological questions were of a ‘greater theoretical and 
practical interest for the United States than for any other nation’ and that the ‘American society 
offers the greatest variety of material for an inductive investigation of them’. One of the specific 
questions that Giddings considered to be pertinent to American society was the following: ‘Is dense 
aggregation favorable or unfavorable to contagious emotion and impulsive social action?’ Giddings 
believed that in order to answer this question, the sociologist needed to take psychological factors 
into account – in particular, observations of mob and crowd action (Giddings, 1903b, p. 250). 
55 MacKay’s account of the Tulip mania is widely acknowledged as the standard and original 
description of the event, but MacKay actually borrowed it from Johann Beckmann’s A History of 
Inventions, Discoveries, and Origins (Beckmann, 1846 [1797], pp. 22–31). The economist Peter M. 
Garber has critically assessed the tulip mania, claiming that it was neither a mania nor a case of a 
bursting bubble. Part of Garber’s criticism is directed at well-established economists such as Paul 
Samuelson and Joseph Stiglitz who have, in his opinion, uncritically adopted MacKay’s account as a 
factual depiction of the event (see Garber, 1990, 2000). The criticism that Garber directs at 
contemporary economists’ bubble-studies could also be directed at Sidis’ analysis of excessive 
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the Tulip mania was also where Sidis began his analysis of financial crazes. According to 
MacKay, the Tulip mania began around 1634, when tulip bulbs had become a praised 
and very valuable object of exchange. As a result of the exceptionally high demand for 
tulip bulbs, prices rose drastically between 1634 and 1637. In early 1637, the market for 
tulip bulbs suddenly collapsed, and prices fell to one-tenth of the peak prices (MacKay, 
1852a, pp. 85–92; Sidis, 1919, pp. 343–344). The panic that superseded the mania was 
allegedly amplified by the way in which many of the tulip-deals were constructed.56 What 
made the tulip mania a widespread panic was, according to Sidis, that ‘social suggestion 
began to work in the opposite direction’, which meant that the speculative craze turned 
into a panic that took over the minds of the tulip bulb speculators (Sidis, 1919, pp. 343–
344). Just as crowds were constantly at risk of erupting into the pathological mob-state, 
the speculative markets seemed to always be on the verge of a mental epidemic, at least 
when viewed through MacKay’s lens, as Sidis did. Sidis noted that one moment the 
market seemed to be in ‘a state of maniacal exaltation’, and in the next ‘a state of still 
more acute melancholic depression’ (Sidis, 1919, pp. 348–349, italics in the original).57 
The markets were, following Sidis, always in a transitory state. Like the subject being 
speculation in financial markets. By using MacKay’s popular accounts or “folklore finance” as 
empirical evidence, Sidis based his rather bold claims about the functioning of markets on rather 
questionable grounds.   
56 Many tulip bulbs were bought and sold in deals similar to the way within which options are being 
bought and sold (Malkiel, 2012, p. 39). In practice, the deals were constructed so that the buyer 
bought the right, but not the obligation, to buy a certain amount of bulbs at a specifically given time 
for a certain price. (The amount, expiration time and prices were agreed upon as part of the deal 
between the seller and the buyer.) The buyer paid the seller a fee (the premium), which was the 
price of the option. If the price of tulips had not collapsed but maintained its upward surge, buyers 
would have secured a significant profit. But the collapse occurred and the price fell well below the 
price agreed upon in the deals. As a result, buyers chose not to buy the tulips, which meant that 
sellers were defaulting one by one (MacKay, 1852a, p. 90). The option-like deal structure made it 
possible for more people to invest, because the option price was relatively low compared to the 
actual price of the bulbs. This made the market much larger and increased the potential profits but 
also the risk (Malkiel, 2012, p. 39). 
57 Sidis’ interpretation of MacKay’s account of the Dutch Tulip Mania was echoed, in a shortened 
version, in Ross’ Social Psychology: An Outline and a Source Book (1908). Ross stressed that crowd 
psychology had been one of the primary causes of the Tulip Mania, as it had also been in other 
panics and crazes (Ross, 1908, pp. 71–72).  
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primed for hypnotism or other experiments with subconscious suggestion, the markets 
were extraordinarily susceptible to suggestion. 
 
Sidis perceived financial markets as a socio-psychological phenomenon in a state of 
permanent (intruding) crisis. Although this was perhaps not surprising considering that 
his only source of empirical data was MacKay’s Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions 
and the Madness of the Crowd, a consequence was that the state of normalcy, i.e. order and 
stability, did not exist in Sidis’ conception of the financial markets. It was either one or 
the other extreme. Panics or crazes occurred in the financial markets because individual 
speculators were brought into a state of abnormal suggestibility, which then propagated 
through the capillaries of the social. The market actors went from being constituents of 
an unstable but somewhat ordered crowd to being part of an unthinking and ferocious 
mob. By making a diagnosis of the state of speculative markets on the basis of his 
experiments in individual psychology, Sidis accentuated that the problem of crowds was 
essentially a problem of individuation. He simultaneously problematised the modern 
conditions of economic life that he assumed were diminishing the individual’s mental 
and physical movability, which increased the risk of outbursts of mob behaviour. There 
seemed to be but few places where the socio-static press from the crowd was stronger 
and the limitation of voluntary movements more pronounced than on the trading floor 
of a stock or commodity exchange on a busy day. The implications of bodies pressing 
against each other and the corresponding squeeze of minds are among the issues I will 
attend to in the following and final part of the chapter. 
Crowd psychology on the floor of the exchange 
 
Ideas, sentiments, emotions, and beliefs possess in crowds a contagious power as 
intense as that of microbes. This phenomenon is very natural, since it is observed 
even in animals when they are together in number. […] A panic that has seized on a 
few sheep will soon extend to the whole flock. In the case of men collected in a 
crowd all emotions are very rapidly contagious, which explains the suddenness of 
panics. (Le Bon, 1896, p. 128) 
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 In the article ‘The sociological view of history’ published in the first-ever issue of the 
Sociological Review, the English historian Herbert Fisher argued that some sociologists 
were becoming increasingly aware that besides paying attention to the psychology of 
individuals, they had to be equally attentive to ‘the psychology of crowds, and to the 
psychological states produced by the aggregation of men in urban centres’ (Fisher, 1908, 
p. 62). Tarde’s The Laws of Imitation was, Fisher noted, one of the ‘brilliant examples’ of 
this kind of modern sociological research, which he, without being derogatory, described 
as ‘common-sense psychology’ applied to the field of social enquiry (Fisher, 1908, p. 62). 
While praising crowd psychology-informed sociological inquiries, Fisher inferred what 
could be read as a somewhat convoluted invitation to sociology to take up additional 
inquiries, when stating that ‘the psychology of the stock exchange still awaits its Walter 
Bagehot’ (Fisher, 1908, p. 62).58 Fisher was most likely unaware that Tarde had already 
applied his sociological psychology to the stock exchange in a two-volume work entitled 
Psychologie Économique that was based on a series of lectures he held at the Collège de 
France during the years 1900 and 1901 (Hughes, 1961). Furthermore, applications of 
‘common-sense psychology’ in the empirical field of the stock exchange had also been 
made outside the field of sociology. In this final part of the chapter, I start out by 
discussing an attempt to outline a psychology of the commercial crisis using ideas from 
crowd theory and social psychology. The understanding of the psychology of a 
commercial or financial crisis that I excavate in the following section is closely associated 
with the physical dimension of markets and the corporeal aspects of trading epitomised 
58 Bagehot was a British journalist and business man who wrote the influential book Lombard Street 
(1873) about the English money market as well as several other seminal books and articles on 
primarily politics and finance. What Fisher meant by stating that the psychology of the stock 
exchange awaited someone like Bagehot was that there seemed to be a demand for a psychological 
study of the stock exchange of the calibre of Bagehot’s study of the English money market. Besides 
being an authority on the subject of finance, Bagehot was also one of the first to claim, as Tarde did 
later on, that imitation (conscious and unconscious) was an organising force in society. In Physics and 
Politics (1873), Bagehot argued that ‘unconscious imitation’ was ‘the main force which moulds and 
fashions men in society as we now see it’ (p. 97, pp. 32–33). In the same volume, Bagehot also 
elaborated on the gregariousness of people. Furthermore, his analysis of the imitative and herding 
propensities of especially ‘primitive societies’ have many overlaps with Le Bon’s study of the 
psychology of peoples and of crowds (Bagehot, 1873, pp. 100–104; see Le Bon, 1898, 1899).  
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by open outcry trading on the floor of the exchange. After exploring these dimensions 
of floor trading, I then turn to Tarde’s economic psychology in which he described and 
analysed stock exchanges as ‘laboratories of collective psychology’ (Tarde, 1902a, p. 
225). 
 
In Economic Crises (1900), assistant professor of Economics and Commercial Geography 
of the University of Michigan Edward David Jones drew on a range of ideas from crowd 
and imitation-suggestion theory in an attempt to carve out an outline of the ‘chief 
psychological phenomena of crises’ (p. 181). Following psychological and sociological 
studies of social epidemics and crowds, Jones argued that one of the main reasons why 
crises occurred in the stock market was that people were both physically and mentally 
closely associated, which meant that beliefs, opinions and emotions could easily spread 
through a crowd of people via contagion. Furthermore, Jones noted that individuals 
were most often guided by the opinions of others rather than by their own autonomous 
beliefs.59 The imperfections and general erroneous ways of the ‘individual mind’ were, he 
noted, only amplified in the ‘social mind’ (Jones, 1900, pp. 199–200). In the stock 
exchange, the imperfect functioning of the social mind could lead to the ‘mutual 
accumulations of error’ that transpired via the inter-mental processes of ‘sympathy’ or 
‘contagion’ (Jones, 1900, pp. 203–204, p. 205).60 Since the ‘sympathetic force’ or ‘mental 
59 A similar view of the psychology of financial crisis is found in the Republican politician and 
financial writer Theodore E. Burton’s Financial Crisis and Periods of Industrial and Commercial Depression 
(1902), in which Burton argued that ‘many of the phenomena of crisis remain capable of 
explanation only as the result of various characteristics of human nature, which cannot be classified 
according to any established rule, and seem to be more or less capricious, such as the tendency of 
men to move in a mass; the disposition to alternate moods of hope and discouragement, of trust 
and distrust; to excessive action and inaction by turns’ (p. 130). Another diagnosis of the 
psychology of speculative crazes and panics was made by Professor of Psychology at the University 
of Iowa George Thomas White Patrick in the article ‘The Psychology of Crazes’ published in 
Popular Science Monthly (Patrick, 1900). 
60 Tarde noted that ‘sympathy’ was a type of mutual imitation ‘produced only in our so-called 
waking life and among people who seem to exercise no magnetic influence over one another’ 
(Tarde, 1903, p. 79). Drawing on Adam Smith, Tarde argued that sympathy was a form of ‘mutual 
imitation’ (or ‘fellow-feeling’) and further argued that it was ‘the primary source of sociability and the 
hidden source or overt soul of every kind of imitation’ (Smith, 2009 [1759], p. 48; Tarde, 1903, p. 
79, 79, n. 2, italics in the original). Despite terming sympathy ‘the soul of imitation’, Tarde stressed 
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contagion’ that transmitted erroneous beliefs among people allegedly worked more 
effectively among people closely associated in crowds than among separated individuals, 
the exchange’s densely packed trading floor presented an optimal setting for an outburst 
of what Jones termed – citing Sidis’ Atlantic Monthly article ‘A Study of the Mob’ – 
unthinking and ferocious ‘mob action’ (Jones, 1900, p. 202, 204). Like Jennings, who had 
expressed his concern with crowding in his patent application for the improved trading 
pit, Jones saw crowding as challenging effective trading in the exchange and ultimately as 
a trigger of panic and subsequent crisis. The limitation of voluntary movements, the lack 
of visibility and the annulment of sensible communication on a crowded trading floor in 
a very active market could lead to an eruption of irrational crowd behaviour. The 
physical pressure on the body was, following Sidis, also a pressure on the mind that 
could force the individual into a state of suggestibility and the gathering of traders on the 
floor into a mob-state. 
Just as crowd theorists discussed how modern communication technology and 
urbanisation had increased the risk of mental contagion Jones, drawing on Tarde’s 
reflections on the intensification of imitation in urban environments from The Laws of 
Imitation, argued that ‘the railway, telegraph, and telephone’ had increased the ‘power of 
mental contagion’.61 Jones added that the practices by which business was conducted in 
that ‘prestige’ and not ‘sympathy’ was the ‘foundation and origin of society’, because the ‘unilateral 
must have preceded the reciprocal’ (Tarde, 1903, p. 79). It thus seemed that unilateral prestige was a 
more prevalent form of imitation in crowds than sympathy. However, Tarde did not rule out the 
possibility that a positive form of fellow-feeling, i.e. sympathy, occurred in certain types of crowds. 
61 Urbanisation was a fairly popular theme in social psychology and sociology in the late nineteenth 
century and particularly in the beginning of the twentieth century. In The Laws of Imitation Tarde, for 
example, wrote that ‘[i]n the prodigious growth, in the hypertrophy of great cities and, especially, of 
capitals, […] is to be found the kind of inequality which modern life creates and which it finds 
indispensable, in fact, in managing and promoting the great currents of its industrial production and 
consumption, i.e., of imitation on an immense scale’ (Tarde, 1903, p. 226, italics in the original). 
Crowd behaviour was, however, not considered solely a metropolitan phenomenon, even though it 
was often associated with and identified in the urban environment. In an article in The Forum, 
Giddings argued that although it was normal in political science to associate all the evils and dangers 
of ‘the mob spirit’ with a ‘democratic organization of great cities’, crowd behaviour was primarily a 
phenomenon associated with rural communities (Giddings, October-December 1903, p. 251). Even 
though there had been, Giddings admitted, wild riots and collective violence in the great cities of 
Europe and America, these events did not compare with the epidemics of emotion sweeping the 
rural communities. The reason for this was, according to Giddings, that rural communities were 
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the stock and produce exchanges only further enhanced mental contagion (Jones, 1900, 
p. 205).62 The overarching problem of the physical proximity of traders on the 
exchanges’ trading floors or the mental touch of the market facilitated via telephones, 
telegraphs and stock tickers or the financial pages was, according to Jones, that it 
allowed for an intoxication of the mind that paralysed thought (Jones, 1900, p. 206). 
Drawing on the work of German psychiatrist Albert Moll (as Sidis had also done in The 
Psychology of Suggestion), Jones pointed out that the sympathetic influence that people were 
moved by in the exchanges and other densely populated spaces was ‘allied to hypnotic 
influence’ (Jones, 1900, pp. 205–206, n. 27; Sidis, 1919, pp. 73–76). In the 1880s, Moll 
visited both Charcot at the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris and Bernheim at the University 
of Nancy, and it was particularly the latter’s views on hypnotism and suggestion that 
shaped Moll’s own work on the subject, which culminated with the publication of 
Hypnotism in 1890 (Maehle, 2014, pp. 4–6). By employing Moll’s work, Jones thus also 
indirectly drew on the French hypnosis research tradition that had so greatly influenced 
Tarde, Le Bon and Sidis.63 Jones’ psychology of crisis was essentially a description of the 
delusions of individual traders and the ways in which these individual delusions had a 
tendency to transform into collective hallucinations in the exchanges when trading 
became intense and traders crowded the trading floor. One could say, following Fisher, 
that Jones applied a crowd psychological framework to the market itself. Crowd 
homogeneous and the population of great cities heterogeneous. However, Giddings did emphasise 
that dealing with crowd behaviour, in all settings, was an important task for the sociologist 
(Giddings, October-December 1903, pp. 250–251). 
62 Since Economic Crises was published prior to the first English translation of The Laws of Imitation, 
Jones did not quote the book directly. Instead, he quoted a summary of the book published in 1893 
in a Bureau of Education circular. The passage that Jones quoted was a composition of extracts 
from chapter 6, ‘Extra-Logical Influences’, in which Tarde explained how imitation in large cities 
was ‘proportionate to the density of their population and to the multiform multiplicity of the 
relations of their inhabitants’ (Tarde, 1903, p. 239).  
63 Besides mentioning and discussing the work of Tarde, Sidis and Moll, Jones also drew upon the 
work of Cesare Lombroso, MacKay’s history of crowd folly, Walter Bagehot’s Physics and Politics as 
well as the work of notable psychologists such as Alexander Bain and Hugo Münsterberg.  
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psychology was thus the prism through which he made the chief psychological 
phenomena of crisis stand out.64 
A year after the publication of Economic Crises, the New York Stock Exchange 
experienced a financial panic during which many of the psychological phenomena that 
Jones had discussed seemed to appear. On May 9, 1901, panic broke out on the trading 
floor of the exchange – a panic that the acclaimed financial editor and journalist 
Alexander Dana Noyes some years later deemed an event ‘rarely paralleled in the history 
of speculative manias’ (Noyes, 1909, p. 300). The panic was sparked by a struggle to gain 
the control of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company with the combatants being 
Edward H. Harriman, the director of the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroad, 
on one side, and James Hill, the director of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific 
Railroad, on the other. (John D. Rockefeller and Jay Gould backed Harriman, while J. P. 
Morgan and Cornelius Vanderbilt stood by Hill.) When the price of Northern Pacific 
started soaring, every trader and investor wanted to buy the stock and started selling 
their stockholdings in other companies in order to mobilise funds to buy Northern 
Pacific. As a result, most stock-prices, with the exception of Northern Pacific, started to 
decline, and as the ‘contagion’ began to spread, the market fell drastically (The New 
York Times, May 9, 1901a). Those who had thought that selling Northern Pacific stock 
short, in the hope that it would decline and not continue its upward surge, was a good 
decision ended up losing everything.  
An article in The New York Times reported of ‘pandemonium’ on the floor and of 
panic spreading outside in the corridors and in the Stock Exchange’s visitors’ gallery, 
which, according to the article in The Times, had to be closed when the onlookers became 
too excited and too many in numbers (The New York Times, May 9, 1901a). The mental 
contagion that Jones had identified as one of the psychological phenomena of a crisis 
seemed to have worked indiscriminately during the panic of 1901. Traders active on the 
64 A lengthy excerpt from Economic Crises, in which Jones explained how mental contagion was 
enhanced by the practice of trading in the crowded stock and produce exchanges, was later featured 
in a chapter on ‘The Crowd’ in Ross’ Social Psychology (1908, pp. 58–59). Curiously, Ross did not 
mention that Jones was actually drawing on Tarde’s imitation theory in the passage he quoted. 
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floor as well as visitors in the exchange’s visitors’ gallery had felt the mental strain of the 
panic and the bodily expressions it provoked. A broker told The Times that panic had hit 
so suddenly that ‘conservative men lost their heads’ and that ‘reputable church going 
members of society’ had used language ‘that would not bear repetition under ordinary 
circumstances in a barroom of even the second class’ (The New York Times, 10 May 
1901b). The ‘mad struggle’ had made otherwise ‘rational and responsible’ persons act as 
‘insane men’ who literally fought with each other on the trading floor (The New York 
Times, 9 May 1901a). In accordance with Le Bon’s characteristic of the crowd, the 
feeling of individual responsibility among brokers, clerks and traders on the floor had, 
according to the eyewitnesses’ statements featured in The Times, disappeared or been 
numbed during the panic. Noyes concurred, stating that no one escaped the mania that 
day; even the ‘experienced capitalists lost their heads’ (Noyes, 1909b, pp. 300–301). The 
excitement on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange was, Noyes recollected, so 
strong that exchange officials found it necessary to intervene and stop the trading:  
 
Execution of the orders on the floor of the Stock Exchange, under the prevalent 
conditions of excitement, so manifestly threatened physical break-down of the 
brokers that the governing committee took the quite unprecedented step of declaring 
an extra Stock Exchange holiday to give the membership a rest. (Noyes, 1909, pp. 
300–301) 
 
That trading was stopped and an extra exchange holiday declared can be read as a token 
of how physically challenging floor trading could be during these extreme phases of 
trading. Thus, the activity on the floor took its toll, not only on the minds of the brokers 
and traders (and the audiences) but on their bodies as well. Although physical presence 
was not required for mental contagion to be able to spread from one mind to another (at 
least according to Le Bon), the physical presence and proximity of bodies nevertheless 
seemed to increase the intensity of the imitation-contagion dynamic, as Jones had noted 
with reference to Tarde’s imitation theory. The accounts of the panic emphasised the 
psychological dimension of trading and implied that there seemed to be a parallel and 
perhaps a connection between the destabilisation of the market and the mental stability 
88 
 
of market actors. Similar reflections about the emotional contagion and different 
obstacles to reasonable social interaction on the trading floor of an exchange were 
formulated by Tarde in Psychologie Économique, in which he drew his own sociological 
conclusions from what had happened at the New York Stock Exchange on 9 May 1901. 
Sociological research in the laboratory of collective psychology 
Minimal scholarly attention has been directed towards Tarde’s reflections about the 
financial markets in his economic psychology (one possible reason being that Psychologie 
Économique has not been translated into English).65 Apart from Karl-Erik Wäneryd’s 
article ‘The psychological underpinnings of economics: Economic psychology according 
to Gabriel Tarde’ (2008), Bruno Latour and Vincent Antonin Lépinay’s short book The 
Science of Passionate Interests: An Introduction to Gabriel Tarde’s Economic Anthropology (2009) is 
arguably the most thorough examination of Tarde’s economic psychology (or 
‘anthropology’, as they choose to call it).66 Latour and Lépinay’s interest primarily lies in 
the intermingling of the technical and the social as well as the calculable and the 
psychological that Tarde saw as elemental to the way markets in general and stock 
markets in particular functioned (Latour and Lepinay, 2009, pp. 59–65). I am, in the 
context of this dissertation, exclusively interested in the places in Psychologie Économique 
where Tarde’s theory of imitation, his notion of the collective and the crowd and his 
understanding of the financial markets converge. The panic on 9 May 1901 represents, I 
will argue, one of these points of convergence. 
65 Some scholars have, however, shown interest in Psychologie Économique, mostly in the similarities 
between Tarde’s ideas about ‘invention’ and ‘the entrepreneur’ and Joseph Schumpeter’s later work 
on ‘innovation’ as well as ‘the entrepreneur’ (Lepinay, 2007; Michaelides and Theologou, 2010; 
Taymans, 1950). Furthermore, in a 2007 special issue on Tarde in Economy and Society, several articles 
engaged with aspects of his economic psychology (Barry and Thrift, 2007; Blackman, 2007; 
Lepinay, 2007; Toscano, 2007). Also included in the special issue was a translation, by Alberto 
Toscano, of a part of Psychologie Économique (Tarde, 2007). It is also worth mentioning Everett C. 
Hughes’ article ‘Tarde’s Psychologie Économique: An unknown classic by a forgotten sociologist’ 
published in The American Journal of Sociology in 1961. Hughes argued that Psychologie Économique, which 
unfortunately had been ‘completely ignored by social scientists’, was a sociological classic that could 
serve as a rich source of ideas for sociologists (Hughes, 1961, p. 553). 
66 Maurizio Lazzarato also briefly mentions Tarde’s ideas about the financial markets in a critique of 
contemporary financial capitalism (Lazzarato, 2004, pp. 195–197). 
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Tarde described the panic as an outcome of a ‘dual of two trusts’ and as a struggle 
between ‘two great kings of finance’ (Tarde, 1902b, p. 118).67 He also noticed the bodily 
and spatial dimensions of the panic that Noyes later addressed. Tarde argued that the 
brokers on the New York Stock Exchange trading floor had been unable to process the 
large number of orders simply because the atmosphere had been so hectic that they had 
been unable to hear each other. The consequence of these physical and spatial obstacles 
to trading was, according to Tarde, that in the opposite corners of the trading floor the 
same security was sold, at the same time, at a completely different price (Tarde, 1902b, p. 
41, n. 18). The panic of 1901 had shown, Tarde argued, that stock markets, as most 
other places where social action took place, were not free of imitative dynamics and 
mental contagion (Tarde, 1902b, p. 119). The stock exchanges were, he proclaimed, 
continuously active ‘laboratories of collective psychology’ (Tarde, 1902a, p. 225). Like 
Sidis, who had taken his findings from the psychological laboratory and extrapolated 
them to the societal level, including the financial markets, Tarde saw the stock exchange 
as a place where socio-psychological processes were constantly taking place.  
In Psychologie Économique, Tarde extended his idea of the social, as underpinned by 
imitation, to the economy and the financial markets. On the opening page of volume 
one, Tarde described ‘society’ as a network of inter-mental actions, of mental states 
acting upon each other (Tarde, 1902a, p. 11, paraphrase). Like sociology and social life, 
economic science and economic life were, according to Tarde, constituted of a melange 
of inter-mental connections and relations (Blackman, 2007, p. 576; Tarde, 2007).68 The 
stock exchange was an ideal venue for observing these inter-mental actions at a distance. 
Tarde referred to ‘the stock exchange’ as a place dominated by psychological influences 
and inter-mental actions that passed from one brain to another via imitation and 
67 Tarde wrote that the panic occurred on 10 May 1901, perhaps mistaking the publication date of 
the Evening News article he used as a reference for the actual date of the panic (Tarde, 1902b, p. 41, 
p. 118). 
68 I use the term ‘inter-mental’, which is a direct translation of the French term ‘inter-mental’ that 
Tarde used in Psychologie Économique. Besides the term ‘inter-mental’, Tarde throughout both 
volumes used the terms ‘inter-spiritual’ and ‘inter-cerebral’. These three terms are closely related, 
almost to the point that Tarde used them interchangeably (Tarde, 1902a, p. 83).      
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contagion (Tarde, 1902b, p. 136, paraphrase). The market activity in the exchanges 
revealed and highlighted the subjective sides of economic and financial phenomena 
instead of neglecting or downright ignoring it, as Tarde believed economists often did 
(Tarde, 1969a [1898], p. 314, 2007 [1902], p. 631).69 Market fluctuations were, Tarde 
thought, products of collective psychology. Prices did not move as the thermometer’s 
mercury level, which naturally followed increases and decreases in the temperature. They 
were, on the contrary, informed and shaped by the sentiments of the traders and the 
general mood created by the imitative spread of affect in the market (Tarde, 1902b, p. 
41). 
In Monadology and Sociology (1893), Tarde used the same thermometer metaphor when 
describing the stock exchange: He described the exchanges as the modern markets’ 
‘special thermometers’ (pp. 42–43). The stock exchange was, he thought, an emblematic 
example of the social evolution of commerce from a primitive phase to a much more 
sophisticated one. Compared to the primitive phase with no fixed prices and unregulated 
haggling, the modern markets were, Tarde argued, uniform and regulated (Tarde, 2012 
[1893], pp. 42–43). The ‘regularity and almost physical inevitability of the overall 
economic facts’ allegedly characterising the modern market, did not, Tarde emphasised, 
eradicate but supported the ‘unbridled impulse to speculation and the spirit of 
enterprise’ (Tarde, 2012, p. 43). The economic ‘facts’ directing the functioning of the 
modern markets thus encouraged, in Tarde’s opinion, a form of market action (i.e. 
69 Tarde’s criticism of the prevailing theories of economics was snubbed by most economists of his 
time. Many regarded Tarde’s economic psychology as no more than mere ‘psychologism’ 
(Michaelides and Theologou, 2010, n. 7, p. 369). ‘Psychologism’ was a label that Tarde’s critics, 
including Durkheim, also tended to associate with his theory of imitation (Presskorn-Thygesen, 
2017, p. 148, n. 402). One of the possible reasons why Tarde’s economic psychology was not taken 
up or taken more seriously by economists was that Tarde engaged with contemporary theories of 
economics in a somewhat superficial manner. He referred to the thoughts and ideas of ‘economists’ 
as if they were a completely homogenous group, and when he did refer to specific economists, it 
was predominantly prominent figures of classical economy such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. 
He did, to be fair, mention contemporaries from the field of economics such as Carl Menger, 
Adolph Wagner and Gustave Von Schmöller, but only once and only as an example of economists 
who had, in Tarde’s opinion, to some extent dealt with economic psychology (Tarde, 1902a, p. 102). 
Based on Tarde’s thoughts on desires and needs in the second volume of Psychologie Économique, 
Wärneryd suspects that Tarde had not even read Menger’s work on marginal utility, since there were 
clear overlaps but no references (Wärneryd, 2008, p. 1697). 
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speculation) that made the ‘psychological particularities of the players break forth 
lawlessly in sudden triumphs or catastrophes’ (Tarde, 2012, p. 43). Therefore, even 
though the modern markets were highly regulated, ordered and uniform, speculation was 
nevertheless inferring an element of psychological bias into the instrumental setting of 
the modern stock markets. The bartering of speculators in the exchanges thus brought 
forth the speculators’ ‘psychological particularities’ or subjective factors through which 
they were mutually affected via processes of imitation and contagion. 
Belief was one of the subjective factors or psychological particularities that, according 
to Tarde, played a major role in the formation of prices in the stock exchange just as it 
did in the formation of crowds. Tarde claimed that beliefs of stock speculators were to a 
large extent determined by factors such as ‘prestige’ and fascination (Tarde, 1902b, p. 
41). In crowds, prestige was, as I have mentioned earlier, a force emanating from a 
charismatic leader-figure, a specific object or a spectacle that made people succumb to 
the rule of the crowd’s mind. The beliefs of exchange-speculators were, in a similar 
manner, swayed by prestigious securities (objects), panics (spectacles) or the trades made 
by successful traders (market/crowd leaders) whom they were fascinated by (Tarde, 
1902a, p. 84, 137). Although the action of individual speculators may have appeared to 
be a product of informed judgements, Tarde asserted that investment decisions were 
always influenced by the beliefs of other market participants. Beliefs were often 
informed – with or without the individual being aware of it – by contagion from 
‘sensational news’ and ‘corridor conversations’ (Tarde, 1902a, p. 139, 1902b, p. 41).70 
Like Le Bon had pointed out in The Psychology of Socialism, Tarde perceived the opinions 
and beliefs of speculators as being swayed by certain types of financial news, which, 
70 To Tarde, it was an illusion to think that real market actors were able to make decisions without 
being affected by imitation in one way or the other. To think that the economic man, homo 
æconomicus, was an adequate representation of the human being in economic life was, in Tarde’s 
opinion, preposterous. The economic man was, he argued, (a) devoid of emotion and (b) 
completely detached from associations of any kind (such as a group, corporation, homeland etc.). 
Tarde saw this abstract persona as simply mutilating to the general understanding of economic 
science and economic life (Tarde, 2007 [1902], p. 631).  
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again, had direct influence on the movements of prices in the markets.71 Markets were, 
Tarde pointed out, mainly driven by psychological causes – ‘sensations, emotions, ideas 
or volitions’ – rather than natural causes. Using yet another measuring device – the 
barometer – as a metaphor to describe market dynamics, Tarde argued that:  
 
the peaks and troughs of values in the stock market, unlike the oscillations of a 
barometer, could not even remotely be explained without considering their 
psychological causes: a fit of hope or discouragement in the public, the propagation 
of a good or bad sensational story in the minds of speculators. (Tarde, 2007 [1902], p. 
630) 
 
That psychological causes influenced the movements of stock prices were, according to 
Tarde, not a problem per se but rather a fact that had to be acknowledged. In Penal 
Philosophy, Tarde had already underlined that the ‘so-called law’ of supply and demand 
that allegedly ruled in the exchanges was also no more than a mere construction or 
‘pretended law’ with which people let themselves be guided (Tarde, 1968 [1890], p. 405). 
 
Thus, to Tarde, it was only obvious that people trading securities in the exchanges were 
moved by factors such as prestige, fascination, fashion and rampant emotion. Tarde 
believed that financial markets were highly organised institutions in which actors mostly 
adhered rigorously to self-imposed pretended economic laws. However, it was an 
undeniable fact, he thought, that the socio-psychological processes of imitation, 
contagion and unconscious’ following of leads, leader-figures or leading stocks happened 
constantly in the exchange. Viewed through the lens of Tarde’s imitation theory, markets 
71 Tarde was, however, not sceptical about all kinds of financial news. In The Laws of Imitation, Tarde 
bemoaned that the informative and useful graphical curves ‘showing the fluctuations of the 
different securities of the stock-exchange’ were relegated to the last pages of the daily newspapers. 
He fantasised that such statistical representations would, in the future, replace the polemical stories 
filling the pages of the newspapers. This would turn the papers into providers of ‘exact and 
ungarnished fact’ (Barry and Thrift, 2007, pp. 516–517; Tarde, 1903, pp. 135–136). ‘Statistics of 
stock-exchange values’ were, as Tarde later noted in Social Laws: An Outline of Sociology (1899), 
expressions of variations in ‘public confidence’ regarding the success or possible failure of some 
listed company (p. 36). Stock-price statistics was thus, according to Tarde, reflecting collective 
psychological factors. This praise of graphical representations of securities prices reflects Tarde’s 
predilection for statistical representations rather than for financial markets.  
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were thus subjected to the same kinds of inter-mental action prevalent in every other 
social sphere. For example, in order to understand how the price of a particular security 
could rise or fall dramatically from one moment to the other, it was not enough to 
consult the so-called fundamentals of the market or look for unexpected external events 
that could have shrugged the markets. Instead, it was also necessary to examine and 
understand the psychological causes that occasionally turned the slightest of oscillations 
in prices into a massive decline or rise. This way of discussing transactions in markets as 
psychological processes and comparing market events to crowd phenomena would, as I 
will examine in the chapters that follow, profoundly influence discourses on and 
perceptions of financial markets and speculation in America in the following decades.      
Conclusion  
The problematisations and discussions of financial markets examined in this chapter – 
regardless of whether it was specific events such as Leiter’s attempt to corner the wheat 
market, the panic at the New York Stock Exchange in 1901 or more general elaborations 
such as Jones’ and Jennings’ concerns about the concentration of traders on the trading 
floors of the U.S. exchanges – show that crowd theory provided a vocabulary and a set 
of notions well-suited to articulate and describe seemingly pertinent problems associated 
with financial markets and the speculation carried out in them. The crowd theoretical 
framework provided by the likes of Le Bon, Tarde and Sidis neatly described non-
economic factors that they perceived as influencing the movement of prices and the 
minds of traders in the volatile U.S. financial markets in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The leader-follower dynamic could, for example, make it possible to 
explain excessive speculation as instigated by a suggestion from somewhere and/or 
someone. The same can be said about the idea that emotions were contagious and could 
derail the reasoning powers of the individual. This idea did, for example, substantiate the 
claim that excessive and unfounded speculation was more likely to happen in the 
exchange if the trading floor was densely packed with traders. Ultimately, the crowd 
theorists’ explorations of markets rendered it probable that markets and speculation 
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could and perhaps ought to be examined as socio-psychological phenomena and not 
exclusively as economic entities and practices. Presenting market phenomena as 
expressions of certain socio-psychological processes identifiable in other parts of the 
social made it possible to draw parallels between and make analogous readings of the 
problems unfolding in society and the practices of actors in the markets. As a 
consequence of this conflation of market and crowd phenomena, the boundary between 
what could be considered the interior of the markets and the exterior became blurred. 
As I will examine and discuss in the following chapters, this circumstance created an 
opportunity for various critical readings of the alleged sociality and psychology of 
markets as well as the mental proficiencies of the investors and speculators trading in 
them.  
By asserting that market action was influenced by collective emotions and thus by the 
temperament of investors and speculators, the crowd theorists and those employing 
their ideas to market phenomena rendered it probable that aspects of the individual 
market actor’s psychological constitution such as mental tenacity, suggestibility, credulity 
and excitability were relevant to the organisation of financial markets. In Chapter 3, I 
examine concerns about mental contagion and crowd behaviour that were raised in 
debates about the popularisation of and public participation in financial markets. The 
psychology of the public did, in many financial writers’ and other observers’ opinion, 
disqualify members of the public from the practices of investment and speculation. 
Critics of public participation in the established financial markets argued there were 
groups of people who were not qualified to invest, let alone speculate. Some people 
were, as I show in the following chapter, more susceptible to following the crowd or 
herd than others and therefore were incapable of enduring the immense mental strain of 
the market atmosphere.  
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Chapter 3: The speculative public and the 
popularisation of financial markets 
 
Wall Street had a little lamb, 
Its fleece was very thick;  
At every turn the market took 
The lamb was sure to stick.  
 
Moses Smith, Wall Street Lamb, 1887, p. 22, first verse 
 
[T]he firm had no consideration for the “outsiders,” the “public” – the Lambs. The 
Lambs! Such a herd, timid, innocent, feeble, as much out of place in La Salle Street as 
a puppy in a cage of panthers.  
 
Frank Norris, The Pit, 1903, p. 81  
 
Really, the best of our business, the very foundation of it, will be found among the 
people of modest means, the crowd of nobodies who speculate. 
 
Émile Zola, L’Agent, 1890, p. 88   
 
During the late nineteenth century, an increasing number of Americans developed an 
interest in the business conducted in and around the stock and commodity exchanges. 
Along with the public’s increasing interest in markets and speculation came, for some, 
burgeoning aspirations and desires to take an active part in ‘the game’. As Mark Twain 
and Charles Dudley Warner wrote in their famous novel The Gilded Age (1901 [1873]), it 
was a time when all young men ‘caught the fever of speculation’ (p. 208).72 As the fever 
of speculation, to stick to that metaphor, caught hold of a still greater part of the 
American public, concerns grew over the possible consequences of this popularisation 
of financial markets. While some observers argued that an inflow of outsiders would 
destabilise the markets on the nation’s stock and commodity exchanges with significant 
72 The novel’s title alluded to the thin linings of gold gilded upon otherwise inferior metals, yet it 
later came to be used as a label for the entire period from around 1870 to 1900. 
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national economic consequences to follow, others were more worried about the 
financial, social and mental well-being of the newcomers who were entering the 
exchanges or brokerage offices seemingly without any experience, plan or proper market 
knowledge.    
Gradually, as public interest and participation increased, financial writers began to 
devote more of their attention to the activities and characteristics of non-professional 
market actors. This new class of investors and speculators were often referred to as the 
‘investing’ or ‘speculative public’, but most often they were simply called ‘the public’ 
(Keyes, 1904, p. 24). The public was described as ‘a body of several million well-to-do 
individuals, of varying occupations,… and all of whom, taken together, make up a 
formidable force in the investment market’ (Noyes, 1903, p. 516). Contrary to the 
professionals to whom speculation was an occupation, the public were comprised of 
people who were basically amateurs (Marcosson, 1907, p. 104).73 The members of the 
public were often characterised by the qualities they lacked rather than those they 
possessed. Compared to seasoned professionals, the constituents of the public were 
considered to be inexperienced, credulous and lacking fundamental knowledge about the 
functioning of the financial markets. Whereas professionals were generally perceived as 
being self-determent and adamant, members of the public were considered to be 
dependent: They were dependent on the banker for credit and on the broker for 
information and access (Rollins, 1907, p. 319). Furthermore, the public allegedly were 
dependent on other more knowledgeable and experienced investors and speculators, 
whose lead they tended to follow uncritically. Regardless of whether the issue of public 
participation in financial markets was addressed by economists, financial journalists, 
73 Besides being labelled as amateurs, the public were also identified with animals and animal 
behaviour (Knight, 2016, pp. 107–111, see also 2014). Most often, they were referred to as ‘lambs’, 
but they were also occasionally referred to as a ‘swarm’ (Keyes, 1904, p. 16, 45). In a historical 
account of speculation on the New York Stock Exchange during the period September 1904 to 
March 1907, the ‘general speculative public’ was described as an ‘imaginary swarm assumed to have 
been hovering over the market’ (Osborne, 1913, p. 96). Labels such as ‘lamb’ and ‘swarm’ 
accentuated connotations of anonymity, collective behaviour and, in the case of the swarm, 
ephemerality.    
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how-to book authors or fiction writers, it was almost always presented as a problem or a 
cause of problems that ought to be responded to in one way or the other.  
This chapter discusses how ‘the public’ became this contested and problematic 
category in the U.S. financial markets during the late nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century. With the public’s entrance into the stock and 
commodity exchanges, problems that the exchanges had formerly been able to keep at 
arm’s length – because they were considered problems of the ‘outside’ – began to 
intrude on them. Responding to problems concerning collective action by means of, for 
example, intervening in the trading hall architecture, such as Jennings suggested with his 
improved trading pit (see Chapter 2), did not present a viable response to the problems 
deriving from the public’s participation in the markets, which were not necessarily 
confined to the spatiality of the market. The problematisation of the public and of public 
participation did, I will argue, mostly revolve around three related themes. First, public 
participation in financial markets was discussed as a question of competence and 
qualification. It was often debated if and how the public’s assumed lack of experience and 
speculative competence would impact the movement of prices in the markets, the 
exchange as an organisation and the newcomers themselves. Second, the public was 
considered by many financial writers to have misperceptions about the functioning of the market. 
Unlike the professionals who gained their market knowledge from practice, the public’s 
market knowledge often derived, critics of public participation claimed, from unreliable 
popular accounts of financial speculation. Third, the debate on public participation often 
evoked discussions of the alleged susceptibility and lack of mental tenacity of the public. As 
some critics argued, due to the public’s lack of competence and misconceptions about 
the markets’ functioning, they were more at risk of losing their composure and resorting 
to imitation and herding behaviour than professionals were.   
This chapter consists of three parts. In the first part, I examine the problems 
associated with public participation in financial markets through the work of the 
economist Henry Crosby Emery and some of the early writings of Max Weber on stock 
and commodity exchanges. Both scholars addressed the issue of public participation and 
discussed the problems associated with it as well as how the exchanges should attempt 
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to respond to them. In the second part of the chapter, I turn to the more frivolous and 
in some cases heavily psychologised popular literature on financial markets and 
speculation found in magazines, novels and short stories as well as in some how-to 
books. I examine a distinction drawn between the outsider (the spectator) and the 
insider (the broker-trader) and how the public were problematised as a group of 
spectators-turned-speculators. This then leads to a related discussion of whether the 
public should be rendered speculators or gamblers. In the third part of the chapter, I 
examine the speculation or, according to critics, the gambling taking place in so-called 
bucket shops. Bucket shops became tremendously popular and common in the cityscape 
in late nineteenth century, and they brought the ‘feel’ of financial speculation to the 
masses. I will argue that their business depended entirely on some of the dictums of 
crowd or public psychology, namely that the crowd is intellectually inferior to the 
individual. 
The main argument I make in this chapter is that the different responses to the 
participation of the public in the financial markets and the corresponding 
characterisations of the speculative public created a market problem that was essentially 
a crowd problem and additionally established a precedent for discussions of the impact 
of crowd psychology in the financial markets.  
The widening of the market and the evils of speculation  
The question of public participation and its effects were thoroughly discussed by 
American economist Henry Crosby Emery, who wrote an influential dissertation at 
Columbia University titled Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States 
(1896). Emery opened his dissertation stating that the American people were regarded as 
the greatest of all speculators and that the world’s two greatest speculative markets 
(produce and stock) were located in Chicago and New York (the Chicago Board of 
Trade and the New York Stock Exchange). Nonetheless, as Emery decried, only 
minimal scholarly work had been carried out on the topic of speculation in America, 
which was something he intended to change (Emery, 1896, p. 7). One of the reasons 
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why speculation in the U.S. stock and produce markets was a timely topic that ought to 
be the object of a thorough scientific inquiry was, according to Emery, that speculation 
in the stock and commodity exchanges was a highly pertinent topic among legislators. 
(Emery mentions that several bills pleading for a ‘suppression of speculation’ had been 
introduced in Congress.) Futures trading, in particular, had been subjected to ongoing 
debate among American politicians and numerous regulatory interventions since the 
early 1880s (Cowing, 1957, pp. 403–404). In order to mitigate the risk of regulation of 
the financial markets on an uninformed or inaccurate basis, Emery asserted that a study 
of the actual functioning of the speculative markets was appropriate (Emery, 1896, pp. 
7–8).74  
In the introduction and in the last chapter of his dissertation, Emery engaged with 
what he thought was a paradigmatic example of ‘repressive legislation’ on speculation: a 
bill set to reform speculative markets in Germany. The bill was put to vote in the 
German Reichstag in June 1896 and passed without amendments. On 1 January 1897, 
the new law went into force. The bill was an outcome of an investigation into the 
speculation carried out on the crises-ridden German stock and commodity exchanges 
undertaken by a commission appointed in 1892 by the Imperial Government. The 
Exchange Inquiry Commission’s work amounted to a massive four-volume report 
stating that the speculation on the German exchanges had reached an intolerable level 
(Lestition, 2000, p. 290). Though his discussion of the content of the bill preceded the 
actual law and thus its effects, Emery found the German regulatory intervention 
interesting yet frightening because it proved, he thought, how disastrously ‘stringent 
governmental control of exchanges’ could harm the competitiveness of an entire 
national economy (Emery, 1896, p. 230).  
Almost parallel to Emery’s work on his dissertation, Max Weber was writing on the 
topic of speculation with specific emphasis on the Exchange Inquiry Commission’s 
74 Another reason why Emery found it necessary to conduct an in-depth study of speculation was 
the alleged prevailing confusion as to what role the study of speculation should play in the theory of 
economics. Emery wanted to show how speculation was ‘vitally connected with the theory of value’ 
(Emery, 1896, pp. 8–9). 
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report. In two contiguous pamphlets, ‘Stock and Commodity Exchanges’ [Die Börse] 
(1894) and ‘Commerce on the Stock and Commodity Exchanges’ [Der Börsenverkehr] 
(1896), Weber did something similar to what Emery attempted to do in his dissertation, 
namely study the phenomenon of speculation in stock and commodity exchanges.75 Like 
Emery, Weber wanted to shed light on the phenomenon in order to eradicate popular 
misunderstandings that could sway politicians and consequentially inflict unfounded 
regulatory intervention on the exchanges. Furthermore, both scholars believed that there 
was an intimate connection between what Emery termed ‘the evils of speculation’ 
(Emery, 1896, Ch. 5) and the increasing number of, in the eyes of both scholars, 
inexperienced and unqualified people commencing on speculative endeavours in the 
exchanges. In Weber’s wording, the ‘tremendous expansion of the market’, i.e. the 
bringing in of the public, had ‘numerous serious side-effects’ (Weber, 2000a, p. 261, pp. 
363–364).76  
75 The pamphlets were published in The Göttingen Workers’ Library, an article series supported by 
and aimed at a Christian Socialist movement (Lestition, 2000, p. 292). Work published in this series 
was hence not aimed at an expert audience, which explains why Weber’s texts are not overly 
technical although they dealt with highly technical matter (Lestition, 2000, p. 295). The primary 
objective of the pamphlets was, as Weber emphasised in the beginning of the first, to provide an 
‘initial orientation for those who in their daily lives are relatively distant from the things described 
here’ (Weber, 2000b, p. 305). The same year as the first pamphlet was published, Weber was 
appointed for a professorship in macroeconomics [Nationalökonomie] and finance at the University 
of Freiburg – a position he held for a two-year period (Lestition, 2000, p. 294). Hence, the texts 
ought to be read as work done by an expert in macroeconomics and finance and not by a 
sociologist, which, however, does not mean that they are irrelevant from a sociologist’s point of 
view (Swedberg, 2000, p. 374). 
76 In the second pamphlet, Weber meticulously explained futures trading, which played a central 
role in the Exchange Inquiry Commission’s report and the succeeding reform bill. Futures trading 
had, according to Weber, made it easier to participate in financial markets because the amount of 
capital required to trade futures was comparably lower than stock trading (Weber, 2000a, p. 347). 
This lowered entrance barrier in futures markets had led to the expansion of the market, which 
Weber also referred to as ‘the widening of the market’ (Weber, 2000a, p. 363). Whereas Weber’s 
work on the organisational characteristics of the stock and commodity exchanges has been given 
some scholarly attention within the field of economic sociology (see Gane, 2012; Hansen, 2015; 
Preda, 2009; Stäheli, 2013; Swedberg, 2000), only little attention has been given to his detailed 
examination of futures trading and the consequences of its proliferation in the financial markets. An 
exception is Nicholas Gane (2012), who argues that due to the side effects of futures trading 
(manipulation and derived herding behaviour, excessive speculation, inclusion of incompetent 
speculators etc.), the pertinent question Weber’s second pamphlet raised was the following: Are 
market movements ‘the result of meaningful and for the most part instrumentally oriented social 
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Among the evils of speculation, Emery mentioned different types of market 
manipulation such as cornering, ‘wash sales’ and rumour spreading. Corners had, Emery 
noted, attracted much more popular attention than they, from the economic point of 
view, deserved. They were, he thought, few and far between, and only rarely successful 
(Emery, 1896, pp. 173–176). Weber had a similar view on cornering, describing them as 
‘quickly-passing “fever-symptoms,” ending usually with the collapse of a couple of 
speculative careers and finally even the “corner” group itself’ (Weber, 2000a, pp. 367–
368). Wash sales, however, were, in Emery’s opinion, somewhat more disturbing, since 
they were extremely elusive. As Emery explained, a ‘wash sale’ was an operation where a 
speculator employed: 
 
one broker to sell to another broker at prearranged prices’ in order to create false 
prices on the floor of the exchange. Though fictitious, the price would stand as a 
quotation and thus influence the market. Emery described it as a ‘convenient method 
of giving a false appearance of activity’, which would ‘induce speculation or 
investment by the public. (Emery, 1896, pp. 177–178)77  
 
Like wash sales, rumour spreading was a method of manipulation that interested Emery, 
because it was an effective way of swaying the public into buying or selling. Since 
spreading false rumours was a fairly easy thing to do, it was, Emery stressed, tempting to 
certain cunning speculators (Emery, 1896, pp. 176–177). Hence, market actors had to be 
aware of and somehow account for the many rumours circulating in the markets.  
actions or of crowd behaviours that lie outside the limits of the social?’ (p. 57). Although it is true 
that Weber thought that the public, en masse, could be manipulated and thus led to cause excesses, 
he definitely did not think that crowd behaviour was a primary cause of price fluctuations in 
markets (cf. Weber, 2000a, pp. 366–368). Viewed through Weber’s lens, the futures market can be 
seen as a place where a highly sophisticated, rationalising trading system collided with a minimally 
sophisticated, largely irrational class of people who began to participate in futures trading towards 
the end of the nineteenth century.  
77 The Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking defines a ‘wash sale’ as ‘[a] US name for the sale and 
purchase by a single investor, or a group in collusion, of a block of securities either simultaneously 
or in a short space of time to establish a loss or a gain; it may also be used to create the impression 
that the security in question is trading actively’ (Law, 2015, entry: ‘wash sale’). Emery’s 
understanding of a wash sale thus corresponds to the second part of the aforementioned definition. 
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However, the greatest of all evils of speculation, in Emery’s opinion, was the ‘reckless 
participation in the market by the outside public’ (Emery, 1896, p. 187). The ‘amateurs’, 
as Emery termed the constituents of the public, were, he argued, purely relying on 
chance for the simple reason that they were either knowledgeable or experienced enough 
to trust their own discernment. Besides being dependent on something as ephemeral as 
chance, the public were, Emery added, reliant on the banks, since they were, as a rule, 
speculating on borrowed money (Emery, 1896, pp. 186–187).78 Their alleged 
recklessness, gambling inclination and profound lack of experience made the public 
extra-susceptible to the aforementioned forms of manipulation (cornering, wash sales 
and rumour spreading). Thus, the ramifications of manipulation were regarded as 
amplified due to the public’s mere presence in the markets. In the same vein, Weber 
argued that allowing and thus making it possible for the underqualified and unprepared 
to speculate would ‘increase the public’s mania for gambling and opportunities to satisfy 
that mania on the exchanges’ (Weber, 2000a, p. 364). Weber further emphasised that the 
‘small speculator’ or ‘superfluous parasite’, which were terms he used for the constituent 
of the market public, formed a threat to the very foundation of the exchange as a social 
organisation (Weber, 2000b, p. 333). Small speculators were, he thought, completely 
dependent on external guidance. ‘The whole horde of small speculators, armed with 
practically nothing beyond good lungs, a little notebook, and a pencil’ had, Weber noted, 
‘little other choice than blindly to follow the word given “from above”’ (Weber, 2000a, 
p. 367). If small traders with little to no experience, limited funds and an inclination to 
78 In a PhD dissertation titled Money, Credit Instruments and Prices in Their Relation to General Prices 
(1907) – presented to the faculty at Cornell University in June 1903 – Edwin Walter Kemmerer 
argued that credit was, in essence, a psychological phenomenon. He described it as ‘a state of mind, 
a belief’, and, as it is with beliefs, ‘it is subject to all those causes of fluctuation which influence the 
minds and control the beliefs of men’ (Kemmerer, 1907, p. 83). Among the influences affecting the 
minds of people, Kemmerer named the ‘sympathetic and epidemic excitement which so largely 
sways communities of men’ and which made even the most intelligent persons ‘compelled in their 
actions to follow the lead of the ignorant, who are seized with an unreasoning panic, and thus swell 
the current, which having opened a crevasse, deepens and widens it, until it has spread devastation 
far and near’ (Kemmerer, 1907, p. 83). Thus, the phenomenon of credit did, according to 
Kemmerer, enhance the influence of collective psychology on economic transactions. In other 
words, speculating on credit ostensibly increased the risk of becoming subjected to the mind of the 
crowd. 
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gamble constituted the public in the exchange, Weber feared that the continual 
formation and training of capable and respectable exchange traders, which he saw as the 
very heart of the exchange organisation, would be rendered impossible. Overall, Weber 
believed that the prevalence of small speculators in the exchanges had the following 
consequences: 
 
[It hindered] the formation of a class of exchange traders who would be more 
homogeneous in their preparatory training, their practical education, and their position 
[on the exchanges] – a class that would be in a position to form a [self-instituted] 
“tribunal” that could have the energy to educate effectively [the traders] and have its 
judgments respected. The pronouncements of a tribunal that is composed out of the 
mishmash that now constitutes our “public” on the exchanges will never have its 
pronouncements respected; the precondition for that, a unified “concept of honor,” 
is lacking. My own personal opinion, that I state with full reservations (because I 
think people can rightly question it), is therefore that honorableness and honesty is the 
strength of any social organization. On our, and all other, exchanges, the dominant 
force is in fact the greater quantity of money [to be gained], and it cannot be 
otherwise. Therefore, one may wish to give the playing field over to it, simply in terms 
of formal organization, and make entrance into the exchanges more difficult by requiring 
stronger monetary guarantees; one would not strengthen the position of the large 
capitalists thereby, but simply make possible for the first time a control over and the 
emergence of a unified view of what are or are not “honorable business practices” on 
the exchanges. (Weber, 2000b, pp. 333–334, italics in the original) 
 
Hence, the public brought their vulnerabilities into the market and forced a mingling of 
social categories such as amateurs, professionals, large investors and small speculators, 
which Weber perceived as being a challenge to the organisational order of the exchange 
(Preda, 2009, pp. 43–44). Due to the inclusion of ‘less professionally-knowledgeable persons’, 
Weber felt that the exchange as a system and an organisation was weakened (Weber, 
2000a, pp. 361–362, italics in the original). To sustain the social order and the 
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honourableness of the exchanges, he maintained that the exchanges should remain ‘the 
monopoly of the rich’ (Weber, 2000b, p. 327, 334).79  
Emery and Weber both framed the problem of public participation as one problem 
that had to do with lack of competence and with a high degree of credulousness on the part of 
the speculative public. Since the public allegedly did not have the experience, the 
training, the analytical skills or the capital required in order to speculate in a ‘healthy’ 
manner, they were compelled to follow the guidance and advice that others offered 
them. Their lack of competence therefore increased their credulousness. (They were 
bound to follow the lead ‘from above’, as Weber stressed.) What turned public 
participation into a concrete market problem was, Emery argued, the fact that there were 
specific instances where the public’s lack of competence and credulousness in 
speculative matters had direct economic effects:  
 
The most apparent of these [economic effects caused by the speculation of the 
outside public] is the unsteadiness of the market in times of speculative excitement. 
The larger the number of irresponsible persons involved, the more does trading at 
such times partake of the unreasoning nature of all crowd action. (Emery, 1896, p. 
188) 
 
79 When it came to the organisation of the exchange, Weber had an affinity for the English and 
American exchanges because of their alleged archaic, plutocratic structure. He compared the 
acquisition of a membership at the American and English exchanges to German churches, where 
one had to either inherit or pay a significant fee in order to become a member (Weber, 2000b, pp. 
127–128). The foremost exchange in the Anglo-American world at the end of the nineteenth 
century was, as Emery had pointed out, the New York Stock Exchange. The New York Stock 
Exchange was governed by a Governing Committee composed of the president of the exchange, 
the treasurer and forty members, whose primary purpose was to make sure business was carried out 
in accordance with the exchange’s constitution. In order to qualify for membership, the applicant 
had to be an American citizen and at least twenty-one years of age (Emery, 1896, pp. 17–18). 
Additionally, the person applying for a seat had to be able to put up the initiation fee, i.e. the price 
of a seat. The number of seats in the New York Stock Exchange was, around the end of the 1880s, 
1,099 and the cost an average of thirteen thousand dollars. The real value of a seat at the stock 
exchange was, however, allegedly much higher – according to Wall Street vernacular, around 
twenty-five thousands (G. R. Gibson, 1889, p. 74). At the time, the New York Stock Exchange was 
unquestionably a monopoly of the rich, as Weber wanted it to be. 
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That public participation could potentially generate crowd action was, to Emery, a 
disturbing fact. He did, however, stress that crowd action and speculative excitement 
were not attributes of speculation as such. Instead, it was the participation of the public 
that disrupted the otherwise effective and necessary practice of speculation (Emery, 
1896, p. 188).80 Crowd problems in markets (as, e.g., speculative excitement that led to 
unreflective collective action that ultimately could result in a panic) were thus results of 
the speculative deals the public made and not a direct consequence of the practice of 
speculation in itself.  
Although Emery perceived the participation of the outside public as the greatest of 
all the evils of speculation and as a pertinent issue for the markets in general, he also saw 
some possible advantages associated with the increased number of people conducting 
business in the stock and commodity exchanges. In the long run, Emery noted that ‘the 
influence of the public in speculation is not that of inflation or panic’: Therefore, even 
though the risks of crowd behaviour and speculative mania were real, they should not be 
considered the only possible consequence of the increased public participation in 
speculation (Emery, 1896, pp. 188–190). Though the participation of the public did not 
bring any ‘great degree of intelligence or fitness for investigation to the market’, as 
Emery claimed that some overly excited advocates of public participation suggested, it 
did increase numbers, and numbers were, as Emery pointed out, ‘a steadying influence in 
80 Economists such as Emery and Weber as well as other financial writers who saw speculation in 
the exchanges as a practice beneficial to the national economy and thus society felt obliged to 
highlight the benevolence of speculation because the public opinion in the late nineteenth century 
was generally not in favour of the (to many outside observers) impalpable business practices 
exercised in the exchanges. Since speculation was not producing anything, critics believed that it 
could not be generating any value for society (see, e.g., Levy, 2012, pp. 242–252). More than a 
decade prior to the publication of Emery’s dissertation, the historian Martha Joanna Reade Nash 
Lamb had stressed that the speculation carried out in the exchanges was definitely not unproductive 
although the broad public might think it was, but contrarily of vital necessity in an age and country 
of progress. The exchange was, Lamb argued, a ‘great national mart and market place, where the 
capital and capital seeking investment are brought together, where the relative values of money and 
of securities representing national, municipal or corporate credit are established and expressed, 
where securities may be turned into money, and where money, in itself inert and incapable of self-
increase, may find its way into the channels in which it will impart life and activity to business 
enterprise and material development, and become productive to its owner through interest, 
dividends or the fluctuations in values’ (Lamb, 1883, p. 90). 
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the market’ (Emery, 1896, p. 190). So even though Emery was not impressed with the 
public’s ability to learn from experience, he saw the liquidity they provided as potentially 
beneficial (Emery, 1896, p. 190). However, Emery maintained for good measure that 
‘the price-making benefits of speculation come, not from the number of outsiders, but 
from the activity of those best qualified for speculation’ (Emery, 1896, p. 191). Hence, 
the perks of a widened market could prove to be the seeds of impending crowd 
behaviour: 
 
While the participation of speculators in the market increases the chances of an 
intelligent forecast of coming events, it also affords the opportunity for panic 
influence. The ease with which business is done, and especially the facility of trading 
on insufficient capital, occasionally precipitate movements in price which are due 
solely to the unreasoning excitement of a crowd. (Emery, 1896, p. 122) 
 
To Emery, public participation in financial market speculation was thus both a good and 
bad development. With the increased number of fortune-seeking amateurs in the 
markets, the risk of panic and speculative mania increased as well. However, the increase 
in the number of buyers and sellers in the market also increased market activity and 
hence made markets more liquid. (It ostensibly led to an increase in liquidity as well as in 
volatility.) Ultimately, Emery concluded that it was near impossible to determine ‘at just 
what point the evil of public speculation becomes too high a price to pay for the 
advantages of the active market’ (Emery, 1896, p. 191).  
 
Neither Emery nor Weber thought that the problems of market instability were located 
in the structures of the markets themselves. Market problems arose from externalities 
obstructing the established market order. The speculative public were, en masse, one of 
the intruding externalities that posed a risk to the stability of the markets. Financial 
journalist and author Charles Conant shared this view. Conant argued that the public 
often seemed to forget that the quotations in Wall Street were only ‘the mirror of their 
own estimates of the value of securities’, by which he meant that it was not the 
exchange’s but the public’s own fault that they tended to buy the wrong securities at the 
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wrong time (Conant, 1903, p. 343, 1904, p. 145, 152). Conant reminded the critics of the 
business conducted in the exchanges that the stock market was a ‘barometer of values’ 
that in the most sensitive and value-free way recorded ‘the operation of the scientific 
laws of value’ (Conant, 1901, p. 712, 1905, p. 359). If or when the ‘truthfulness of the 
barometer of values’ was impaired, it was, he insisted, due to some sort of illegitimate 
practice or excessive gambling by uninitiated persons (Conant, 1901, p. 712).81 As a 
solution to the problem of public participation, Conant suggested that the ‘outsider’, 
whom he also referred to as the ‘uninitiated’ person, should either completely keep out 
of the market or at least not enter it ‘in the gambling spirit’ (Conant, 1901, p. 712, 1904, 
p. 145). Determining exactly when a person was sufficiently equipped or unfit to partake 
in the financial markets was not as easy as writers such as Conant made it appear. It was 
furthermore difficult to define what ‘the gambling spirit’ was and to detect those who 
were ‘possessed’ by it. Conant’s emphasis on the importance of the ‘spirit’ in which the 
public entered the financial markets can be read as an expression of a central problem 
associated with the public – namely, that the public’s connection to and association with 
the financial markets was emotional rather than rational.      
The participator and the spectator 
Whereas advocates of the business conducted in the exchanges such as Emery, Weber 
and Conant saw public participation as a threat to the stability of the markets, critics of 
so-called ‘organised speculation’ did not think that the inflow of small speculators 
threatened to corrupt an otherwise well-functioning and ordered market. Popular 
accounts of financial market speculation imprinted an entirely different image of 
financial markets into the public mind than the one pro-market advocates tried to instil 
(Cowing, 1957). Writers in these genres of financial writing often portrayed speculators 
81 As I discussed in Chapter 2, Tarde also used the barometer as a metaphor when describing 
fluctuations in the stock markets. However, Tarde emphasised that the quotations of stock prices 
were not an equivalent of the exact measurement of a barometer. On the contrary, and contrary to 
Conant, Tarde insisted that markets could not be properly understood without taking seriously the 
‘psychological causes’ affecting the minds and thus the behaviour of market actors (Tarde, 2007 
[1902], p. 630).  
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as undignified in their behaviour and markets as irrational rather than rational. They 
furthermore seldom differentiated between speculation and gambling. Proponents of the 
business conducted in the exchanges tried to delegitimise popular financial writing by 
rendering their accounts of markets misconceived and accusing them of misguiding the 
public. Conant captured the essence of the public’s ostensibly delusional views of the 
financial markets when he stated that one of the most ‘persistent of the hallucinations 
which prevail among people otherwise apparently lucid and well informed is the 
conception that operations on stock and produce exchanges are pure gambling’ (Conant, 
1903, p. 433). In the following part of the chapter, I examine the contrasting market 
views of insiders (practitioners and experts) and outsiders (the public and the market 
spectators) as well as the challenges associated with letting the outside public into the 
market. 
 
One of the writers who allegedly evoked hallucinations in the public mind was the 
prolific financial journalist-cum-fiction writer Edwin Lefèvre.82 In a Munsey’s Magazine 
article titled ‘Boom Days in Wall Street’, Lefèvre depicted the stock market as a 
‘pendulum’ swinging back and forth between extremes. One moment, a fall in prices 
would cause ‘an epidemic of commercial cowardice’; the next moment, a rise would 
evoke a ‘carnival of financial fearlessness, intoxicated by success’ (Lefèvre, 1901, p. 31). 
Unlike Conant’s delicate and highly sensitive barometer of values, Lefèvre’s pendulum 
was an indicator of extreme fluctuations in emotional states.83 The swings of the 
pendulum were assumedly, if not induced, then greatly influenced by the psychological 
quirks of the public. As Lefèvre noted, those who came into Wall Street on ‘a wave of a 
general boom’ failed to ‘display the ordinary ability’ to speculate and were generally 
82 Lefèvre is perhaps best known for the partly biographical and partly fictionalised book 
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator (1923) that told the story of the legendary speculator Jesse Livermore.  
83 Rather than recording the ‘facts’ of economic law, as Conant argued that the stock market’s 
barometer of values did, Lefèvre’s pendulum was measuring what Sidis had referred to as the ‘social 
folie à double form’ of speculation (Sidis, 1919 [1898], p. 349, italics in the original). As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Sidis argued that financial speculation made the collective mind oscillate between ‘a state 
of acute maniacal exaltation to a state of still more acute melancholic depression’ (Sidis, 1919 
[1898], pp. 348–349). 
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‘ignorant of the basic principles of stock speculation’ (Lefèvre, 1901, p. 40). However, 
when taken together, Lefèvre thought that the public constituted a ‘powerful engine’, but 
it was an engine without an engineer to direct it (Lefèvre, 1901, p. 40). Just like a crowd 
needed a leader-figure to guide it (see Chapter 2), the public required direction from 
someone or something.84  
However, according to Lefèvre, it was not only the public who were acting in 
incontrollable ways. In times of panic or overexcitement, everyone in the market was all 
of a sudden ‘afflicted with the gambling fever’ and started reacting to irrational impulses 
rather than resorting to their independent judgement (Lefèvre, 1901, p. 36). It was thus 
rather the market itself than the participation of the public that was creating the 
contagious excitement that provoked irrational behaviour among market participants. 
The feverish behaviour of market actors could, Lefèvre thought, be observed from the 
visitors’ gallery at the New York Stock Exchange. From the gallery, spectators could 
experience the action on the floor, which Lefèvre described as utter ‘pandemonium’ and 
as a display of ‘maniacal humanity’ (Lefèvre, 1901, p. 34).85 The stock exchange was 
thus, according to Lefèvre’s dramatised depiction, not simply a building housing people 
who occasionally acted irrationally. It was, in Lefèvre’s wording, a ‘well-dressed Bedlam’ 
(Lefèvre, 1901, p. 32).  
84 In another Munsey’s article titled ‘The New Wall Street’, the article’s author, one H. Allaway, 
underlined that the public was forceful yet simultaneously vulnerable to the slightest of influences. 
Allaway noted that ‘[o]nly a suggestion was needed to incite the gathering throng of outsiders into 
enthusiastic activity’ (Allaway, 1899, p. 17). Just like the crowd mind was, according to Le Bon,  
controlled by the ‘despotic authority’ of the crowd leader, the public mind was, according to 
Allaway, suggestible and in need of direction or guidance (Allaway, 1899, p. 17; Le Bon, 1896, p. 
121). Although Allaway described the public as highly suggestible, that was not, he thought, the 
same as saying that they were inveterate gamblers ill-suited for investing and speculation. On the 
contrary, he stressed that ‘[t]he newcomers in Wall Street were not a crowd of heedless gamblers 
depending upon thin margins, making reckless guesses, taking desperate chances; they represented 
solvent men putting accumulated funds into investments wherein there was reasonable sureness of 
safety’ (Allaway, 1899, p. 17). That the public was excitable was, in Allaway’s eyes, not a problem per 
se: It was also a sign of its forcefulness. 
85 The visitors’ gallery in the exchanges constituted an often-used vantage point for market 
observation as well as a ‘crucial trope’ in many accounts of the business conducted in the stock and 
commodity exchanges (Knight, 2016, pp. 116–118).  
111 
 
                                                   
There are certain parallels to be drawn between Lefèvre’s picturesque portrait of the 
virulent behaviour of traders on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange and Frank 
Norris’ portrait of pit trading on the Chicago Board of Trade in his novel The Pit (1903). 
Whereas Lefèvre’s market pendulum swung between extremes, Norris drew a distinction 
between order and chaos that was based on the person perceiving the action unfolding – 
in Norris’ case, in the wheat pit at the Board of Trade. In The Pit, there is a striking 
difference between how the outsiders and the insiders experienced market action (Borch, 
Hansen and Lange, 2015, pp. 1087–1088). To the outsider Page Dearborn (to-be sister-
in-law of the novel’s protagonist Curtis Jadwin), sitting in the gallery watching the 
trading unfold beneath in the pits of the Board of Trade, the market was nothing but a 
strange polyphony of meaningless noises. Norris describes how Page felt the noises of 
the market surround her and ‘form a prolonged muffled roar, that from moment to 
moment increased in volume’ (Norris, 1920 [1903], p. 380). The broker’s clerk Landry 
Court (an insider) was, contrary to Page, familiar with the markets ‘noises’, which were in 
his ears just sounds made by the people going about their everyday routines and by the 
devices – telephones and tickers – used to facilitate the buying and selling of wheat 
futures. When the market opened at nine-thirty in the morning, Court would change 
from being the ‘rattle-brained’, ‘absent-minded’, ‘impractical’ and ‘easily excited’ person 
as he was in his leisure time into being the most ‘shrewd’, ‘alert’ and level-headed man 
on the floor of the Board of Trade (Norris, 1920, p. 92). During trading, Court was able 
to ‘feel the market – almost at his very finger tips – how… [it] moved, how it 
strengthened, how it weakened’ (Norris, 1920, p. 100). Court immersed himself into the 
market without being carried away by it. Page, on the other hand, was too much of a 
stranger to the noises and practices of the market to be able to handle it well, as Court 
did. Instead, she was overwhelmed and almost entranced by the intense atmosphere in 
the exchange. 
Advocates of the speculation undertaken in the exchanges drew a similar distinction 
between the outside and the ‘immersed’ view and interpreted it as a distinction between 
a distorted and a real perception of the markets. On account of this distinction, they 
dismissed popular representations such as Lefèvre’s as mere misconstrued views of 
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outsiders who did not have proper knowledge of the fundamental functioning of the 
market. The financial journalist Isaac F. Marcosson, for example, argued that those who 
observed the action on the trading floor from the visitors’ gallery in the exchanges or 
experienced it second-hand through newspapers or magazine articles could not fully 
comprehend the intricate machinery of the market (Marcosson, 1907, pp. 101–102). In 
the book The New York Stock Exchange (1905), Edmund Clarence Stedman, a staunch 
defender of the institution of the exchange, described how the floor brokers’ ability to 
remain impervious to the affectation from what seemed to be a tumultuous market 
baffled people unfamiliar with the daily business conducted in the exchange. In an 
almost superhuman fashion, the floor broker was, according to Stedman, capable of 
embodying ‘the desires, the hopes, and the fears of his customers, and wields a magnetic 
force many times greater than his own’ (Stedman, 1905, p. 11). Spectators were, Stedman 
thought, utterly amazed that the brokers on the floor were able to ‘endure the strain 
upon them without breaking down mentally and physically’ (Stedman, 1905, p. 11).86 In 
the same vein, financial writer and member of the Chicago Board of Trade and the 
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce Rollin E. Smith argued that the brokers on the 
floors of the exchanges were in ‘sympathetic touch with the market’ to such a degree 
that they were able to detect the culmination of an advance or decline in prices (R. E. 
86 A couple of years prior to the publication of his book on the New York Stock Exchange, 
Stedman had written an article in The Century Magazine titled ‘Life “on the Floor”: The New York 
Stock Exchange from within’ (1903). In the article Stedman provided matriculate descriptions and 
explanations of the practices of the floor broker, the behaviour of people in the gallery, the 
difference between participating and spectating, etc. Stedman opened the article by telling the story 
of one time when he took a ‘gentle lady’ to experience stock speculation from the gallery at the 
New York Stock Exchange. The woman, who was ‘not in the least wonted to the rack of the 
brokers’ world’, was ‘startled, silenced, fascinated’ and eventually ‘appalled’ as she observed the 
spectacle unfolding on the floor beneath them. Stedman recalled that the woman suddenly 
exclaimed ‘What a terrible scene! What dreadful faces! It cannot be that you have to do with such 
people, with that ferocious mob. They look insane – no, wicked – and they act like fiends. It is 
pandemonium itself!’ To the woman’s outcry, Stedman calmly replied: ‘Let me show you the 
meaning of it all’ (Stedman, 1903, p. 1). Stedman used the story to make the simple point that it was 
not easy for a mere spectator to comprehend what was actually happening on the floor of the 
exchange and as an offset to sketch out what ‘life on the floor’ was from an expert’s perspective and 
not from ‘the casual visitor’s point of view’ as was the norm (Stedman, 1903, p. 2).  
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Smith, 1904, p. 62).87 According to Stedman and Smith, being a spectator did not 
provide an accurate understanding of the market. The market was hence only fully 
grasped through practice. The descriptions of the floor broker or trader as someone in 
‘sympathetic touch’ with the market and who was able to wield a ‘magnetic force many 
times greater than his own’ resonates with Tarde’s characterisation of magnetisers 
exerting their ‘prestige’ on subjects (Tarde, 1903, pp. 78–79). Like the floor brokers who 
were capable of embodying the desires of their customers, Tarde argued that magnetisers 
were able to ‘open the necessary outlet’ for the ‘force of belief and desire’ anchored 
subconsciously in every person’s mind (Tarde, 1903, p. 78). While the insiders were 
perceived as having a clear understanding of the functioning of markets and managed 
these functions in rather masterful ways, the spectators in the visitors’ gallery only 
experienced the commotion of the market and were unable to grasp the intricate 
institutionalised practices hidden behind it. The spectators were perceived as being 
connected to the markets on an affective or emotional level, while having no practical 
and therefore no ‘real’ knowledge about how the markets functioned.  
The alleged misconceptions of the public were, however, not exclusively reflected in 
the views of spectators in the visitors’ galleries of the exchanges. In The Americans (1904), 
Professor of Psychology at Harvard Hugo Münsterberg presented a social psychological 
87 An even more venerated characteristic of the floor trader was given by another sympathiser of 
legitimate stock speculation, William C. Van Antwerp, in the The Stock Exchange from within (1914). 
Antwerp praised the floor brokers, whom he referred to as ‘gentlemen’, for their incorruptibility; 
their imperviousness to every form of suggestion; their strong will and unbendable discernment 
(Van Antwerp, 1914, p. 285). In unbridled admiration, Antwerp went on to describe the floor trader 
as ‘intent, resourceful, suspicious, vigilant, and ubiquitous. He asks no quarter, and gives none. Now 
he is sphinx-like, deaf, inscrutable and impenetrable; now exploding with the frenzy of battle. You 
may stand and chat with him, and he may seem to listen to you. In reality he does not hear you at 
all. His roving eye is elsewhere, his mind is intent on other things. In the middle of a sentence he 
may leave you abruptly and go tearing from crowd to crowd like a thing possessed, the incarnation 
of energy’ (Van Antwerp, 1914, p. 285). What the audiences and readers of popularised accounts of 
the business conducted in the New York Stock Exchange failed to grasp was, Antwerp maintained, 
that the floor traders were exercising ‘perfectly orderly’ behaviour in a smoothly operating 
machinery and not vile crowd action (Van Antwerp, 1914, p. 286). Weber also noticed the way in 
which the audiences were strongly affected by their experiences of trading in the exchanges. He 
noted how the often intense open outcry trading was ‘likely to arouse both astonishment and 
dismay in those who visit the observation galleries of an exchange hall for the first time’ (Weber, 
2000a, pp. 340–341).  
114 
 
                                                   
and cultural diagnosis of the American people, and one of the distinctive psychological 
and cultural traits he noticed was Americans’ fondness of gambling and speculation.88 
Münsterberg had, for instance, been surprised to realise that one could find Americans 
in the stock exchange who would smilingly confess that they were citizens in ‘a gambling 
nation’ (Münsterberg, 1904, p. 232). Americans’ affinity for gambling in financial 
markets was, Münsterberg stressed, not perceived as a problem by the ‘gamblers’ 
themselves: The small investors saw their trades as sound and as made on the basis of 
informed judgements. However, brokers understood, according to Münsterberg, that the 
popularisation of trading was leading to reckless speculation by little-knowledgeable 
people. Münsterberg wrote the following about the broker’s and the small investor’s 
views of the market:  
 
[The broker] sees how all classes of people invest in speculative securities, and how 
the public interests itself in shares which are subject to the greatest fluctuations; how 
the cab-driver and the hotel waiter pore nervously over the quotations, and how new 
mining stocks and industrial shares as greedily bought by school teachers and 
commercial clerks. The broker sees in this the people’s desire for gambling, because 
he is himself thoroughly aware of the great risks which are taken, and knows that the 
investors can see only a few of the factors which determine prices. But in the public 
mind all this buying and selling looks very different. The small man, investing a few 
dollars in such doubtful certificates, never thinks of himself as a gambler; he thinks 
that he understands the market; he is not trusting to luck, but follows the quotations 
day by day for a long time, and asks his friends for “tips,” until he is convinced that 
his own discretion and cunning will give him an advantage. If he were to think of his 
gain as matter of chance, as the broker thinks it is, he would not only invest his 
money, but would be no longer attracted by the transactions. And whenever he loses, 
he still goes on, believing that he will be able the next time to figure out the turn of 
the market more accurately. (Münsterberg, 1904, pp. 232–233) 
 
Münsterberg’s characterisation of the speculative public echoed ideas prevalent in crowd 
theory. Similar to people gathered in a crowd, the public were collectively excited and 
88 There were other psychologists and sociologists, such as Sidis and Giddings, who claimed that the 
inclination to speculate and gamble seemed to be particularly strong with the American public (see 
Chapter 2).  
115 
 
                                                   
their attention fixed on an object (the price of a particular security). They were 
furthermore inclined to follow without thinking; trading on ‘tips’ from friends, as 
Münsterberg noted, instead of relying on their individual discernment. To Münsterberg, 
the public’s investment decisions were thus not made on the basis of matriculate 
analyses of the market, but rather on the basis of emotion, temperament and a tendency 
to follow others’ lead.89 Following the rationale in Münsterberg’s critique, the public thus 
had to become able to make trading decisions on an informed basis in order for them to 
be considered as legitimate speculators rather than as petty gamblers.  
Enlightening the gambling public 
During the second part of the nineteenth century, advocates of financial markets 
(including exchange-affiliates, authors of practical market literature and some academics) 
went to great lengths to draw a clear distinction between speculation and gambling. The 
intention was, following Preda, to ‘make plausible to the middle classes that financial 
investments were totally different from gambling, and hence ethically and socially 
acceptable’ (Preda, 2004, p. 335). They wanted to erase misconceptions about the 
markets such as, for example, those expressed by financial writer and fierce critic of 
exchange speculation Moses Smith. In Plain Truths about Speculation: How to Avoid Losses in 
Wall Street (1887), Smith asserted that ‘[m]orally there is no difference whether one 
makes his commissions on a stock gamble, or on pool selling at a horse-race’ (Smith, 
1887, p. 24).90 Discussions of how to deal with the increasing popularity of financial 
89 In an address titled ‘The Relation between Speculation and Gambling’, delivered before The 
Congregational Club of New York City and Vicinity in 1903, the financial journalist Collin 
Armstrong pointed to some of the same problems of public participation as Müsterberg did. 
Armstrong stated that the public mainly bought securities ‘because of their temperament’ and 
because of their ‘susceptibility to the influence of the crowd’ (Armstrong, 1903, p. 10).  
90 A similar argument was put forward in an article in The Forum in which it was stated that if 
gambling was eliminated from the stock exchange ‘grass would soon grow in Wall Street’ (Curtis, 
1891, p. 283). Some years later the broker-turned-financial writer John Ferguson Hume stressed, in 
the how-to book The Art of Wise Investment (1904), that although the exchange was perhaps not a 
‘madhouse’ giving shelter to a ‘howling mob of incurable lunatics’, as it had been depicted in 
popular accounts such as Lefèvre’s, it certainly was a place largely occupied by simple gamblers 
‘wagering on stocks’ as if it was a card game (pp. 53–55). 
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markets overlapped with and were shaped by the efforts made to distinguish speculation 
from gambling. Since the market newcomers were often presented as a bunch of 
inveterate gamblers, their mere presence in the markets was perceived as blurring the 
distinction between morally corrupting gambling and valuable and legitimate speculation.   
One attempt to disentangle speculation from gambling was made in a report drafted 
by the Hughes’ Committee, which was appointed by the attorney and governor of New 
York, Charles E. Hughes on 14 December 1908. The committee was asked to find out 
‘what changes, if any, are advisable in the laws of the State bearing upon speculation in 
securities and commodities, or relating to the protection of investors, or with regard to 
the instrumentalities and organizations used in dealings in securities and commodities 
which are the subject of speculation’ (White et al., 1909, p. 3). In the committee’s report, 
it was suggested that speculation ‘carried on by persons of means and experience, and 
based on an intelligent forecast’ was legitimate, while the speculation carried out by 
persons ‘without these qualifications’ should rather be termed ‘gambling’ (White et al., 
1909, p. 4). Whereas the former kind of speculation was considered good for the 
economy and thus society, the latter was considered to do ‘but a small amount of good 
and an almost incalculable amount of evil’ (White et al., 1909, pp. 3–4). The committee 
basically concluded that competent people speculated, while the incompetent gambled.  
Basing a distinction between speculation and gambling on the qualifications and 
competencies of the individuals carrying them out, as suggested in the Hughes’ 
Committee’s report, was, according to Professor of Economics at Columbia University 
Carl Parker, not only problematic but bordering on the absurd. For speculation to be 
legitimate, Parker believed that an actual transaction had to take place. When someone 
speculated in the stock and commodities markets, they made a contractual agreement to 
buy or sell property and eventually receive or deliver the property in question with a 
profit or a loss (Parker, 1911, pp. 151–152). If a deal involved what Parker referred to as 
‘unnecessary risk-taking’ (by ‘unnecessary’, Parker meant risk that was unnecessary to the 
‘welfare of the community’), he would characterise the deal as gambling (Parker, 1911, p. 
151). This was, Parker thought, the only viable way to understand gambling as a practice 
distinguishable from legitimate speculation. The only thing the Hughes’ Committee 
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achieved with their distinction was more or less to say that those buying and selling with 
the intent of profiting from the fluctuations in prices were speculators insofar as they 
succeeded and gamblers if they failed, which was, in Parker’s opinion, neither a fair nor 
useful distinction (Parker, 1911, p. 151). He insisted that speculation should be 
understood as a practice independent of the speculators qualifications, competencies let 
alone success.  
Although Parker did not find the Hughes’ Committee’s distinction between 
speculation and gambling particularly convincing, he did agree with the committee 
members’ proposed solution to the problem of gambling, which was to ‘lessen 
speculation by persons not qualified to engage in it’ (White et al., 1909, p. 4). Like 
Emery, Parker pointed out that in order to ‘meet the evil of speculation’ it was necessary 
to eliminate ‘from the field of speculation those who are unfitted by nature, financial 
circumstances, or training to engage in it’ (Parker, 1911, p. 152). Hence, being unfit for 
speculation in the financial markets was not only a matter of competence, wealth and 
experience: It was, to Parker at least, also a matter of whether the individual was 
naturally fit to cope with the intense competition in financial markets and to process the 
seemingly insurmountable amount of financial communication that existed in and 
around the markets. Instead of regulatory intervention, Parker believed that the evils of 
speculation should be mitigated through a process of public enlightenment. In order for 
such a process to even commence, it was crucial that brokers in particular recognised 
their fiduciary relationship to the public (Cowing, 1957, p. 19). Parker suggested that the 
bankers and brokers recognised their responsibility to their clients and started to be 
more selective in terms of whose business they would facilitate.91  
Authors of how-to books provided another form of public enlightenment, which, 
contrary to the abovementioned, did not entail that the public kept out of the financial 
markets. The how-to literature was beneficial to the less experienced speculators who, 
91 One way the bankers and brokers could act responsibly towards the public was, Parker argued, by 
raising the margin payment (the collateral required in order to be allowed to trade). This would, he 
noted, keep many small speculators – who would be better off not speculating – out of the markets 
(Parker, 1911, p. 152). 
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despite the warnings and seemingly unfavourable odds, wanted to try their luck in the 
financial markets. The most basic rule articulated in many late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century how-to books was to steer clear of the public, since they had a 
notoriously bad track record in the financial markets. The public’s lack of experience and 
competence combined with their credulousness and susceptibility to the influence of the 
crowd were considered the main reasons why not following the trading strategies of one’s 
peers (insofar as they had one) would be the best possible way for the small speculator 
to approach a speculative venture. Not getting carried away by others was, however, an 
extremely difficult thing to do, since emotions in the markets allegedly were, as how-to 
book author, financial journalist and editor William Walter Wall noted, ‘undoubtedly 
contagious’ (Wall, 1901, p. 136).92  
One of the financial writers who aimed to enlighten the public about the intricacies 
and pitfalls of speculation was William E. Forrest Hoyle. In the how-to book The Game 
in Wall Street, and How to Play It Successfully (1898) Hoyle subscribed to the stereotypical 
conception of the public as inexperienced, incompetent, ignorant and generally 
unsuccessful in market endeavours. Professional speculators were, Hoyle argued, well 
aware of the public’s deficiencies and were scrupulous when they took advantage of 
them. Market insiders or ‘pool generals’, as he called them, used their knowledge of the 
public’s weaknesses to ‘play upon’ their hopes and fears (Hoyle, 1898, p. 30, 32). The 
92 In the how-to book How to Speculate in Mines: Being an Exposition of the Principles of Investment and 
Speculation, with Descriptions of Mine-Developments and Principle Gold Fields (1901), Wall asserted that the 
‘temperament’ of individuals, but especially of collectives, was one of the most important and 
‘potent’ influences in the markets (Wall, 1901, pp. 135–136). The problem with the public was, Wall 
argued, that they generally were unable to restrain themselves and control their temperament. He 
described the speculative public in the following unflattering way: ‘That the public are unreasoning 
and foolish is indisputable. They have no individual initiative. They all wait patiently for someone to 
take the lead, and they all with one accord follow, whether they are led to their destruction or not. It 
all comes of the public’s ignorance, their disinclination to think and reflect. […] the public will not 
reflect. They will not see that this is the time to buy and to hold, either for investment or 
speculation. And, therefore, they are content to watch and wait, letting the golden opportunities slip 
by, until the boom is started, and then, as usual, they will be eager to buy at inflated prices, buy the 
valuable as well as the rubbish, and some people will be ruined. But the hope that it not be they, but 
only the other people, to whom they will sell at a profit’ (Wall, 1901, pp. 148–149). Wall description 
of the market public as a mass of docile, unreasoning, deindividualised persons was reminiscent of 
characterisations of crowds and of crowd behaviour found in the theories of the likes of Le Bon, 
Sidis and Ross. 
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pool generals profited from panic, which Hoyle regarded as a distinctively American 
‘disease of the public mind’ (Hoyle, 1898, p. 39). Since the market professionals were 
already taking strategic advantage of the susceptibility of the public, Hoyle’s advice to 
amateurs was to try to do the exact same thing. Though the small speculator was unable 
to manipulate or enter into conspiratorial allegiances with the newspapers, as Hoyle 
accused the professional speculators of doing, they could learn to be smarter than the 
public. Hence, Hoyle advised small speculators to do the exact opposite of what the 
public was doing: ‘sell when the public want to buy’ (Hoyle, 1898, p. 36, italics in the 
original).93  
Due to the risk of manipulation, misinformation from the newspapers and the 
notoriously bad judgement of the speculative public, counteracting it was, in Hoyle’s 
opinion, not only the best but also the safest way to speculate. To counteract the public 
was, however, more a mantra than it was a concrete trading strategy. In terms of 
strategy, Hoyle suggested that the amateur adopted and strictly adhered to a certain 
trading system. Having a system to abide by could prove decisive for the amateur, whom 
Hoyle believed had a tendency to approach speculation in an ad hoc rather than a 
systematic manner (Hoyle, 1898, p. 44). The system that Hoyle recommended as the 
most appropriate for the amateur was the so-called ‘simple scale system’, which 
presented a rather easily adoptable alternative to the generally unsuccessful approaches 
of the speculative public (Hoyle, 1898, p. 52). Basically, using the scale system meant 
‘buying or selling a certain number of stocks at every point or half-point up or down as 
the prices advance or recede, and then taking profits on every individual transaction 
when the profit shows’ (Hoyle, 1898, p. 45). The simple scale system was low risk, low 
reward. Hoyle’s system could not provide profits that paralleled the amounts that 
professional speculators were making. In terms of the capital involved and therefore the 
93 In Hoyle’s slipstream, several financial writers of how-to books advanced similar descriptions of 
the haphazard speculation, susceptible minds and limited capabilities of the public. Like Hoyle, 
these other writers offered advice on how the small speculator could counteract the public when 
the market was at a tipping point. Such arguments and advice can be found in, inter alia, C. H. 
Thorpe’s How to Invest and How to Speculate (1901) and William Young Stafford’s Safe Methods of Stock 
Speculation (1902).  
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size of the trades, the amateur speculators traded on a whole other (lower) “level” than 
the professionals. Pertaining to the differentiation in “levels” on which speculation was 
conducted, Hoyle emphasised that the scale system should not be applied in the New 
York Stock Exchange for the simple reason that entrance fees were too high and lot 
sizes were too large. Instead, he advised amateurs to take their capital to New York’s 
Consolidated Exchange where it was possible to deal in ten-share lots – a tenth of the lot 
size in the New York Stock Exchange (Hoyle, 1898, pp. 52–53). What Hoyle did in his 
how-to book was to address the difficulties that his readership, the amateurs, were faced 
with when entering into speculative markets, and suggest the scale system as a practical 
response to these difficulties.  
One of the proficiencies of the simple scale system was, Hoyle stressed, that it was 
‘absolutely automatic and machine-like’ (Hoyle, 1898, p. 44). In order to capitalise from 
the mechanistic character of the scale system, the person operating it had to strive to 
refrain from having ‘an opinion about the market’ that could cause her or him to deviate 
from the system (Hoyle, 1898, p. 44). That being said, Hoyle emphasised that it was the 
operator’s obligation to give direction to the system. While personal opinions should not 
influence the operation of a speculative system, Hoyle insisted that sound judgement 
should. Therefore, the successful operation of a system required brains, not opinions 
(Hoyle, 1898, p. 45). Sound judgement, or ‘brains’, was a crucial accompaniment to the 
scale system since the operator needed to identify the general trend in the market in 
order to initiate the buying or selling at the right time and on the right side of the market 
(Hoyle, 1898, p. 47). The systems’ function was in this sense two-fold: First, it helped 
amateurs to compensate for their relative lack of experience and speculative competence 
as compared to the professional speculators. Second and equally important, it functioned 
as a safety-barrier between the susceptible selves of the public and the lures of the 
markets.  
In addition to the simple scale system, the amateur could consult a list of twenty-five 
‘hints’ outlined in The Game of Wall Street, and how to Play it Successfully. Like the scale 
system, the hints were very straightforward and thus easy to follow. For example, hint 
no. five stated, ‘As a rule do not sell stocks on the third day of a decline (unless you are working 
121 
 
on the “scale system”) and do not buy on the third day of a rise’ (Hoyle, 1898, p. 57, italics in 
the original). Somewhat curiously, Hoyle admitted that he could not explain why markets 
tended to react after moving in one direction for three days. It simply seemed to be the 
rule, which was, to Hoyle, a good enough reason why this particular hint should be 
followed. Even though Hoyle continuously stressed the importance of independent 
judgement and depreciated unfounded market advice, he nevertheless underlined that 
there were certain rules of the market that the amateur simply ought to follow without 
much critical reflection.  
Whereas most of the hints, including the above mentioned, were action-oriented and 
action-directing, Hoyle also hinted to the mental dispositions and individual qualities 
required when embarking on a speculative endeavour in financial markets. While the 
former kind of hints encouraged strict rule-following, the latter involved seemingly more 
intricate and, by Hoyle, less well-defined practices of the self. In hints no. fifteen and 
seventeen, he emphasised that the formation of independent judgement as well as 
possessing or acquiring qualities such as courage, patience and nerve were necessary in 
speculation (Hoyle, 1898, p. 61, 63). These hints were a lot less palpable, but arguably 
showed the amateur speculator that successful speculation required more than following 
some basic rules – it allegedly required a strong-willed person who was able to withstand 
and repress inner urges to follow the whims of the markets. The public ought to strive 
to become more like the seemingly unattainable ideal trader or broker (mentioned and 
discussed earlier in the chapter).94 That character mattered in speculation resonated well 
94 Such qualities or competencies were considered attributes of the exemplary market actor. In The 
ABC of Stock Speculation (1902), Samuel Armstrong Nelson stressed the importance of – in a more 
thorough and stringent manner than Hoyle – the qualities and the mental disposition 
(temperament) needed in order to become this exemplary market actor (pp. 103–110, 148–167). 
Along similar lines, the Wall Street professional and prolific financial writer Richard Demille 
Wyckoff, who occasionally used the pseudonym ‘Rollo Tape’, argued in his how-to book Studies in 
Tape Reading (1910) that the good trader possessed ‘nerve to stand a series of losses; persistence to 
keep him at the work during adverse periods; self-control to avoid overtrading; a phlegmatic 
disposition to ballast and balance him at all times’ (p. 17). As Wyckoff stated, being a good trader 
required a strong sense of and ability to exercise self-control. It should be noted that Wyckoff was 
dealing specifically with the ‘tape reader’, whom he perceived as the ideal trader insofar as she or he 
possessed or acquired the aforementioned qualities. (As ‘Rollo Tape’, Wyckoff wrote columns in 
The Ticker titled ‘Tips to Tickerites’ in which he gave expert tips to fellow ticker readers.) The 
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with the assumption that suggestibility was one of the main threats to successful 
speculation. A strong character was the best possible guard against innate impulses and 
the different sources of mental contagion coming from the outside.   
 
The evils of speculation and the problems associated with inexperienced, impressionable 
and unqualified speculators were not exclusively problems within the exchanges. Outside 
the exchanges, in the streets of the financial districts, the bucket shop had become a 
symbol of the increasing gambling fever of the American public that amplified the 
alleged problems of public participation in speculation. These shady establishments 
appealed to people on the fringes of the market, i.e. to people who were drawn towards 
and had aspirations about making money in the financial markets but who did not have 
the means to do it. The bucket shop provided an opportunity to speculate in proximity 
of the exchanges, somewhat similar to the trading opportunities offered in the so-called 
‘curb market’ in New York.95 The bucket shop (and the curb market) made speculation 
experienced tape reader would use the stock ticker the way Hoyle had suggested that the amateur 
used the simple scale system. It functioned as an impervious and incorruptible extension of the tape 
reader’s rational judgement, and turned her or him into an unswayable ‘automaton’. ‘The tape 
reader’, Wyckoff noted, ‘evolves himself into an automaton which takes note of a situation, weighs 
it, decides upon a course and gives an order.’ The tape reader experienced ‘no quickening of the 
pulse, no nerves, no hopes, no fears’ (Wyckoff, 1910, p. 16). That being said, Hoyle advised his 
reader to shy away from the tickers and from the brokers’ offices in which they were located. Ticker 
watching was, in his opinion, incompatible with the simple scale system: ‘The ‘scale system’ buys 
and sells’, Hoyle stressed, ‘exactly contrary to the whisperings of the ‘ticker’’ (Hoyle, 1898, p. 61). 
Ticker watching suppressed, Hoyle asserted, the formation of independent judgement and made 
traders act on fear rather than courage (Hoyle, 1898, p. 61). On a side note, the notion of ‘the 
automaton’ was also used in crowd theory, though it had more negative connotation in that context. 
An ‘automaton’ was considered the emblem of the docile person caught up in a crowd, stripped of 
her or his will and reason (Le Bon, 1896, pp. 12–13; Sidis, 1919 [1898], p. 312). Interestingly, while 
crowd theorists perceived the ‘automaton’ as an emblematic example of a person completely 
subjugated the will of the crowd, Wyckoff used the term to characterise the person who had learned 
to be impervious to the negative mental influences emanating from the market and from other 
market participants.  
95 In his book The Stock Exchanges of London, Paris, and New York (1889), George Routledge Gibson 
noted that the curb market came into existence when financial excitement made business overflow 
into the streets and hotel lobbies after the New York Stock Exchange had closed (p. 104, 
paraphrase). According to financial journalist Alexander Dana Noyes, the curb market satisfied the 
public’s unabated ‘appetite for gambling in values’ (Noyes, 1907, p. 326). The New York curb 
market was located on Broad Street, close to the stock exchange on Wall Street. The curb market 
and the bucket shop symbolised an expansion or widening of the market different from the one 
123 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
an integrated part of the everyday life or at least a pastime of people from the middle-
classes in the major cities. The bucket shop was, from the critics’ standpoint, a place 
where the problems of the public coincided with the problems of the masses in the 
cities. Qua the proliferation of bucket shops, concerns about the mental strength, self-
restraint and the general level of intelligence of the masses indirectly came to be 
concerns of the established markets, i.e. the exchanges. The clash between the finance-
wise ignorant public, bucket shop proprietors with ominous intentions and the strong 
attraction that speculation was perceived as having on the public made the bucket shop a 
hotbed of political and legal contestation.  
The bucket shop: Taking advantage of public psychology96  
 
The majority of small investors keep away, or are kept away, from standard stocks. 
They inhabit bucket-shops, and surround the offices of low-class brokers, who sell 
less-than-nothing, nothing, or almost nothing, for something. The very atmosphere 
of the bucket-shop, like that of the gambling-den, attracts them and holds them. 
They are intoxicated with greed. They care nothing for honor, or for anything else in 
their mad rush to get rich mighty quick. They are gamblers, neither more nor less. 
(Fowler Jr., 1913, p. 140) 
 
Weber described in his pamphlets. It was not an expansion of the market within the regulated realm 
of the exchange, but an expansion of the market into the city and thus into the public sphere. This 
widening of the market across city spaces – the exchange, the curb and the bucket shop – widened 
the array of types of investing and speculating and contributed to a blurring of the lines between 
what was considered legitimate and what was considered illegitimate speculation (on the legitimacy 
and illegitimacy of curb trading, see Noyes, 1907, p. 326).     
96 In an exposé of bucket shop speculation, John Hill, a member of the Chicago Board of Trade and 
the chairman of a committee set up by the exchange with the aim of putting the bucket shops out 
of business, pointed out that the term ‘bucket shop’ originally, had no reference to gambling and 
speculation whatsoever. The term was allegedly coined in London around the middle of the 
nineteenth century, and the term was used to refer to a den where beer-drinkers from London’s 
East Side carried out a rather peculiar money-saving ritual. According to Hill, the bucket shop was 
the place where ‘beer swillers’ went after they had ‘drain[ed] every keg they came across’ into a 
bucket. When arriving at the den, the bucket of leftover beer was passed around, and those who 
wanted to took turns drinking from it (Hill, 1904, p. 39). 
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With these words, deriving from the how-to book How to Save Money (1913), Nathanial C. 
Fowler Jr. expressed a view of the bucket shop and of the amateur speculators who 
frequented these establishments that was shared by many financial writers in the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Though the bucket shop might have felt and looked 
like a brokerage office, it was, Marcosson noted, indeed no brokerage office (Marcosson, 
1907, p. 98). The main difference between the brokerage firm and the bucket shop was 
that the former was a facilitator of the buying and selling of securities listed on the 
exchanges, whereas the latter had no formal affiliation with the exchanges. Instead, 
bucket shops simply provided the opportunity for people (including those of modest 
means) to bet on whether the price of a certain security was rising and falling going up 
or down. However, contrary to investments made and speculation carried out on the 
exchanges’ trading floors and in the brokers’ offices, bucket shopping did not involve 
the exchange of actual commodities or stocks (Conant, 1901, pp. 709–710; Thomas, 
1900, p. 68).97 To get the right atmosphere and appearance, many bucket shops 
mimicked the décor of the brokerage offices, which meant having large blackboards on 
the walls where clerks could write down security prices, proper financial newspapers and 
stock indices for customers to read and telephones for customers, proprietors and clerks 
to use. Being located in the same financial districts – for example, near the Board of 
Trade building on LaSalle Street in Chicago and the New York Stock Exchange on Wall 
Street – as the regular brokerage firms only made the bucket shop seem more authentic 
(Hawley, 1900, p. 760). However, it was, more than any other thing, the stock ticker that 
authenticated the bucket shop and propelled its popularisation (Hochfelder, 2006, p. 
336).98 
97 The present discussion of the bucket shop draws on existing studies of the bucket shop business 
and the legal and political controversies it ignited (see Fabian, 1999; Cowing, 1965; De Goede, 2005; 
Levy, 2012; Knight, 2016; Hochfelder, 2006).  
98 The stock ticker was a telegraph that recorded price quotations of securities listed on the 
exchanges onto a strip of paper called ‘the tape’. Edward Calahan of the American Telegraph 
Company invented the ticker in 1867. (In the 1870s, Thomas Edison invented an improved version, 
the ‘quadruplex’, which had a higher capacity than Calahan’s ticker.) The quotations were 
transmitted from the exchanges to the brokerage offices or bucket shops via telegraph wires 
connecting the different facilities. The stock ticker has been the subject of several studies within the 
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The ticker was described as the ‘pulse of the market’ (Lefèvre, 1901b, p. 542).99 It 
made it possible to have access to the market without being near an exchange. This, 
however, also meant that it allegedly was more difficult to escape the ‘contagious’ market 
feeling (Marcosson, 1907, p. 103). The ticker made the market flow through the 
telegraph wires connecting various establishments across and between America’s big 
cities. Although this new form of communication helped to connect various markets 
across the nation, it also contributed to a concentration of information and sources of 
information pertaining to the most important markets such as those in Chicago and New 
York (Cronon, 1991, pp. 120–122). Having wires and tickers providing a constant 
stream of quotations from the exchanges meant that the bucket shops had direct access 
to the market (see Hochfelder, 2006; Knight, 2013; Preda, 2006).100 
In practice, the result of bucket shop deals was always one of loss for the client and 
of profit for the proprietor or vice versa. (The former scenario happened more often than 
the latter.) The interest of the bucket shop proprietor was thus always ‘diametrically 
opposed to that of the customer’ (Eames, 1894, p. 70). To turn out a profit, the bucket 
shops were hence completely reliant on their clients being on the wrong side of the 
wager. As Patton Thomas put it in his Munsey’s Magazine article ‘Bucket shops in 
Speculation’, the bucket shop’s livelihood rested on the Wall Street axiom ‘the public is 
always wrong’ being true (Thomas, October 1900, p. 68). Relatedly, it was widely agreed 
upon that the public only understood one form of speculation, and that was speculation 
in rising prices. The public were active in the market when there was a general 
fields of economic sociology, social studies of finance and the cultural history of finance (see Cetina 
and Preda, 2007; Knight, 2013, 2016; Preda, 2006, 2008; Stäheli, 2003, 2013). 
99 Lefèvre furthermore imagined that the ticker had a voice and even a mind and temper of its own 
(Lefèvre, 1901a). Lefèvre was not alone in ascribing human traits to the stock ticker. Hoyle, for 
instance, described how the ticker ‘whispers’ to the traders and brokers monitoring it (1898, p. 61). 
The ticker was said to have an influence on its users (observers) mental constitution, and this 
influence could occasionally, according to some writers, turn pathological. Traders could become 
‘mentally intoxicated’ with ‘ticker fever’ (Lefèvre, 1901c, p. 72) or ‘tickeritis’ (Harper, 1926, p. 10).  
100 In some bucket shops, the ticker served as nothing but a symbol, i.e. as a part of the 
paraphernalia of the properly equipped shop (Fabian, 1999, pp. 191–192). Since bucket shops were 
mostly small businesses, many either could or would not buy access, even if the exchanges had 
granted them permission. Some allegedly stole access by tapping into the telegraph wires of the 
exchanges (Hill, 1904, p. 21). 
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excitement about securities, and they kept out or got out when markets were 
“depressed”. Most observers believed that the public would never speculate in falling 
prices, i.e. sell short (Thorpe, 1901, pp. 62–63). Therefore, the proprietors took the 
short, ‘bearish’ side of the wager anticipating that the customer would stay on the bull 
side until the price went past its peak and started falling. The very foundation of the 
bucket shop business thus relied on the simple assumption that the customer would 
follow the crowd on the buy side almost regardless of what happened. In short, the 
proprietors assumed that the public were gullible, ignorant and susceptible to the 
influence of crowd psychology. What the proprietors needed was basically to lure 
customers into their shops and then sooner or later the small speculators would end up 
overstaying their position and come out on the losing end. 
Providing small margins and fractional lots (the lot being the number of shares that 
constitute one transaction, whereas an odd lot is a number of shares below the one lot 
minimum) the bucket shops allowed people of modest means to become acquainted 
with the thrills and disillusions of speculation.101 Not being exclusively for the affluent 
and professional investors, the bucket shop attracted quite a diversified clientele. In the 
101 A bucket shop deal was usually made via a margin payment or an opening of a margin account. 
The margin constituted the collateral that the bucket shops demanded from its customers in order 
to let them speculate on the movement of securities’ prices. Trading on margin was, as already 
mentioned, not an uncommon practice in the exchanges, but the difference was that the margin 
payment in bucket shops was comparatively lower than the one set by the exchanges (Cowing, 
1957, p. 406). Typically, the margin payment in bucket shops was around three per cent of the price 
of the financial product purchased (it could even be as low as one per cent), whereas e.g. the New 
York Stock Exchange required a 10 per cent margin as a minimum. The New York Stock Exchange 
furthermore required a minimum of hundred shares per trade, which amounted to transactions 
involving hundreds or even thousands of dollars (Hochfelder, 2006, p. 343). In The ABC of Wall 
Street, S. A. Nelson noted that ‘bets’ in bucket shops ‘are usually based on $5 as a minimum or 5 
shares of stock on a margin of 1 percent’ (Nelson, 1900, p. 131). Conant, who greatly disapproved 
of bucket shops and everything that they stood for, claimed that the margin in bucket shops was, in 
fact, ‘only a wager and not a margin’ (Conant, 1901, p. 710). A real margin, such as the one paid to a 
broker, was, Conant argued, the cash amount that a buyer of a financial product needed to pay the 
broker in order to buy a certain amount of stocks or commodities. The margin constituted a certain 
percentage of the actual price of the product and the difference between the cash put up as a 
margin and the product’s price the buyer borrowed from the broker (Conant, 1901, p. 710). Since 
there were not any actual transactions being made in the bucket shops, Conant maintained that their 
margins were nothing but yet another fictitious emulation of an otherwise legitimate market practice 
(Conant, 1901, p. 710). 
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beginning, it was predominantly young bank or investment house clerks – with an 
affinity for speculation but without the means to partake on the same terms as the 
people they were servicing on a daily basis – who were lured into the bucket shops by 
the prospect of speculative gains. Gradually, other groups, besides those affiliated with 
the market by proxy (as the clerks were), began to frequent the bucket shops with hopes 
of making what seemed, from the outside, to be easy and fast money. Contrary to the 
exchanges, the bucket shop proprietors did not discriminate based on class, status or 
gender as long as those coming through the doors were willing to part with money 
(Hochfelder, 2006, pp. 341–343; Levy, 2012, pp. 252–253). 
Generally, the exchanges considered bucket shop speculation detrimental to the 
‘interest and welfare’ of the exchanges (Rollins and Brown, 1920 [1911], p. 23). The 
bucket shops tarnished the exchanges’ image as facilitators of legitimate organised 
speculation, a reputation the exchanges had fought long and hard to establish. In order 
to legitimise their own business, the exchanges needed to maintain that the business 
conducted in bucket shops was an immoral form of gambling completely detached from 
the speculation they facilitated (De Goede, 2005, pp. 75–81; Fabian, 1999, pp. 188–
189).102 The exchanges had to clear the ‘confusion in the public mind’ that the bucket 
shops, according to Conant, had played a central role in creating (Conant, 1901, p. 701). 
One way clarity could be brought to the public mind was by emphasising that bucket 
shops had nothing to do with and, even more importantly, had no effect on the regular 
market. Since their activities had no effect on demand and supply, their economic and 
social value was, Conant believed, non-existent or, in fact, negative (Conant, 1901, pp. 
709–711, 1903, p. 433). Contrary to Conant, who went to great lengths to clarify the 
distinction between financial market speculation and bucket shop gambling, other 
102 Besides being referred to as ‘immoral’, various unflattering terms and phrases were used to 
describe buckets shops. The bucket shop was called ‘a parasite’ on the exchanges (G. R. Gibson, 
1889, p. 120), a ‘nefarious trade’ (Wallace in King, 1898, p. 6), a trade ‘destructive to the morals and 
pockets of young men’ (Conant, 1903, p. 433), the ‘principal menace to the public’ (Guenther, 1911, 
p. 247), the ‘pest of Wall Street and the country’ (Nelson, 1900, p. 131) and simply ‘immoral’ 
(Howe, 1916, p. 63). 
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writers persistently claimed that there was no considerable difference between the two. 
Some even preferred bucket shops to the exchange affiliated brokerages.  
In Wall Street Speculation: Its Tricks and Tragedies (1904), Franklin Keyes argued that 
people venturing into bucket shop speculation were for the most part sceptical about the 
proprietor’s intensions and advice, which made them cautious. This was seldom the case 
in the exchange-affiliated brokerages, where people believed they would be treated fairly 
(i.e. that their interests were being looked after). To Keyes, it was thus a mitigating 
circumstance that people speculating in bucket shops at least knew that entering such an 
establishment meant that they were about to engage in gambling activities and thus 
should, as he phrased it, ‘work out their own destruction’ (Keyes, 1904, pp. 30–32). 
Conant rebutted such a view by pointing out that the gambling carried out in the bucket 
shops was by no means comparable to the legitimate speculation undertaken in the 
exchanges (Conant, 1903, p. 433). Another reason why the exchanges tried to eradicate 
bucket shops was that the latter were making substantial inroads in the exchanges’ 
revenue stream by reeling in customers who would perhaps otherwise have gone to do 
business in the exchanges.103  
 
Around 1915, the exchanges’ persistent campaign to make an end to bucket shop 
speculation had succeeded (see De Goede, 2005, pp. 68–75; Fabian, 1999, pp. 188–200; 
Hochfelder, 2006, pp. 350–354). While they were still in business, the bucket shops 
were, at least in the eyes of the exchanges and their affiliates, symbols of the vices of 
public participation. The success of the bucket shop was necessarily always at the 
expense of the public. The immense success of the bucket shops accentuated that the 
103 The author of the exposé The Dragon and the Juggernaut of Speculation (1916) James Hamilton Howe, 
who was highly critical of speculation in all its forms irrespective of whether it took place in the 
exchange building or in the nearby bucket shop, argued that the exchanges’ campaign against 
bucket shops had nothing to do with protecting honourable business. Bucket shops were, Howe 
argued, the ‘illegitimate children of the Board of Trade’ in Chicago (Howe, 1916, p. 18). They were 
tokens of the morally corrupting financial gambling fever spreading from the so-called legitimate 
markets into the public sphere, creating outgrowths like the bucket shops. The exchanges were not, 
Howe thought, on a moral crusade against a societal menace called the bucket shop. On the 
contrary, their aim was simply to crush the competition (Howe, 1916, p. 63). 
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public were gullible and suggestible to manipulation and therefore should be provided 
some form of protecting against scams. The best remedy against bucket shops was, 
according to the exchanges and those in favour of the business they conducted, to have 
them illegalised, thus emphasising that the only place speculation could be carried out in 
an orderly and socio-economically beneficial way was in the exchange.104  
In basing their business model on the axiom that the public was always wrong, the 
bucket shop came to incarnate the problem concerning the speculative public as 
expressed by advocates of organised exchange speculation. The bucket shops were 
perceived as a fraudulent business that prayed on the gullibility and speculative fever of 
the public, and their tremendous success only accentuated that the public actually did 
lack the required knowledge, experience and mental strength when it came to investment 
and speculation. The bucket shops emerged as a response to the popular demand for 
opportunities to speculate in stocks and commodities. Unlike the exchanges that 
deployed exclusionary mechanisms to deal with public participation, the bucket shops 
opened their doors and let the public satisfy their speculative urges with them. They thus 
embraced the public’s alleged susceptibility to follow the crowd, and their success was a 
testament to the assumption that it was logical in the market sense to counteract the 
104 The number of people with a broker’s account in an exchange-affiliated brokerage firm increased 
dramatically after the eradication of the bucket shops. The popularity of bucket shop speculation 
had, according to Hochfelder, made the bucket shop speculators somewhat acquainted with 
investment and speculation. When the bucket shops were forced out of business, their clientele of 
small speculators went to the exchanges to invest and speculate (Hochfelder, 2006, pp. 357–358). 
The more than three hundred per cent increase in the number of Americans owning stocks between 
1900 and 1922 (from 4.4 million to 14.4 million) was, however, not exclusively propelled by the 
proliferation and later eradication of the bucket shops (Hochfelder, 2006, p. 336). The introduction 
and propagation of employee stock ownership plans and in particularly the Liberty or War bond 
campaigns contributed greatly to the increased public participation during and after World War I 
(Hochfelder, 2006, pp. 337–338). A massive increase in the number of American investors took 
place during World War I when the US government started mass-issuing so-called Liberty or War 
Bonds to the American public. The aim of the war bond campaigns was simply to support the allied 
cause (Ott, 2011). The campaigns turned out to be tremendous successes. According to historian 
Julia Ott, ‘20 million subscribers (82 percent of U.S. households or roughly 20 percent of the 
population) pledged to buy a federal war bond’ during the four War bond drives that took place 
between June 1917 and May 1919. Altogether, the four drives raised $21.4 billion (Ott, 2011, p. 56). 
Besides helping to sustain the financial side of the war machinery, the war bond drives markedly 
increased the number of Americans with a stake in the financial markets.  
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public, since the public was always wrong. This piece of market logic was later 
popularised in the how-to literature, as I will return to in Chapter 5.   
Conclusion 
A significant dimension of the debates associated with the topic of public participation 
that I have left out of this chapter is that of women’s role in the financial markets. 
Although there were female speculators in the exchanges, the idea of the female investor 
or speculator was met with scepticism from financial writers. As I have shown in this 
chapter, many financial writers and economists were concerned with the increasing 
number of small or amateur speculators and investors who ventured into the financial 
markets without the required skillset, knowledge or experience. The concerns raised 
about the speculative public were echoed in discussions of women’s role in the markets. 
The debates about women in finance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
can, I will argue, be seen as a prism through which all the problems associated with the 
public were reflected in an amplified form with stronger moralistic connotations.105 
Although I have chosen not to focus specifically on the debates about women in finance 
in this chapter, I will give one brief example that illustrates how the problematisations of 
women in finance and public participation converged in the three areas examined in the 
chapter, namely (a) competencies and qualifications; (b) misperceptions of the market; and (c) 
suggestibility and credulousness. The problematisation of women’s role in finance illustrates 
how the theme of public participation was one that began to permeate many discussions 
of financial markets in the late nineteenth century and especially in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Many financial writers assumed at the time that the optimal 
functioning of the organised markets was dependent upon the exclusion of disturbing 
elements such as the hapless public, including allegedly excitable females.  
In the Q&A section of his Munsey’s Magazine segment ‘Financial Department’, the 
respected financial journalist John Grant Dater was once asked for investment advice by 
105 Women’s role or the role of the female sex in the history of financial markets has been touched 
upon from different perspectives in different studies (see De Goede, 2005, Ch. 2; Fraser, 2005, pp. 
76–78; Ott, 2011, pp. 75–92; Stäheli, 2013, Ch. 6). 
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a woman from Springfield, Massachusetts who openly admitted to know ‘nothing about 
bonds and very little about stocks’ (Dater, May 1911, pp. 237–238).106 Among other 
things, the woman, who signed as Miss J. B., asked Dater whether he would advise her 
to buy stocks or real estate and if buying stocks in railroad companies at the present 
prices would be a good investment. Pedagogically and methodically, Dater answered 
Miss J. B.’s questions one by one, without concealing that a different set of rules of 
precaution applied when it was women and not men who were speculating and 
investing. He pointed out that ‘[i]t is well for a woman to confine her investment 
operations as closely as possible to the highest investment standards’, by which Dater 
meant high-class bonds (Dater, 1911, p. 237). With regard to the question of whether it 
would be wise to buy railroad stock, Dater was reluctant to give any specific 
recommendations. Although arguing that there were ‘many good stocks’, he did not 
think that buying stocks was a good investment for ‘a woman or a dependent person’ 
(Dater, 1911, p. 238). Buying and owning stocks required, in Dater’s opinion, the ability 
to cope with price fluctuations, and though he acknowledged that seeing prices decline 
could act as a disturbing influence on everyone, it was, as a rule, more disturbing to 
women. Dater used the term ‘woman’s investments’ about investments, which he 
believed were suitable for women. These, Dater thought, were investments that fitted 
women’s allegedly limited market knowledge and temperamental nature (Dater, 1910, p. 
106 Apart from his segment in Munsey’s Magazine, Dater wrote prolifically on market-related topics, 
and he was the financial editor of both Munsey’s and the daily newspaper The New York Herald 
(Lefèvre, 1904a, p. 147). In ‘Financial Department’, Dater offered overviews of the market 
situation, ideas as to what would be a good investment and, in particular, warnings about bad 
investments and ‘get-rich-quick’ schemes. Foremost, the segment was focussed on informing 
readers about the legitimate business being made in financial markets as well as the misdeeds of 
certain phony scammers. The last part of every ‘Financial Department’ segment was devoted to 
questions from the magazine’s readers and Dater’s answers hereto. The Q&A section mostly 
contained investment advice and investment warnings, but contrary to the advice clients would, for 
instance, receive in bucket shops, Dater’s errand was, generally, to convince his readers to minimise 
risk insofar as they had decided to invest in securities in the first place. In Dater’s opinion, the 
American public was notoriously ignorant about the workings of financial markets, and this was 
particularly problematic considering how eagerly the public invested in stocks and bonds. The 
American public’s level of financial illiteracy was, Dater briskly stressed, downright appalling (Dater, 
1912, pp. 141–42). Dater’s view of women’s role in the financial markets was an aspect of a broader 
concern he had with public participation in the U.S. markets. 
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148). Slightly derogatory, Dater reminded his female readers that a savings account in a 
bank also could be considered a kind of investment (it paid interest), so settling for that 
was, in his opinion, the most proper and safest investment for a woman (Dater, 1910, p. 
148). The combination of women’s growing interest in investing and speculation and the 
alleged mental vulnerability of women made Dater label ‘woman’s investments’ a ‘timely 
topic’ (Dater, 1913, p. 823).107 
What Miss J. B.’s query and Dater’s answer reflect are the prejudices that financial 
writers had about women and the assumption that women ought to follow different 
rules than their male counterparts insofar as they wanted to invest in securities. What 
this short example also shows it that the problems Dater ascribed to women’s 
participation in financial markets were, as mentioned, in many respects similar to the 
problems associated with the participation of the public. Women were unknowledgeable 
about financial products and the general functioning of the market, which made them 
dependent on advice, tips and other guidance sources of which they were unable to 
judge the reliability. Furthermore, they were, in most cases, financially dependent on 
their husbands’ income (other constituents of the speculative public were dependent on 
an equivalent, the credit system). Besides being inexperienced, incompetent and 
dependent, women did not have the poise or mental strength to withstand the lure of 
the market, which was why Dater advised Miss J.B. and all other women for that matter 
to stick to bonds or a simple savings account if they were to invest in the first place. 
Finally, Dater and several other financial writers perceived women as naturally inclined 
to act impulsively and as having a hard time exercising emotional restraint, which were 
problems that the public, en masse, were also perceived as having. Le Bon argued in The 
Crowd (1896) that crowds had predominantly ‘feminine characteristics’ (p. 21), and it 
seems clear from the articulations of the problem of the public in the markets and of 
females in the markets that there is a kinship between the mental states of the public and 
that of women. 
107 It should be noted that in the early twentieth century, women were investing and speculating to 
an increasing and unprecedented degree, which arguably made ‘women’s investments’ a timely topic 
(Gregory, 1912, p. 722). 
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*** 
The popularisation of financial markets and the way in which the public was stigmatised 
as a pariah with little hope of making it in the fiercely competitive markets influenced the 
way markets were perceived and analysed. Additionally, a range of opportunities for 
action upon the action of the public was rendered possible, which concerned individual 
market actors as well as the regulators of markets. There were two primary consequences 
of the popularisation of financial market speculation and the derived problematisation of 
the public. First, these aspects created an immediate demand for accessible market 
advice that could help bridge what seemed to be an abysmal knowledge-gap between the 
amateur and the successful market professional. With the widening of the market thus 
emerged a significant group of potential readers of how-to literature. Public participation 
and the increased popularity of how-to books went hand-in-hand. In other words, the 
inclusion of the public in the financial markets created a demand for simple market 
knowledge, accessible to the inexperienced public. In Chapter 5, I explore how financial 
writers with a so-called ‘contrarian’ impetus tried to accommodate the public’s demand 
for advice on how to invest and speculate successfully in the financial markets, while 
simultaneously subscribing to the stereotypical notion of the public presented in this 
chapter. By conflating the notion of the market public with the notion of the crowd 
found in crowd theory, the contrarians drafted a market approach or philosophy that 
took into account the alleged incompetence and lack of mental tenacity of the 
speculative public.  
Second, the emphasis on the public’s assumed lack of competence, credulousness 
and suggestibility made the psychology of the market and of market actors stand out as 
not only a pertinent topic but also, in some cases, as a factor that directly influenced the 
formation of prices in the markets. The following chapter (Chapter 4) examines the 
influence that applications of psychology in various genres of financial writing, such as 
practitioners-oriented how-to literature, academic writing and reports by federal 
regulatory agencies, had on the way financial markets were perceived and how market 
practices and phenomena were explained. Furthermore, the chapter explores how this 
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psychologisation of the markets, which was particularly prevalent during the second and 
third decades of the twentieth century, highlighted different challenges, opportunities 
and problems that speculators and regulators alike ought to be concerned about and act 
upon. In the psychologised market, the so-called ‘psychological moment’ became, as I 
argue in the chapter, an organising principle and focal point for individual market action 
as well as a possible regulatory intervention.  
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Chapter 4: The psychological moment 
 
In the stock market, as elsewhere, men love to follow a leader. They will take 
desperate chances on the opinions of others; on the merest hearsay, the most absurd 
rumor. They are as easily frightened as a flock of sheep and credulous to the point of 
stupidity. Men who are contemptibly mean in the matter of expenditures upon 
themselves and their families will lose thousands of dollars in betting on a tip, and 
others who in their ordinary walks of business are sane and reasonable lose all their 
powers of reason on coming in contact with the “chance” to make “something for 
nothing.” 
 
Samuel Armstrong Nelson, The ABC of Stock Speculation, 1902, pp. 158–159 
 
The fear of losing control and the power of reason in the midst of trading were major 
concerns of financial writers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
rather extensive media coverage of ominous market events such as the panics in 1901 
and in 1907 revealed to the public how quickly things could escalate in the markets (see 
Noyes, 1909; Sprague, 1908). As examined in Chapter 2, the panic unfolding on the 
floor of the New York Stock Exchange in May 1901 proved, according to some 
observers, how rapidly tempers could flare and emotions of fear or excitement could 
spread through a market. A trait that many financial writers found to be distinctive of a 
panic was that those who experienced it appeared to be suffering from a temporary 
change in personality. The New York Times reported after the panic in 1901 that persons 
who were normally considered to be ‘rational and responsible’ had been acting as if they 
were ‘insane’ (The New York Times, 10 May 1901). Since an impairment of reasoning 
powers could allegedly have devastating consequences for the individual market actor, 
many financial writers were deeply interested in figuring out what caused the impairment 
and the loss of control. Often, they would explain the loss of reasoning powers with 
reference to people’s assumed inclination to imitate other people’s actions. The 
continuous exposure to a myriad of influences and suggestions in the markets arguably 
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made it immensely difficult for investors and speculators, especially for those perceived 
as the constituents of the speculative public, to withstand the urge to imitate others.  
These concerns about whether or not market actors were able to remain rational in 
the fiercely competitive financial markets were propelled by two composite 
developments: First, the discussions about the possible problems associated with an 
increase in public participation in the financial markets painted a picture of an 
inexperienced, incompetent and notoriously susceptible market public (see Chapter 3). It 
was a commonly acknowledged ‘fact’ that the general level of competence in the market 
was in inverse proportion to the number of newcomers being allowed to trade on the 
stock and commodity exchanges. As the number of amateurs increased, several 
observers – from gossip journalists and how-to book authors to reputable financial 
journalists, regulators and economists – assumed that the markets would become more 
unstable and volatile. Second, during the first three decades of the twentieth century 
financial writers as well as some academics began to resort to ideas, tropes and terms 
from psychology and crowd psychology to explain the irrational forces which were 
occasionally allegedly at play in the financial markets. This second development, which 
will be the main focus in this chapter, was heavily influenced by and in some cases a 
direct outcome of the first. Thus, the problems associated with public participation in 
financial markets were viewed as inextricably entangled with what I term the 
psychologisation of the markets. 
The present chapter explores deployments of psychological explanations, ideas, 
tropes and terms in practice-oriented market literature and scholarly work by economists 
and sociologists, as well as in reports by federal agencies from the second and third 
decades of the twentieth century. I argue that ascribing significance to the psychology of 
markets and resorting to the discipline of psychology for answers to concrete market 
problems were not merely or exclusively preoccupations of rather unorthodox writers of 
guidebooks on how to invest and speculate in securities. On the contrary, the use of 
psychology and crowd psychology in the advice literature was, I will argue, only one 
element in a more general incipient psychologisation spreading across and circulating 
between different genres of market writing and forms of market knowledge. Psychology 
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offered a vocabulary that seemed well suited for describing certain phenomena occurring 
in the market, especially the actions of the public. It furthermore offered ways of 
thinking about the transmission of ideas, opinions and emotions in collectives as well as 
the individual experience of being in a crowd regardless of the shape or form it might 
have. These ways of thinking about the psychology of crowds were directly applied in 
accounts of the functioning of markets and the behaviour of speculators.108  
The chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, I examine the influence that the 
psychologisation of the market discourse had on the practical dimension of speculation, 
and I do so through an analysis of the notion of ‘the psychological moment’ in financial 
markets. I argue that ‘the psychological moment’ came to constitute the most decisive 
moment in trading according to many psychologised accounts of the markets. 
Psychology was not, as I have already mentioned, only informing the practical discourse 
on investing and speculation. Social psychological and sociological ideas about crowd 
formation, the transmission of emotion via suggestion, imitation and contagion as well 
as the transformation of the self (and the conduct of the self) in highly affective 
environments such as the financial markets also permeated economic and sociological 
discussions of markets and market action. In the second part of the chapter, I begin with 
a discussion of (a) how social psychological ideas about suggestibility and imitative 
108 Although increasing importance was ascribed to psychological factors during the second decade 
of the twentieth century, psychology-informed interpretations of financial markets were not 
completely colonising the discourses on financial markets. Market psychology was still a 
marginalised perspective that went against the grain of more orthodox conceptions of financial 
markets as being ordered and determined by the rational action of market participants. In 
connection to this, it is worth noticing that the distinction drawn between the small or amateur 
speculators, i.e. the public, and the professionals created two levels on which market action and the 
psychology of market actors were generally discussed. On the level of the amateur, factors such as 
temperament, inclination to herd and mental contamination were considered paramount. To 
professionals, however, such factors were most often considered at least less important than, e.g., 
market fundamentals. This distinction between levels of market participation was concisely 
described by the investor, economist and prolific financial and business writer Roger Babson, who 
argued that those ‘not fortified by a personal knowledge of the exact fundamental conditions’ of the 
market had ‘the psychological laws’ working against them. The market actors who were particularly 
at risk of being swayed by irrational forces in the market were, Babson noted, the ‘untrained’ and 
‘uninformed’, i.e. the public. He further emphasised that professional speculators were less inclined 
to get carried away by this or that psychological factor, since they generally stuck to the analysis of 
fundamentals (Babson, 1914, pp. 47–48). 
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inclination informed some economists’ views on social action in markets. Social 
psychology provided the economists with what they saw as more empirically realistic 
ideas about individual and collective action in the markets than what the prevailing 
theories of economics could ostensibly deliver. I further (b) explore the assumed adverse 
effects of irrational crowd behaviour in the speculative markets as investigated in two 
reports on commodities futures trading drafted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and the Grain Futures Association (GFA). Being introduced in the regulatory discourse 
– as a means to explain the collective behaviour allegedly contributing to unfounded 
movements in prices in the futures markets – meant, I will argue, that crowd psychology 
was assigned prescriptive relevance: It was recognised as a factor that regulators had to 
decide whether to account or not account for when drafting market legislation.  
The psychological moment in financial markets 
During the second decade of the twentieth century, several writers, among them 
economists and sociologists, began to show increasing interest in the psychological 
factors supposedly influencing financial markets. A market phenomenon that was 
assigned significant importance in psychologised accounts of financial markets was the 
so-called ‘psychological moment’. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the compound 
noun ‘psychological moment’ as ‘the moment at which something will or would have the 
greatest psychological effect’. The notion was used in an almost identical way by 
financial writers, to whom it constituted the decisive moment when prices seemed to 
have reached top or bottom and were about to move in the opposite direction, i.e. the 
crucial moment when the active trader either made a profit or incurred a loss (see, e.g., 
Brand, 1915; Browne, 1918; Gibson, 1915; Selden, 1912). The expression the 
‘psychological moment’ was already part of the Wall Street vernacular in the first decade 
of the twentieth century. It was, for example, used rather extensively in the investors’ 
and speculators’ magazine The Ticker. The uses of the expression in The Ticker were, 
however, not accompanied by reflections on the psychology of markets, as was later the 
case. It was first during the second decade of the twentieth century that the expression 
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became an object of theorisation and given a central place in the psychology of the 
markets.109 
Selden’s market psychology 
One attempt to determine and study the psychology of the stock market was made by 
George Charles Selden (a former fellow at Columbia University, statistician and prolific 
financial writer). Selden’s short volume The Psychology of the Stock Market (1912) stands as 
one of the first books entirely devoted to the task of unfolding a psychology of the 
market.110 In the book’s preface, Selden made it clear that his study of the stock market 
was based on the assumption that ‘the movements of prices on the exchanges are 
dependent to a very large degree on the mental attitude of the investing and trading 
public’ (Selden, 1912, preface). When Selden spoke about the ‘mental attitude’ of the 
public and of ‘the public mind’, he specifically meant ‘the mental attitudes of those 
persons who are interested in the market at the time’ (Selden, 1912, p. 9). He refrained, 
however, from explicating what he meant by ‘interest’ and hence how it would be 
109 In the article ‘The Psychological Moment’ published in The Scientific Monthly, Professor of 
Psychology at the University of Indiana Harry Dexter Kitson used a Shakespeare quote to illustrate 
what he meant by the term ‘psychological moment’: It was ‘a tide in the affairs of men, Which taken 
at the flood, leads on to fortune’ (Kitson, 1919, p. 247). Though the term ‘psychological moment’ 
was, according to Kitson, a popular expression applied to ‘the most widely varying circumstances’, 
he argued that it was particularly important in relation to what he referred to as ‘the psychology of 
the sale’. The psychological moment in connection to a sale or a purchase was, Kitson emphasised, 
a moment of ‘extreme delicacy’ that could either result in a desired transaction being carried out or 
destroy the preparatory work of the salesman. Failing to recognise and thus seize the psychological 
moment either by being too eager and thereby rushing the transaction or by delaying the process 
until it was too late were, Kitson pointed out, the constant risks associated with the psychology of 
the sale (Kitson, 1919, p. 246, pp. 250–251). A revised and extended version of the article became a 
chapter in Kitson’s book The Mind of the Buyer: A Psychology of Selling (Kitson, 1921, pp. 169–181).   
110 Selden was, however, not the first to attend to the idea or the topic of the psychology of the 
stock market or stock exchange (see H. a. L. Fisher, 1908, p. 62). For example, in the article ‘The 
Theory of Marginal Utility and the Fundamental Law of Psychophysics’ (1908), Max Weber 
discussed the idea of a psychology of the stock exchange. In the article, Weber criticised attempts 
made by certain scholars to infer psychology as a complementary science to economics. Weber 
noted that ‘taking into account the specific “psychology of the stock exchange” as a complement to the 
purely abstract theory of price [formation]’ was, from the economist’s point of view, utter nonsense 
(Weber, 2012 [1908], p. 249, italics in the original). However, he did not say anything about whether 
accounting for the psychology of the stock exchange could be beneficial to practitioners such as, 
e.g., the speculator trying to make a profit trading securities. 
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possible to identify the people interested in the market at a particular time. Furthermore, 
how ‘mental attitudes’ should be scientifically accessed and assessed was another 
methodological question to which Selden did not provide clear answers. Although 
Selden aspired to cultivate a new field of research, namely market psychology, the real 
value of the book was, according to a review in Journal of Political Economy, its suggestions 
to aspiring investors and speculators. The reviewer noted that Selden had made ‘no 
attempt at working out a causal organic theory’, and that the scientific contribution of 
the book could accordingly only be seen as ‘a suggestion of what might be accomplished 
in this direction’ (1913, p. 95). ‘The primary object of the book’ was, the reviewer 
concluded, ‘to offer practical guidance toward successful speculation’ (1913, p. 95). 
Though Selden resorted to psychology for explanatory purposes, it primarily came to 
serve him as a means to describe market movements and to prescribe ways of acting in 
the stock market with a successful outcome. 
Selden’s orientation towards the practical side of stock market trading reflected his 
conviction that the market fundamentally was a ‘purely practical proposition’ (Selden, 
1912, p. 34). Various scientific methods might be applied to it, but that did not mean, 
Selden insisted, that it was possible to ‘reduce the fluctuations of the stock market to a 
basis of mathematical certainty’ (Selden, 1912, p. 34). This aversion towards 
mathematics, which was arguably only an expression of scepticism from someone who 
had actually experienced the empirical reality of social action on the stock exchange at 
close quarters, paved the way for ideas from collective psychology to emerge in Selden’s 
account of the stock market. Selden distinguished between two levels of psychological 
influence on markets: (a) the aggregate market level and (b) the level of the individual 
market actor. On the market level, Selden was interested in providing answers to the 
following questions: ‘What effect do varying mental attitudes of the public have upon 
the course of prices?’ And, ‘[h]ow is the character of the market influenced by 
psychological conditions?’ (Selden, 1912, p. 12). On the individual level, Selden queried, 
‘How does the mental attitude of the individual trader affect his chances of success?’ 
And, ‘[t]o what extent, and how, can he overcome the obstacles placed in his pathway by 
his own hopes and fears, his timidities and his obstinacies?’ (Selden, 1912, p. 12). The 
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two levels were necessarily inextricable, for while individual sentiment affected the 
aggregate level, the mental attitude of the individual was susceptible to the ‘public mind’.  
The ‘public mind’ or the public were, according to Selden’s understanding, not per se 
synonyms for an ‘inferior mind’ or for an always inferior class of market actors. The 
‘wrongheadedness’ of the public ‘no longer exists to the same extent as formerly’, Selden 
proclaimed (Selden, 1912, p. 85). The public was, he insisted, not completely incapable 
of making informed trading decisions, as had been a widely shared belief among several 
financial writers before him (see Chapter 3).111 Unlike, for instance, proprietors of 
bucket shops, Selden did not think that the trader could rely completely on the axiom 
‘the public is always wrong’ to hold true (Thomas, October 1900, p. 68). Along similar 
lines, Thomas Gibson – an author of several market handbooks and of Thomas Gibson’s 
Weekly Market Letter published during the first three decades of the twentieth century – 
argued that the public had become better at speculating than they had previously been. 
In an issue of his market letter dated 7 November 1908, Gibson stated that although he 
did not mean to ‘offer the opinion that the public element has suddenly grown extremely 
wise’, he did detect a ‘great improvement in methods’ (Gibson, 1909, p 216). ‘A few 
years ago’, Gibson continued, ‘the outside trader wanted his broker or adviser to tell him 
what to buy – nothing more. To-day the same contingent make the broker who doesn’t 
know his business very unhappy’ (Gibson, 1909, p 216). Successful stock trading 
ostensibly required more than a strategy of counteracting the public. Although a great 
number of small traders had proven that they were able to trade intelligently, Gibson and 
Selden both nevertheless stressed that there were pivotal moments, when the public 
111 Already in the academic article ‘Trade cycles and the effort to anticipate’ published in the Journal 
of Quarterly Economics in 1902, Selden intimated that there was a connection between public 
intelligence and speculation. He argued that as the public grew smarter, their interest in speculation 
– in anticipating and foreseeing the effect of future events on prices – increased concomitantly 
(Selden, 1902, p. 309). One of the consequences of this development was, according to Selden, that 
fluctuations in the prices of securities were caused by subjective ‘speculative forces’ rather than by 
the laws of supply and demand. The speculative forces causing minor but still significant price-
fluctuations were brought about by what Selden termed the ‘instinct of anticipation’ which he 
described as an inclination to speculate and gamble that every person possessed. This ‘speculative 
sentiment’ had become much more influential in the markets due to public participation (Selden, 
1902, pp. 296–297, p. 309).  
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tended to be on the wrong side of the market. These were ‘psychological moments’ or 
simply ‘the moment’, as Selden termed it, when prices seemed to have reached top or 
bottom and were about to take a turn.112 At these crucial turning points, it was, Selden 
claimed, necessary to oppose the public (Selden, 1912, pp. 85–86). In these pinnacle 
‘psychological moments’, the public generally were, as noted in a short article in The 
Ticker and Investment Digest, ‘apt to be carried away by the first strong bit of information 
which comes to hand’ simply because they had not sufficiently analysed the market 
before venturing into a trade (September, 1910, p. 214). The psychological moment thus 
marked the moment when irrational psychology was affecting the sentiment of the 
public and hence making its mark on the fluctuations of prices. 
According to Selden, one way of discounting these turning points in the price of a 
stock was to detect market sentiment in the news (Selden, 1912, p. 58). The press 
reflected, he assumed, ‘the thoughts of the multitude’, and it thus constituted a means to 
identify when a break in a stock price was imminent (Selden, 1912, pp. 28–29). However, 
other observers considered the detection of public sentiment through the news to be a 
rather risky approach. As Gibson emphasised in The Element of Speculation (1913), 
speculators and investors had a tendency to exaggerate the importance of news, and it 
was furthermore generally difficult to distinguish proper news from plain gossip (pp. 
112 There were, as mentioned in the chapter’s introduction, other financial writers besides Selden 
who ascribed immense market-strategic importance to (the detection of) ‘the psychological 
moment’. To take into account the psychological influences in the markets constituted, according to 
the financial writer and former trader John T. Brand, a second aspect to the study of markets (the 
first being the observation of price changes). Brand asserted that having the ability to detect ‘the 
temper of the market’ enabled traders to identify the decisive moment – ‘the psychological moment’ 
– when prices changed direction (Brand, 1915, p. 22). Gibson also noticed and ascribed importance 
to ‘the psychological moment’ in his market letter (Gibson, 19 March 1915). The term ‘the 
psychological moment’ was also discussed in Scribner Browne’s Practical Points of Stock Trading (1918, 
p. 231) and later in William D. Gann’s Truth of the Stock Tape: A Study of the Stock and Commodity 
Markets with Charts and Rules for Successful Trading and Investing (Gann, 1923, p. 2). Furthermore, the 
significance of the ‘psychological moment’ was emphasised by the financial journalist and market 
professional Thomas Temple Hoyne in the how-to book Speculation: Its Sound Principles and Rules for 
Its Practice (1922). Hoyne argued that the ‘hackneyed phrase’ the ‘psychological moment’ had a deep 
significance in speculation. He also stated that ‘[b]ecause of all those changes in price often brought 
about by nothing beyond crowd action resulting from a unified discharge of speculative force, the 
real meaning of that phrase becomes clear and luminous’ (Hoyne, 1922, p. 219). I return to Hoyne 
and his crowd psychology-informed account of speculation in Chapter 5. 
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116–117). Many providers of market news were, Gibson thought, dishonest and 
manipulating. They prayed on the susceptibility of the public by exercising what he 
referred to as ‘the power of suggestion by means of exaggeration’ (Gibson, 1911, p. 
587).113 Gibson suggested that ‘gossip masquerading as news’ should be disregarded, 
while speculators and investors should only attend to ‘genuinely informative’ and 
authoritative sources of market information (Gibson, 1913, pp. 116–117). How 
information should then be distilled from noise was not a question to which Gibson 
provided an answer. Nevertheless, the point seemed to be that reading the news 
allegedly made it possible for the watchful investor or speculator to capture a snapshot 
of the mood of the market (following Selden), and yet it could also serve as proof of 
deceptive and distorted judgement (following Gibson). These opposing views reflected 
an infrequently discussed yet thinly veiled paradox penetrating the work of autodidact 
market psychologists like Selden, namely that the disease also appeared to be the remedy. 
To specify, studying the psychology of the public could give an indication of where 
markets were moving, but it could allegedly also distort the individual trader’s ability to 
make unbiased, independent decisions.  
A pertinent question that Selden did not pose directly in The Psychology of the Stock 
Market but one he nevertheless seemed to grapple with throughout the book was this: 
What happens to the individual when trading in the stock market? One thing Selden was 
certain about was that the discernment of market actors was often affected in the stock 
113 Gibson’s scepticism towards news was informed by the essentially crowd-psychological idea that 
the newspapers deceived the masses and turned them into docile crowds (see Chapters 2 and 5). 
Generally, Gibson was convinced that crowd psychology played a significant yet frequently 
unrecognised role in financial markets. In his market letter of 16 September 1911, Gibson argued 
that there were ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ causes of price movements in the financial markets. While 
the tangible causes could be identified deductively in the fundamentals, the intangible causes were 
impalpable and impossible to detect via deduction. They were simply of another nature, and Gibson 
described these intangible causes of price movements as ‘what Le Bon called “the psychology of the 
crowd”’ (Gibson, 16 September 1911b). Early in the second decade of the twentieth century, 
Gibson began to discuss ‘the temperament of the speculative public’ and ‘the psychology of the 
crowd’ and how studying crowd psychology would provide the individual trader with an invaluable 
competitive edge in the market (Gibson, 1910b, p. 237, 1911a, p. 587). The psychology of the 
public and that of the crowd were, for Gibson, two sides of the same coin. The temperament of the 
speculative public was comparable, he reckoned, to the whimsical ‘temper of a mob’, which, he 
argued, tended to change ‘instantly and simultaneously’ (Gibson, 1910a, p. 147). 
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market. When commencing on a market venture, Selden believed that the individual 
trader ‘unconsciously’ permitted ‘his judgment to be swayed by his hopes’ (Selden, 1912, 
p. 71). This idea that the mind of the individual was unconsciously influenced in the 
market is strikingly similar to the idea that people lose a sense of their individuality in 
crowds. This latter idea was a cornerstone in crowd psychology. Le Bon, for example, 
assumed that people gathering in a crowd unwittingly lost their ability to decide for 
themselves and became subjected to ‘the law of the mental unity of crowds’ (Le Bon, 1896, p. 
2, italics in the original). This law seemingly also applied in the stock market, at least 
according to Selden.114 Hence, the trick was not to become subjected to the collective 
mind of the market crowd. Though it seems counterintuitive that market actors should 
be able to actively or consciously prevent an unconscious loss of autonomy, Selden 
nonetheless believed that they could. According to Selden, in order not to experience a 
loss of discernment the trader had to ‘hold himself in a detached, unprejudiced frame of 
mind and needed to study the psychology of the crowd, especially as it manifests itself in 
the movement of prices’ (Selden, 1912, p. 86). If an investor or speculator understood 
and hence was able to detect crowd psychology in the market, she or he would have 
insight into what Selden perceived as one of the main causes of the movements of stock 
prices, namely public sentiment. The market actor should, Selden stressed, try to remain 
unaffected by any emotion, because emotions had a tendency to ‘cloud the intellect’ 
114 The loss of individuality due to the unconscious influence of crowd psychology in the financial 
markets and in business and economic life more broadly was not exclusively a concern of financial 
writers of handbooks and how-to literature such as Selden. In his book Wealth and Welfare (1912), 
Professor of Political Economy at University of Cambridge Arthur Cecil Pigou argued that crowd 
psychology played an important role in business; more precisely, it incurred errors on business 
forecasts. Pigou argued that people doing business, in the financial markets and elsewhere, were 
bound together by ‘psychological interdependence’, which he described as a ‘quasi-hypnotic system 
of mutual suggestion’ (Pigou, 1912, p. 460). Drawing on Edward David Jones’ thoughts on the 
crises and panics in the stock and produce exchanges in Economic Crises (which were greatly 
influenced by Tarde’s theory of imitation (see Chapter 2)), Pigou stressed that the problem of 
mutual suggestion, i.e. psychological interdependence, was amplified when people were 
‘congregated in close physical proximity to one another in the business sections of large cities’. In 
large cities, people were, he added, ‘bound together by an atmosphere of sympathy’ (Pigou, 1912, p. 
461). Besides being bound by sympathy, businesspeople were, according to Pigou, also bound 
together by debtor-creditor relations. He believed that these interdependence-relations – regardless 
of whether they were psychological or economic – tended to ‘promote action in droves’, i.e. ‘the 
psychology of crowds’ (Pigou, 1912, pp. 461–462).   
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(Selden, 1912, p. 113).115 Selden thus assumed that there was a privileged position from 
which the trader could observe the actions of the market crowd and act upon them 
without being affected in return.  
Acting in the stock market was thus believed to require a constant awareness of 
collective sentiment. The trader needed to know when to ride a wave of public 
sentiment and when to break with it, while, at the same time, always keeping a safe 
distance from any mind-distorting influences. Selden’s suggestions for proper market 
conduct were aimed at those who dared to embark on this intricate balancing act. 
Whereas most texts in the practitioners-oriented genre devoted a chapter or a couple of 
chapters to market psychology, The Psychology of the Stock Market stands out as a more in-
depth engagement with the topic.116 In dedicating an entire volume to the topic, Selden 
115 Towards the end of his book, Selden summed up his advice to traders in five suggestions, all of 
which aimed to prevent a clouding of the intellect: ‘(1) Your main purpose must be to keep the 
mind clear and well balanced. Hence, do not act hastily on apparently sensational information; do 
not trade so heavily as to become anxious; and do not permit yourself to be influenced by your 
position in the market. (2) Act on your own judgment, or else act absolutely and entirely on the 
judgment of another, regardless of your own opinion. “Too many cooks spoil the broth.” (3) When 
in doubt, keep out of the market. Delays cost less than losses. (4) Endeavor to catch the trend of 
sentiment. Even if this should be temporarily against fundamental conditions, it is nevertheless 
unprofitable to oppose it. (5) The greatest fault of ninety-nine out of one hundred active traders is 
being bullish at high prices and bearish at low prices. Therefore, refuse to follow the market beyond 
what you consider a reasonable climax, no matter how large the possible profits that you may 
appear to be losing by inaction’ (Selden, 1912, pp. 119–120). Such rules of what could be called 
proper trader conduct were, perhaps not surprisingly, common in the how-to genre, which I return 
to and elaborate on in Chapter 5. 
116 There were nevertheless quite a few market handbooks preoccupied with the topic of collective 
or crowd psychology in connection to speculation in financial markets. In the final chapter of Stock 
Prices: Factors in Their Rise and Fall (1911), Frederic Drew Bond discussed the psychology of 
speculation and emphasised the role of experience in limiting individual susceptibility (pp. 117–
124). In The Value of Organized Speculation (1913), Harrison H. Brace stressed the importance of ‘the 
mysterious psychology of the crowd’, which, he argued, was a constant influence on the exchanges 
(p. vii). Additionally, in a previous volume, Gold Production and Future Prices (1910), Brace studied how 
psychology in the markets affected market actors en masse. In relation to Selden’s work, it is worth 
noticing that he did not ascribe as much importance to market psychology in his later work as he 
had done in The Psychology of the Stock Market. In A Century of Prices (1919), co-written with former 
senator of Ohio and chairman of the Board of Directors in Merchants National Bank Theodore E. 
Burton, ‘the psychology of prices’ was, for example, only touched upon once. Moreover, it was 
perceived as an influence of only ‘some importance’, causing ‘temporary and minor movements of 
commodity prices’ (p. 26). Selden’s co-writer Theodore Burton was no stranger to the implication 
that mass psychology, according to some observers, had in the financial markets. He discussed the 
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underlined that market psychology was in his opinion not a speculative appendix to 
studies of financial markets but an integral cog in the market machinery. While 
economics and psychology were conceived as distinct sciences, using psychology as a 
means of explaining economic as well as financial phenomena was a rather common 
approach at the time. Almost parallel to the increasing popularity of market psychology 
in the practitioners-oriented how-to literature, economists began to take an interest in 
psychological theories as potential modes of explaining and correcting the fundamental 
assumptions of the theories of economics. The psychologisation that Selden referred to in 
his work was also incipient in parts of the economics milieu at the time. However, 
whereas Selden described market movements and prescribed ways to profit from them 
through his application of psychological ideas on market phenomena, economists saw an 
opportunity to rethink and more aptly explain the factors guiding economic action in 
theories of social psychology.  
Psychologisation in economics and a permanent crisis in the markets  
One of the American economists who advocated for a use of psychology as a means of 
explaining, complementing and ultimately improving theories of economics was Wesley 
Clair Mitchell. Armed with insights from crowd, instinct and nascent behaviourist 
psychology, Mitchell proposed some radical changes to the way in which economics 
should be conceptualised.117 Inspired by the then immensely popular social psychology 
of William McDougall, formulated in, inter alia, An Introduction to Social Psychology (1908), 
Mitchell wanted to prove that psychology was the unrecognised foundation of 
economics and, furthermore, that the psychological assumptions already inscribed in 
economic theory were essentially flawed. To specify, McDougall had proposed that 
connection between mass psychology and financial crises in the book Financial Crisis and Periods of 
Industrial and Commercial Depression (Burton, 1902, see Chapter 2). 
117 Mitchell was well-versed in the crowd psychological tradition. Crowd psychology was, in 
Mitchell’s reading, based on the notions of imitation, suggestion and sympathy, a trinity of notions 
whose theoretical development he ascribed to Le Bon, Tarde, Ross and Walter Bagehot (Mitchell, 
1914, p. 16). He argued that when it came to understanding particular economic phenomena these 
notions – imitation, suggestion and sympathy – were as important as those of equilibrium, self-
interest and rationality (Mitchell, 1914, p. 7, p. 16).  
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psychology was the foundation of all the social sciences. In McDougall’s opinion, 
psychology was not taken seriously enough in the social sciences, including in classical 
theories of economics, and the attempts made to say something about the ‘mind’ within 
the social sciences thus often came out as flawed and downright bad psychology 
(McDougall, 1916 [1908], pp. 1–2). Paraphrasing McDougall’s criticism of the simplistic 
psychology underpinning prevailing theories of economics, Mitchell pointed out that 
classical economists had committed an intellectualist fallacy by assuming that individuals 
were always guided by their ‘enlightened self-interest’ as well as a hedonistic psychology 
equating ‘the good’ with ‘the pleasurable’. The classical economists (and John Stanley 
Jevons, who was later labelled a ‘neo-classical’ economist) thus neglected all the aspects 
of human psychology that did not fit into their narrow definition and simplistic idea of 
human psychology (McDougall, 1916, p. 11; Mitchell, 1910a, p. 197).118  
Driven by the desire to reformulate the underlying premises of economic theory, 
Mitchell encouraged economists to open up to broader conceptions of what constituted 
human activity, which required, he argued, an acknowledgement of the importance of 
118 In the double-article in Journal of Political Economy titled ‘The Rationality of Economic Activity I 
and II’, in which Mitchell laid out his assessment of the assumptions underpinning classical theories 
of economics, he presented a lengthy critique of the allegedly hedonistic psychology found in most 
classical theories of economics. From loosely elaborating on the premises of Smith, Malthus and 
Ricardo’s economic theories, Mitchell thoroughly examined the entanglement of utilitarian ethics 
and hedonistic calculus found in the work of, among others, James Mill and Bentham, yet fully and 
explicitly integrated in Jevons’ economic theory (Mitchell, 1910a, pp. 205ff., 1910b, pp. 104ff.). The 
combined assumptions of enlightened self-interest and hedonism turned the human into a reflective 
pleasure-calculating animal that was, according to Mitchell, inconsistent with the way that humans 
actually acted and the way that their minds really functioned. Mitchell’s argument simply was that 
the underlying psychological assumptions of theories of economics should be replaced by more 
accurate assumptions such as those found in the work of, e.g., McDougall (Mitchell, 1910a, p. 197). 
The application of psychology to economic and financial market phenomena was, however, also 
met with criticism. Although he noted that the connection between psychology and economics was 
‘real and intimate’, Professor of Political Economy at Columbia University Edwin R. A. Seligman 
was highly sceptical of the idea that the discipline of psychology should directly inform theories of 
economics. He dismissed attempts to bridge the two disciplines as nothing more than an 
unproductive fad just as it had previously been ‘the fashion to apply biological concepts to 
economic life’ (Seligman, 1910, p. 29). In Principles of Economics (1910), Seligman explained that an 
increasing number of economists were becoming aware that the biological and psychological 
explanations of economic phenomena were ‘vague analogies rather than identities; that the laws of 
life in the economic world are not the same as those in the physical world; and that the only real aid 
which biology can give to economics is to enforce the conviction that in social as in animal life 
there is continual growth and perpetual change’ (p. 29). 
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people’s habits, their ‘amenability to suggestion’, ‘tendency towards imitation’ and their 
‘instinct of construction’ (Mitchell, 1910a, p. 200). Unless they were willing to do so, 
economists would, Mitchell believed, ‘fall unconsciously into an artificial way of 
representing the mental processes of economic life’ (Mitchell, 1910a, p. 205). Mitchell’s 
criticism of what he believed was economists’ artificial representations of economic life 
coincided with Selden’s earlier mentioned insistence on the impossibility of reducing 
stock market fluctuations to predictable mathematical certainties. In his arguably most 
influential work Business Cycles (1913) Mitchell stated his psychology-informed criticism 
of the mathematics-centred theories of economics in a financial market context: 
 
A mathematician’s mood exercises no influence upon his solution of an algebraic 
equation; but it does affect his opinion about the advisability of buying the bonds 
which are offered him. (Mitchell, 1913, p. 445) 
   
The emotional states allegedly affecting the opinion of people about to, in this case, buy 
bonds were, Mitchell argued, both ‘the product of strictly individual condition’ and ‘of 
suggestions received from the demeanor, the talk, and the actions of associates’ 
(Mitchell, 1913, p. 445). Like Selden, Mitchell was certain that individual inclinations or 
instincts as well as external affectations of various kinds could easily make individuals 
diverge from independent judgement. An individual person’s conduct was, as he pointed 
out, highly sensitive to the emotions swirling around in the company of which the 
individual was part. Additionally, Mitchell assumed that as emotions spread in markets, 
the actions they prompted were simultaneously intensified and affirmed by the market 
actors (Mitchell, 1913, p. 445). Echoing the belief of many market observers, including 
Selden, Mitchell noted that the consequences of the contagious spread of emotion in the 
financial markets were direr for the ‘great mass of small investors’ (Mitchell, 1913, p. 35). 
The small investors generally lacked experience and ability, which made them follow the 
advice or action of others instead of relying on their own judgement. ‘[T]hey are’, 
Mitchell argued, ‘peculiarly subject to the influence of feeling in matters where feeling is 
a dangerous guide’ (Mitchell, 1913, p. 35). Even though the psychology of the market 
had a stronger impact on the minds of those who had only minimal if any understanding 
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of the fundamentals of the market, Mitchell was, exactly like Selden, convinced that no 
one was ‘wholly immune from the contagion of emotional aberration’ (Mitchell, 1913, p. 
35). Hence, psychology was perceived as a fundamentally important factor that ought to 
be taken into account when dealing with and in financial markets.119 They did, however, 
agree that some were more suggestible than others depending on their experience, 
familiarity with the logic of emotional spread and their level of speculative competence. 
Selden and Mitchell were thus both interested in understanding the role that psychology 
played in the stock market and in providing a supposedly more realistic account of the 
way it functioned as compared to prevailing accounts heavily informed by mathematics 
and their opinion of a simplistic understanding of human psychology.  
Whereas Selden and Mitchell wanted to provide what they perceived as being a more 
‘realistic’ account of the relationship between human behaviour and the formation of 
prices in financial markets, the American sociologist and journalist Robert Ezra Park was 
interested in understanding and determining what actually characterised the sociality of 
the stock market. Park’s assumption was that the sociality of the market was unique and 
a reflection of a profoundly modern and unmistakably urban form of sociality. In the 
article ‘The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the City 
Environment’, published in the American Journal of Sociology, Park attended to the question 
of crowd behaviour associated with the stock exchange in a short but dense subsection 
119 Mitchell was not the only American economist who ascribed importance to ‘the psychological 
factor’ in financial markets. Professor of Economics at Harvard University Frank William Taussig 
advanced almost identical arguments about the psychology of the market in his Principles of Economics 
(1911). Taussig noted that oscillations of prices in a market had ‘partly economic, partly 
psychological’ causes (Taussig, 1911, p. 403). Elaborating on the collective psychology in markets, 
Taussig drew a parallel between the psychological conditions in a market and in a crowd. Though a 
few ‘very sagacious and sober persons’ were perhaps able to remain unaffected by the psychological 
influences of the markets, Taussig maintained that they were as few and far between as persons able 
to ‘remain rational in a mob or quiet in a cheering crowd’ (Taussig, 1911, pp. 404–405). The group 
of market actors on whom ‘the psychological factor’, according to Taussig, had the greatest 
influence was the public. About the public, Taussig wrote the following: ‘Many of the smaller fry 
and the “outside” speculators exercise no independent judgment at all, but simply buy or sell with 
the crowd, swallow all sorts of exaggerated statements or rumors, think only of the prices of 
securities from day to day, and, in the contagion of the moment, are singularly inattentive to the 
fundamental forces on which their doings are based. The psychological factor plays a large part’ 
(Taussig, 1911, p. 409).  
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titled ‘The stock exchanges and the mob’ (Park, 1915, pp. 591–593). The purpose of the 
article was, as the title indicates, to provide suggestions for investigations of certain 
forms of human behaviour in certain organisations and institutions in the modern city. 
The stock exchange was one of the institutions of the city that Park found particularly 
interesting. As a lecturer at the University of Chicago, Park also took an interest in the 
city’s iconic exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade. However, in his article, Park dealt 
with the exchange as a somewhat generic spatial construct. What enticed Park about the 
exchange – both ‘the stock exchange, and the board of trade’ – was the intenseness of 
the competition on the floor and the rapidity with which changes took place (Park, 1915, 
pp. 590–591). Park was thus interested in the stock market as a space in the modern city 
where human behaviour was unique in terms of the speed and intenseness of 
interactions and where eruptions of crowd behaviour were rather frequent.120 
The ‘constellation of forces’ found in the exchange was, Park argued, comparable to 
the social organisation of crowds or mobs (Park, 1915, p. 591).121 However, as he noted, 
120 Markets, cities and crowds had been studied in conjunction before Park outlined his programme 
for such a study. In Economic Crises (1900), Edward David Jones did, as examined in Chapter 2, 
compare the intensity of imitation in the modern city with the intensity of imitation and the 
contagious spread of emotion in the stock exchange. Jones drew on Tarde’s elaborations on 
imitation in cities (from The Laws of Imitation) in order to substantiate his comparison (Jones, 1900, 
pp. 204–205). Ellis Thomas Powell, the financial editor of the British daily financial newspaper 
Financial News, also argued that there was an affinity between and a mutual dependence of the 
modern market and the modern city. In The Mechanism of the City: An Analytical Survey of the Business 
Activities of the City of London (1910), Powell explained that the city and the market were characterised 
by the same social and psychological processes of imitation, sympathy, mass-suggestibility and 
fashion. With his analysis of the market as a constantly evolving mechanism in the modern city, 
Powell aimed to do what, among others, Selden and Mitchell were also aiming to do – namely, to 
infer what they perceived as ‘reality’ into the abstract theories of economics underpinning the 
reigning laws of markets. Powell elegantly stated that he was attempting to ‘clothe the dry bones of 
economic theory with the flesh of living reality, so that theory and practice come together’ (Powell, 
1910, p. 3). Although Powell was British and although London was the setting of his analysis of 
modern business, he made numerous comparisons to and comments on, e.g., the relation between 
the city of New York and the New York Stock Exchange. In a later volume, The Evolution of the 
Money Market (1916), Powell engaged more thoroughly with U.S. markets and exchanges. He 
furthermore drew on the work of sociologists William Graham Sumner and Edward Alsworth Ross 
and discussed how the ‘mob psychology’ that erupted during market panics called for some form of 
social control (Powell, 1916, p. 256, pp. 324–325, note 2).   
121 It is not surprising that Park took interest in the similarities between interactions and behaviour 
in the stock exchange and in crowds since he had had a strong intellectual interest in the latter. He 
had dealt exhaustively with the topic of crowds and crowd psychology in his PhD dissertation Masse 
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whereas crowds normally were characterised by being very mobile, they exhibited, in the 
exchanges, a ‘relative stability’ (Park, 1915, p. 591). In the same vein as Selden, Park 
asserted that the primary similarity between markets and crowds was that they were 
susceptible to psychological factors:  
 
It is commonplace that decisive factors in the movements of crowds as in the 
fluctuations of markets are psychologic. This means that among the individuals who 
make up the crowd or who compose the public which participates in the movements 
reflected in the market, a condition of instability exists which corresponds to what 
has been defined elsewhere as crisis. It is true of the exchanges, as it is of crowds, 
that the situation they represent is always critical, that is to say, the tensions are such 
that a slight cause may precipitate an enormous effect. The current euphemism “the 
psychological moment” defines such a critical condition. (Park, 1915, p. 591) 
 
Hence, Park perceived ‘the psychological moment’ as a fundamental condition in the 
exchange. It was not simply the moment when prices reached a high or a low, as was the 
general understanding among financial writers such as Selden and Gibson. The 
psychological moment was always imminent, which, according to Park, meant that the 
market, just like the crowd, was in a permanent state of instability or crisis. By crisis, 
Park did not mean financial crisis, although he thought the latter was an ‘extension of 
und Publikum: Eine Methodologische und Sociologische Untersuchung (1904), written at the University of 
Heidelberg. In a footnote, Park touched upon the topic of (financial) panic in relation to collective 
psychology [Kollektivpsychologie] and hence alluded to the possible connection between crowds and 
markets (Park, 1904, p. 60, n. 1). The notion of panic [Panik] had, Park noted, not been thoroughly 
dealt with within the scholarly field of collective or crowd psychology (Park, 1904, p. 60, n. 1). 
However, Park added that there were a couple of exceptions. One was Boris Sidis’ work on 
‘financial crazes’ in The Psychology of Suggestions (1898), which I discussed in Chapter 2, and the other 
was the Swiss linguist and ethnologist Otto Stoll’s Suggestion und Hypnotismus in der Völkerpsychologie 
(1894). Park mentioned the two works without discussing how they respectively dealt with the 
notion of panic. Stoll, in fact, had rather elaborate ideas about how mass suggestion [Massen-
suggestion] was a psychological factor affecting the formation of prices in the exchange [Börse]. One 
phenomenon that Stoll argued was caused by mass-suggestion in the exchanges was bank runs (Stoll, 
1904 [1894], pp. 656–658). When a panic and subsequently a crisis set in, the markets were 
overwhelmed by what Stoll termed contagious suggestibility [kontagiösen Suggestibilität] or the 
infectious suggestibility of the crowd [infektiösen Suggestibilität der Masse], which he, like Sidis, 
exemplified by examining famous speculative panics and subsequent crises in financial history such 
as the tulip mania in Holland and John Law’s Mississippi Company scheme (Stoll, 1904 [1894], pp. 
658–664). 
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this critical condition to the larger business community’ (Park, 1915, p. 592). Just as the 
critical condition in the exchange could easily be extended to the macro-level business 
community, it also reflected a critical condition on the micro, i.e. the individual level. 
The imminent risk of an eruption of a panic on the trading floor was mirrored in the 
individual trader, who was allegedly constantly at risk of being carried away by 
expressions of collective emotion. Thus, the permanent instability of the markets was 
reflected in the fundamental instability of the market actor, just as the critical situation 
inherent in crowds was, according to Park and crowd theory in general, reflected in a 
crisis of individuality (see Chapter 2).   
Park’s article did, as mentioned, consist of pre-studies, i.e. suggestions for how to 
study human behaviour in different urban settings. In order to study the critical 
condition in the markets, i.e. the psychological moment, Park suggested that one could 
examine the ways in which exchange speculators sought to take control of and 
manipulate crowds in the stock exchange. Park found it highly interesting that a crisis in 
the stock market could be instigated via manipulation, just as crowds had historically 
been subjected to the wishes of a leader figure (Park, 1915, p. 592).122 Apart from or in 
addition to the study of control and manipulation of crowds and markets, Park also 
proposed an examination of the emotional states of individuals who had taken part in an 
instance of crowd behaviour in the markets. Park was interested in whether or not the 
122 The connection between the leader and the led was, as I have explored in Chapter 2, one of the 
central aspects of crowd psychology. Whether it was the subjugation of the subject to the 
hypnotiser (Sidis, 1919 [1898], pp. 78ff.), the magnetised subject to the magnetiser (Tarde, 1903, pp. 
78–79) or the crowd to the crowd leader (Le Bon, 1896, pp. 117–125), it stood out as perhaps the 
germ of crowd emergence. The leader-led structure appeared inherent in the markets as a latent 
condition that those with little experience, sparse qualifications and modest means had to take into 
account when embarking on a financial market venture. In a later socio-psychological study of stock 
market values and economic crises, which appeared in an issue of The Annals of American 
Academy of Political and Social Science titled Stocks and the Stock Market (1910), the law scholar 
Arthur Selwyn-Brown suggested that market actors could be categorised as either ‘crowd leaders’ or 
followers. According to Selwyn-Brown, most people were, as a rule, ‘prone to suggestion and 
imitation’ (Selwyn-Brown, 1910, p. 155). These people were, he added, ‘moved more by sentiment 
than by judgment, by imitation rather than by thinking’ (Selwyn-Brown, 1910, pp. 155–156). A 
smaller group of people of the ‘optimistic and indomitable’ type had, Selwyn-Brown argued, a 
strong influence on the suggestible majority. Individuals adhering to the latter group were perceived 
as ‘constructors’ or ‘crowd leaders’ who gathered followers ‘through suggestion, sympathy, and 
imitation’ (Selwyn-Brown, 1910, p. 156). 
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individuals who had experienced a panic had felt a ‘sense of loss of control’ and/or ‘loss 
of personal responsibility’ (Park, 1915, p. 592). He further emphasised that it could be 
relevant to inquire into the ‘devices’ used to prevent panics and to disperse mobs (Park, 
1915, pp. 592–593). Park assumed that people’s market experiences would mirror the 
experiences people allegedly had in crowds. All of Park’s proposed angles on the study 
of human behaviour in the stock market were furthermore already, in some shape or 
form, circulating in the practical literature on speculation and investing in financial 
markets. The noticeable difference was that Park wanted to know whether the loss of 
control, the herd behaviour, the manipulation and other factors were actually happening 
and how market actors experienced them, while authors like Selden considered them as 
matters of fact and tried to come up with practical guidance on how to deal with them.  
 
While the interest of the social scientist (Park), not surprisingly, differed from that of the 
provider of practical guidance (Selden), they nevertheless shared the assumption that 
psychology was a key factor in the movements of prices in the stock market. Psychology 
was thus conceived as something else and as more than a mere means of explaining 
exceptional market phenomena and events: It was considered a factor more or less on 
par with fundamental factors such as interest rates, cash flows, earnings etc. The role 
that collective psychology played in the financial markets was epitomised by the 
psychological moment. Whereas authors of how-to literature such as Selden and Gibson 
saw the psychological moment as the defining moment when the market was just about 
to break, Park perceived it as a permanent critical condition. In both cases, the 
psychological moment was understood as a critical condition or an event around which 
action, trading strategies and market protection measures were shaped.  
Disruptions of the market order 
Expressions such as the ‘psychology of the market’ or of ‘the public’ as well as 
psychological ‘effects’, ‘conditions’, ‘moments’, ‘factors’, ‘laws’ and ‘tendencies’ in the 
markets were becoming part of the financial market vernacular during the second decade 
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of the twentieth century. These phrases as well as the ideas behind them were shaping 
views of the functioning of financial markets. To think that psychology had a profound 
influence on the movements in financial markets was thus far from uncommon during 
the second and third decades of the twentieth century. As quoted earlier, Park, for 
example, argued that it was ‘commonplace’ that ‘decisive factors […] in the fluctuations 
of markets are psychologic’ (Park, 1915, p. 591). On the backdrop of this 
psychologisation of the discourse, some writers thought that the use of psychological 
expressions and explanations had become too excessive and uncritical. In the book 
Investment (1918), Professor of Commerce and Industry at the University of Michigan 
Edward David Jones implied that crowd psychology had become too much of a default 
explanation of market movements.123 In discussing causes of price fluctuations in the 
stock markets, Jones pointed out that ‘[m]inor fluctuations result largely from the 
varying contests of bulls and bears’ (Jones, 1918, p. 238). In the same breath, he added 
that the over-buying and over-selling of the bulls and bears were not only the result of 
‘the contagion of the crowd’ but also predominantly due to the fact that those who 
traded from afar gave their ‘orders on the basis of quotations a day or two old’ (Jones, 
1918, p. 238). Jones stressed that there were obviously other factors affecting the 
movement of prices in the markets besides crowd contagion. Another critical comment 
about the allegedly excessive and frivolous employment of the word ‘psychology’ in 
financial writing came from the editor of The Wall Street Journal William Peter Hamilton. 
In his seminal work on the ‘Dow Theory’, The Stock Market Barometer (1922), Hamilton 
underlined the following with thinly veiled impatience: 
 
123 In Jones’ earlier work on economic crises, he adopted ideas from crowd psychology – more 
specifically, the work of Tarde and Sidis, among others (see Chapter 2). In this much later 
publication Jones, who had in the meantime advanced from associate to full professor, did not 
engage with crowd psychology to the same extent as he had done in Economic Crises (1900). 
However, it seemed as though he had internalised the idea that crowd psychology was an influential 
factor in financial markets. This is, for instance, apparent in his characterisation of low and high 
quality stocks: ‘The better the quality of a stock is, the more it acts like a bond. The worse a stock is, 
the more it depends upon earnings, the “psychology of the crowd,” the operations of pools, etc.’ 
(Jones, 1918, p. 284). 
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If there is one word which has grown wearisome, from constant use and misuse in 
the era of quackery from which we are only slowly emerging, that word is 
“psychology.” But here is a true psychological condition. We have lost trust in 
ourselves. We have meddled so disastrously with the law of supply and demand that 
we cannot bring ourselves to the radical step of letting it alone. (p. 247) 
 
Hamilton’s criticism was not exclusively directed at other financial writers’ misuse of the 
word ‘psychology’ in their accounts of markets. It was also, as implied in the quote, a 
free market and thus deregulation apology. The psychologisation of the discourse 
presented a threat to the idea of the free market since those using psychology to explain 
how markets worked assumed that irrational, extra-economic forces were actively 
influencing the fluctuations of prices. Regulation presented one way of preventing 
irrational forces from affecting the order of the market.   
Although there were critical outbursts, such as those from Jones and Hamilton, 
against the adoption of psychological terminology and against using psychology to 
explain certain market phenomena, the psychology of markets remained a regularly 
discussed topic in the how-to literature (see Chapter 5) as well as among some 
economists. In the same vein as Mitchell, some economists resorted to social psychology 
in order to find what they perceived as more realistic and scientifically adequate 
assumptions about human action. As proponents of this ‘social psychology criticism’ of 
the prevailing theories of economics argued, people did not carry their preferences and 
wants in ‘a suggestion-proof container’: Wants were products of a social process 
conducted by the ‘whole interacting social mind’ (Dickinson, 1919, pp. 407–408). 
Additionally, in the 1920s, regulatory agencies began to take notice of the psychological 
factors that were allegedly influencing the fluctuations of prices in the markets. As noted 
in a report on the grain trade drafted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ‘the 
psychological effect of the character of the market’ should not be disregarded when 
looking for the causes of price discrepancies in the futures markets, and neither should 
the ‘psychology of the exchange members’ (Federal Trade Commission, 1922, pp. 244–
245). It was believed that crowd psychology could and did amplify movements in the 
prices in futures markets and it was furthermore believed that some speculators 
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deliberately traded on the crowd psychology-induced price fluctuations. The regulatory 
agencies used crowd psychology to describe these unfounded oscillations in prices and 
on this basis outlined the possibilities for regulatory intervention. There were different 
reasons why some economists and regulatory agencies such as the FTC and the Grain 
Futures Association (GFA) thought that psychology ought to be recognised as an 
important factor in financial markets. In the following, I focus on the two primary and 
most clearly articulated reasons.  
The first reason why market psychology had to be taken seriously by regulators of 
futures markets was because of the alleged suggestibility of certain investors and 
speculators, which made them more prone to getting swept up in irrational crowd 
behaviour. The discussion of suggestibility was related to the aforementioned social 
psychology-informed critique of economics that overlapped with a decades-long debate 
about ‘speculative competence’ (see Chapter 3). Apart from being understood as the 
ability to understand and analyse the technical and fundamental conditions of the 
markets, speculative competence had developed into an umbrella term under which 
immeasurable and delicate factors such as temperament, experience and tendencies (to 
imitate, herd etc.) were subsumed (Cowing, 1958, pp. 20–21). Suggestibility was often 
seen as a direct outcome of speculative incompetence, which, again, was intimately 
associated with the public. The second reason why psychology in the markets should not 
be overlooked was that certain ‘destructive’ speculators were allegedly exploiting and 
trading on crowd psychology in the markets. The speculative practices of these market 
actors were believed to elicit unwanted irrational behaviour in other actors, setting in 
motion veritable cascades of buying or selling. Regardless of the way in which 
psychology was introduced in the financial market discourse, it always brought about 
discussions of and reflections on public participation and the problems that 
corresponded with it.    
Suggestibility, competence and amateurism 
One of the central questions that made discussions of competence in conjunction with 
collective psychology pertinent was the question of suggestibility. Did people have set 
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preferences, or were they partly or completely shaped “for them” by the environment? A 
related and equally important question in connection to this concerned whether different 
groups possessed different degrees of suggestibility, i.e. if the social or economic class 
that the individual adhered to was determining the degree of suggestibility. Economist 
John Maurice Clark, the son of one of the first American neoclassical economists John 
Bates Clark, advanced the argument that people’s wants and desires and consequentially 
their decisions were informed by stimuli from the ‘system’ that the individual ‘happens 
to be born into’ (Clark, 1918a, p. 11).124 Thus, what studies in social psychology had 
made Clark realise was that every economic actor was embedded in a context that 
moulded her or him through social and inter-psychological processes of imitation and 
suggestion.  
Since suggestion was, Clark argued, such a strong force in economic life, he thought 
that economics was in need of a ‘theory of economic guidance’ that could provide a 
more accurate picture of how wants were directed. In the second of a double-article in 
Journal of Political Economy titled ‘Economics and Modern Psychology II. Constructive 
statement: Outline of the Theory of Economic Guidance’ (1918b), Clark took it upon 
himself to draw out the contours of such a theory of economic guidance.125 Although all 
124 In the same vein as his predecessor Mitchell, Clark believed that the assumptions about human 
agency inscribed in the then prevailing theories of economics were far too detached from the 
realities of economic life. Rather than manufacture their own abstract assumptions, economists 
should, he proposed, borrow them from competent colleagues in other fields such as psychology 
and sociology (Clark, 1919, p. 290). Clark argued, almost as an echo of Mitchell, that ‘[i]f the 
economist borrows his conception of man from the psychologist, his constructive work may have 
some chance of remaining purely economic in character’, and she or he would not end up resorting 
to self-made ‘bad psychology’ (Clark, 1918a, p. 4). In order not to fall into the trap of producing 
bad psychology, Clark resorted, as Mitchell had done before him, to authorities within the fields of 
sociology, psychology and social psychology such as William James, McDougall and Charles Horton 
Cooley, all of whom were to some extent influenced by Tarde’s imitation-suggestion theory (see 
Leys, 1994). 
125 The outline included a general outline of generic factors that, one way or another, had an effect 
on economic choice-making as well as an outline of a detailed analysis of specific groups (Clark, 
1918b, pp. 159–160). The general processes that played a guiding role when individuals were to 
make economic choices were (1) ‘[d]eliberative action in deciding whether or not to act on a 
stimulus presented from outside’; (2) ‘[h]abit, custom, imitation’; (3) ‘[i]deo-motor action and 
suggestibility’. Each of the three parameters for choice-making had a string of sub-categories 
explicating each parameter under certain circumstances. Deliberate action was, for instance, 
conditioned by the information available as well as the ability to be calculative on the basis of the 
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individuals were habituated by the social and cultural ‘system’ in which they adhered, 
some people were, Clark assumed, better at controlling their ‘vulnerability to suggestion’ 
(Clark, 1918a, p. 25). Clark believed that the less intelligent people were, the more 
suggestible they tended to be. This was the case with people about whom Clark attached 
the unflattering label ‘sub-normals’, which he used to refer to persons who were 
intellectually inferior to the ‘average or typical citizen’ (Clark, 1918a, pp. 28–29).126 As 
Clark’s outline of the factors guiding ‘free’ economic choices implied, it was not 
exclusively the intellectually inferior persons who were vulnerable to suggestion.  
One of the specific groups under scrutiny in Clark’s outline was investors. The most 
challenged subgroup in this category was the small investors. Small investors had, in 
information that existed. Calculability and individual ability were thus intimately connected 
conditions that had to be in place in order for the individual to make sound economic judgements. 
Moreover decision-making was, according to Clark, also often a case of (self-)imitation (conscious 
mimicking of former, successful, choices) or a result of the individual’s habituation and the 
prevailing customs of the specific context. However, the ideo-motor action did not derive from 
reasoning but from an unconscious suggestion that provoked some sort of reflex (Clark, 1918b, p. 
151). 
126 Similar to Clark, yet in a broader socio-economic perspective, the economist John Atkinson 
Hobson stressed that people were suggestible and inclined to imitate. He also commented that 
those inclinations were more pronounced in specific classes in society. Hobson explicitly drew on 
Tarde’s ‘psychology of imitation’ in order to explain how inventions and innovations proliferated in 
society. In Work and Wealth: A Human Valuation (1914), Hobson analysed and utilised Tarde’s 
notions of invention and imitation, as well as the dynamic relationship between the two notions that 
Tarde had formulated in The Laws of Imitation and elaborated upon, in the context of economic life, 
in Psychologie Économique (Lepinay, 2007; Tarde, 1902a, 1902b, 1903). Hobson thought that imitation 
was an inborn faculty of man. He believed that ‘suggestion’, ‘infection’, ‘contagion’ and ‘conscious 
imitation’ or any combination of those ‘forces or habits’ constituted ‘the social nature of man’ 
(Hobson, 1914, pp. 40–41). Furthermore, Hobson argued that some groups of people or classes 
imitated more than others. The imitators were, in Hobson’s opinion, the lower classes, and those 
who were imitated were the leisure class. Since imitation, according to Hobson, intensified as it 
spread throughout the social strata, those who were imitated had a tremendous influence on the 
social as such. The vices of the leisure classes would, Hobson thought, become even more socially 
and morally corruptive vices of the lower classes due to the gradual intensification of imitation. 
Using gambling as an example of a vice of the leisure class, Hobson asserted that ‘the defects in the 
standard of the upper few will, by imitation, be magnified as well as multiplied in the lower 
standards of the many’; he also noted that ‘imitation becomes progressively worse as it descends, 
poisoning the life and consuming a larger proportion of the diminishing margin of the income of 
each class’ (Hobson, 1914, p. 141). The idea that vices allegedly became more intense as they 
trickled down from the upper classes of society to the lower was also something Tarde stressed in 
The Laws of Imitation. ‘Drunkenness’ was, according to Tarde, a type of ‘mania’, which began as a 
privilege of the upper classes but infected the lower classes over time. As it did, Tarde noted, it 
tended to ‘raise the folly of the masses to the highest pitch’ (Tarde, 1903, pp. 231–232, n. 1).  
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Clark’s opinion, difficulties with analysing financial reports and calculating prospects. 
These difficulties were partly due to the lack of skill and experience, but they were also 
due to the fact that the financial information that the small investors could obtain was 
limited. The financial information communicated in the reports was sparse because the 
small investors did not have the authority to demand accurate information and because 
there were market actors who profited from concealing commercial facts from 
competitors (Clark, 1918b, pp. 159–160). Since the small investors were allegedly unable 
to understand and thus analyse financial reports, they were ostensibly more likely to 
follow the lead of others, i.e. to imitate, which necessarily made them malleable. 
Although Clark did not elaborate on the more general market consequences of small 
investors’ lack of self-guidance, he did note that it reduced the individual small investor’s 
ability to judge the safety of investments (Clark, 1918b, p. 159). Hence, trading in 
financial securities was perceived as a particularly risky practice when undertaken by 
small investors.  
The risks associated with unsafe investing or speculation, especially among certain 
groups, was a topic that also interested the renowned Yale Professor of Economics 
Irving Fisher. Fisher is perhaps best known in the wider public for stating, in the early 
autumn of 1929, that ‘[s]tock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high 
plateau’ (Fisher in Galbraith, 1975, p. 95). Yet, some years before his erroneous 
prediction, Fisher had noted that there seemed to be a relation between bad speculation 
practices, herding behaviour and financial market panics and crisis. In the text ‘Useful 
and Harmful Speculation’ from 1924, Fisher argued that ‘[a] chief cause of crisis, panic, 
runs on banks, etc., is that risks are not independently reckoned, but are a mere matter 
of imitation’ (Fisher cited in Brenner and Brenner, 1990, p. 98). He furthermore asserted 
that speculators tended to act like sheep and follow a single leader.127 These claims about 
127 At first, it might seem odd that Fisher, whose economic ideas were shaped in the image of 
neoclassical economic theory, spoke of widespread imitation and herd behaviour among 
speculators. However, besides being a lauded economist Fisher was a eugenicist. (He was the first 
president of the Eugenics Research Association.) Having been a student of the prominent social 
Darwinist and the first Professor of Sociology in America William Graham Sumner, as an 
undergraduate at Yale, Fisher had been inoculated with social evolution theory, eugenics and 
degeneracy theory from early on in his career (Aldrich, 1975, p. 35). Fisher believed that the world 
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the possible consequences of what Fisher termed ‘harmful speculation’ echoed 
arguments about the adverse consequences of public participation in markets that had 
been advanced, particularly in popular and practitioners-oriented financial writing, for at 
least a couple of decades. What had changed, it seemed, was that it was no longer 
exclusively providers of financial advice, with all the strategic and self-interested reasons 
they might have had, who turned to (collective) psychology for means to describe and 
explain certain market phenomena. By turning to psychology while adhering to the idea 
of a class-structured financial market, economists such as Clark and Fisher (and Mitchell 
and Taussig in the previous decade) reproduced the, in the popular and practical 
discourses, already well-established idea that the inexperienced were psychologically unfit 
to invest properly and that they constituted an inferior class in the market, i.e. the market 
public or crowd.128 
The how-to literature discussions of suggestibility and the competence-level of 
different classes of market actors often coincided with reflections on the real increase in 
the number of investors and speculators caused by the immensely successful Liberty 
Bond campaigns of WWI (as mentioned in Chapter 3). When looking back on the 
excessive speculation during and shortly after WWI, several financial writers argued that 
was divided into two classes: the educated and the ignorant (Leonard, 2008, p. 218). This divisive 
view of society also shaped Fisher’s thought on the economy: An example was his tripartite 
explanation of income distribution in which ‘time preference’ constituted one factor, ‘ability’ 
another and ‘the innate inferiority of the lower classes and coloured races’ a third (Aldrich, 1975, p. 
36). Fisher believed that the classification of people on the basis of innate mental and racial abilities 
also necessarily applied to the financial markets. Thus, imitation was more prevalent among the less 
qualified or less mentally evolved market actors. Fisher’s thoughts on eugenics were informed by 
the work of notable scholars in American social psychology who also had an affinity for race theory. 
In his presidential address to the Eugenics Research Association in 1921, he drew on the ideas of 
William McDougall and Edward Ross (I. Fisher, 1921, p. 224, 227). The question of race, eugenics 
and social control in relation to the economy was also of interest to Clark (Clark, 1918a).  
128 Financial writer and lecturer at Columbia University Albert W. Atwood was one of the 
exponents of the idea that certain groups in society were ill-fitted for speculation. In the how-to 
book Putnam’s Investment Handbook: A Stimulus and a Guide to Financial Independence (1919) Atwood 
argued that the problem of speculation was the ‘unskilled amateurs […] whose minds are easily 
influenced, whose judgment is feeble, and who allow anxieties to prey upon them’ (pp. 291–292). 
These unskilled people were, Atwood emphasised, more easily influenced by ‘mob psychology’ than 
the experienced and professional speculators, who were, he insisted, however not immune to such 
influences but at least more resilient (Atwood, 1919, p. 303).  
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the mass investment in war bonds contributed to the increased prevalence of speculation 
that came to define the 1920s. Although war bonds were seldom purchased with an eye 
to speculation, some thought that they ignited desires to speculate on a part of the public 
that was more or less completely unfamiliar with the workings of financial markets. In 
the how-to book The Stock Market Investor (1923), insurance underwriter Harold J. 
Aldrich stated that the speculative public were bound to commit a ‘hopeless 
combination of errors’ of which blindly following the crowd was the most disastrous 
(pp. 81–82). ‘[W]ith the nationwide distribution of Liberty Bonds that took place from 
1917 until the end of the War,’ Aldrich noted, ‘millions of people for the first time were 
imbued with the thought that bonds and stocks offered opportunities to those of 
limited, as well as to those of unlimited, means’ (Aldrich, 1923, p. 6). As Aldrich argued, 
the public tended to slip from government bonds into ‘the field of miscellaneous 
securities’ and from there into despair (Aldrich, 1923, p. 6). In some accounts, the 
successful Liberty Bond campaigns were even singled out as one of the main reasons 
why markets were becoming ochlocracies where amateurism rather than professionalism 
reigned.129  
129 Aldrich was not alone in discussing the consequences of the increased public participation 
directly or indirectly caused by the Liberty Bond campaigns. A how-to book author who wrote 
under the pseudonym ‘Don Guyon’ argued, before the war had even ended, that speculation had 
become increasingly popular during the war years. In One-Way Pockets: The Book of Books on Wall 
Street Speculation (1917), Guyon encouraged his readers to trade contrary to a market public that had 
seemingly grown increasingly ignorant during the first years of the war (p. 63). In one of his market 
letters Gibson recalled that the war years had produced a large number of ‘amateurs’ who were 
‘woefully lacking in knowledge of either the economic situation, the psychology of the crowd, or the 
machinery of the market’ (Gibson, 27 January 1922a). In one of his lesser known publications, 
Faith, Fear and Fortune: Why We Have Booms and Depressions. Must We Endure Them Again? (1934), 
psychologist and marketing researcher Daniel Starch pointed out, more than a decade later, that the 
‘speculative fever’ that had ‘cracked the thermometer in 1929’ (Starch referred to the stock markets 
as ‘thermometers’ as well as ‘psychometers’ that measured what he called ‘America’s psychological 
temperature’) was caused by crowd psychology. However, the ‘gems of the malady’, he stressed, 
were planted with the successful war bond drives (pp. 68–69). ‘Liberty Loans and Victory Loans’, 
Starch argued, ‘introduced the idea of investments to millions of people who previously had been 
content to keep their surplus funds in savings banks, building and loan associations, or real estate’ 
(Starch, 1934, pp. 68–69). He believed that introducing the broad public to investing in the financial 
markets made the ‘proverbial snowball’ of mass psychology roll and gain speed and size during the 
1920s (Starch, 1934, pp. 67–68). 
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As I will discuss in the following and final section of the chapter, the real increase in 
seemingly minimally qualified small speculators was recognised by federal regulatory 
agencies (the FTC and the GFA). These agencies reiterated the diagnosis that public 
participation was a central factor that contributed to the creation of artificial price 
discrepancies in the commodity futures markets. Crowd psychology was, however, not 
only considered a problem because of the mere presence of a still larger group of 
suggestible market actors. It was also a problem because some speculators allegedly took 
strategic advantage of the psychology of the crowd when trading. Besides being a 
problem expressed in extreme and unfounded movements of prices, crowd behaviour 
was also something that certain speculators tried to incite in order to artificially cause 
imbalance in the markets.  
The psychology of speculative practices in futures markets 
 
A fundamental reason for doubt as to the effect of a futures market in general in 
checking wide price variations is the large importance of group psychology or “mob 
mind” in the determination of prices in the futures market. The facility with which 
future trading can be entered upon by anyone means that a large number of traders 
are ill informed and neither commercially nor financially competent. If their hopes 
and fears do not themselves drive the market to extremes, their inability to protect 
their trades adequately may furnish material for increased reaction as soon as 
anything happens to disturb the equilibrium of the market. (Federal Trade 
Commission, 1926, vol. VII, p. 238) 
 
With these words, the FTC described what they called the ‘psychological factor’ in the 
futures markets. Crowd psychological effects on price formation were, as stated, directly 
connected to the presence of ill-informed and incompetent traders. Once again, public 
participation and irrational crowd behaviour were depicted as entangled.130 The ‘large 
130 It should be noted that futures markets were easier to access for people of modest means than 
was, for example, the stock market. Entry costs were comparatively lower and so were the general 
capital requirements due to the structure of the futures contracts and the way the contracts were 
bought and sold. The participation by people assumed to be financially and commercially unfit for 
trading was, for these reasons, an often-discussed topic among financial writers, economists and 
regulators interested in futures markets (Parker, 1911, pp. 152–153; Weber, 2000, pp. 347ff.). 
164 
 
                                                   
importance of’ crowd psychological effects on the formation of prices in the futures 
market was identified by the FTC as the problem, while the presence of under- or 
unqualified traders was considered the cause. As noted in the report, the psychological 
factors generated doubt as to whether or not futures markets were effective, which could 
potentially delegitimise or at least blemish the reputation of the business carried out in 
the exchanges – in this case, futures trading in the commodity exchanges. Besides 
destabilising prices in the futures markets, the crowd of unqualified traders thus 
contributed to a questioning of the idea of the futures trading as an effective form of 
financial transaction. The actions of these underqualified market actors were, as stated in 
the report, likely to drive the markets to extremes. 
By singling out the ill-informed and incompetent as disturbers of the market 
equilibrium, the FTC reiterated a decades-old critique of public and popular participation 
in financial markets (see Chapter 3). The critique of public participation was most often 
articulated in discussions of futures trading specifically due to the fact that futures 
trading had, as mentioned, eased the access to the markets. As I briefly touched upon in 
the previous chapter, Max Weber had raised similar concerns about the inclusion of the 
public in futures trading in the 1896 pamphlet ‘Commerce on the Stock Exchange’. 
Although Weber described futures trading as a ‘technically perfect’ form of business, he 
simultaneously emphasised that it had some adverse effects (Weber, 2000, p. 347, 363, 
366). The main and most severe side effect of futures trading was, according to Weber, 
that it raised ‘the participation of poorly-prepared persons in the business of speculation’ 
which increased ‘the public’s mania for gambling and opportunities to satisfy that mania 
on the exchanges’ (Weber, 2000a, p. 364).131 Just as Weber had done in the late 
131 Although Weber admitted that there were problems associated with futures trading, he insisted 
that the adverse effects of futures trading should not be overestimated. The side effects of futures 
trading were, Weber claimed, not as dire as, for instance, the negative consequences of regular 
‘cash-and-carry’ trading when conducted by the speculating public (Weber, 2000a, p. 364). 
Speculation that required cash investment was, Weber stressed, ‘far more dangerous to them [the 
public] than the speculations in futures trading’; he also stated that ‘[o]ne must guard against 
believing that by doing away with futures trading one is doing away with speculation’ (Weber, 2000a, p. 
364, italics in the original). 
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nineteenth century, the FTC reiterated that the public constituted a destabilising factor 
that created doubt as to whether or not futures markets were indeed effective.132  
Thus, the psychological factor in the futures markets, as discussed in the FTC report, 
revealed a single problem that had market-internal and organisational dimensions. The 
problem was, as shown, the disruption of market order that questioned the alleged 
efficiency of futures markets. The market-internal aspect of the problem was that ‘mob 
mind’ and ‘group psychology’ disrupted the idea of market efficiency. The organisational 
aspects of the problem concerned the structure of the futures markets that allowed for 
the commercially and financially unfit to take part in the trading of futures. It is evident 
that these two aspects were, according to the FTC report, inextricable from one another. 
The imbalance caused by irrational crowd behaviour was reflected in and connected to 
an imbalance in the composition of market actors. There was, however, also a third way 
in which the problem of unfounded price disparities and extreme market conditions 
were addressed from the regulatory agencies’ point of view. This third aspect of the 
disruption of futures markets concerned speculative practices rather than speculative 
competence.  
In 1925, a commission under the GFA was instructed to conduct a special 
investigation into some extreme fluctuations in the price of wheat futures at the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT), which took place during the early months of 1925 (Grain 
Futures Administration, 1926, pp. x–xi). The comprehensive report concluded that the 
fluctuations were ‘largely artificial and were caused primarily, either directly or indirectly, 
by heavy trading of the part of a limited number of professional traders’ (Grain Futures 
132 In another FTC report on the grain trade, published in 1920, the distinction between 
professionals and amateurs was made apparent in a characterisation of the scalper. The scalper, 
professional or amateur, was defined (in yet another FTC report) as ‘a man that buys in the market 
to resell in the market’ (Federal Trade Commission, 1922, p. 252). The ‘outsider’ who aspired to 
emulate the professional scalper and make quick profits was described as someone who was 
‘dabbling in the market’ without actually knowing what she or he was doing. It was further stated 
that the outsider ‘does not know the rules of the exchange’; ‘studies nothing but the quotations’; 
‘does not contemplate the requirements of any sort of possible developments three months or six 
months ahead’ (Federal Trade Commission, 1920, p. 306). What is interesting about the 
characteristics is that the outsider, i.e. the amateur, was more or less described as the antithesis of 
the professional scalper: The latter represented market order and stability, while the former 
represented extreme and unstable market conditions. 
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Administration, 1926, p. 1). In explaining how these artificial fluctuations had come 
about, the GFA divided the speculative practices conducted in the Board of Trade into 
two categories and pointed to one of the two as the cause of the calamities. The GFA 
furthermore identified the two types of speculative practice with two types of 
speculators: the constructive type and the destructive type. Speculators of the constructive 
type were ‘[t]hose who trade on the basis of rational appraisement of present and 
prospective conditions affecting supply and demand, without at the same time trading in 
a manner or with aids designed to augment or artificially hasten the market results 
expected’ (Grain Futures Administration, 1926, p. 5). These were speculators who 
analysed and traded on fundamentals. Contrarily, the destructive speculators were 
‘[t]hose who trade largely on the basis of mob psychology and faith in their ability 
through heavy trading to bring about temporary market conditions of which they may 
take advantage to make profits’ (Grain Futures Administration, 1926, p. 5).  
It was stated in the GFA report that the limited yet financially powerful group of 
destructive speculators created a ‘technically weak market condition’ by buying or selling 
great volumes during individual trading days. Although the tactics had not been 
profitable in every case, they caused major price changes and created imbalance in the 
entire market (Grain Futures Administration, 1926, p. 5). What amplified the 
consequences of these ‘unfair tactics’, as the then president of the CBOT termed them, 
and made the artificial fluctuations erratic was the alleged ‘reckless participation by the 
general public’ (Grain Futures Administration, 1926, pp. 6–7). Although the trading 
behaviour of the general public was identified as ‘reckless’, the authors of the report 
were undecided about whether the recklessness had been intentional. Whether 
‘consciously or unconsciously’, as it was phrased in the report, the public assisted the 
manipulative endeavours of the destructive speculators (Grain Futures Administration, 
1926, p. 6). The goal of the destructive speculators was to incite public buying or selling 
– i.e. to create a crowd psychological snowballing effect and attempt to profit from the 
disturbances that it created. 
The destructive speculators who had, according to the GFA, disrupted the futures 
markets in 1925 by trading on the basis of mob psychology had allegedly been aware that 
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their market interventions would incite a chain reaction on the part of the public. The 
GFA report’s description of the asymmetrical and non-reciprocal connection between 
the destructive speculators and the reckless public is comparable to, e.g., Le Bon’s 
description of the connection between the crowd leader and the crowd in The Crowd or 
his similar critique of the uneven relationship between cosmopolitan financiers and the 
masses in The Psychology of Socialism (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, it echoed descriptions 
of market manipulation found in the how-to literature, in which the gullible and hapless 
public was inevitably victimised. The idea that the majority of market actors could rather 
easily be moved by a minority of professional speculators proliferated across discourses 
on markets and speculation. The FTC and GFA thus adopted if not a caricatured then at 
least a stereotyped idea of the public, which carried reminiscences of the contempt for 
the masses given its implication that mental inferiority and susceptibility were higher in 
lower levels of society.  
 
That economists and regulatory agencies began to resort to crowd psychology and 
crowd theory terminology in attempts to describe and explain the probable causes of 
certain forms of seemingly irrational market behaviour and occurrences of unfounded 
fluctuations in the market prices was a token of the extent to which ways of thinking 
about markets had been permeated by psychology (and, in particular, the precepts of 
crowd psychology). Regulatory agencies and economists alike utilised a vocabulary and 
theoretical terminology that were partly offered by the increasingly popular scholarly 
field of social psychology and partly by the market discourse, which was, as I have 
shown in the first part of the chapter, to a still greater extent informed by psychology. 
Much like the psychology of crowds had served crowd theorist such as Le Bon and Sidis 
(and later a sociologist such a Park) as a socio-psychological prism that reflected social 
unruliness, instability and crisis, the precepts of crowd psychology provided economists 
and regulatory agencies with a vocabulary and a set of ideas with which they were able to 
respond to irregular behaviour and problems of destabilisation in the markets.  
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Conclusion 
What the exhaustive late nineteenth and early twentieth century debates about the role of 
the public in investment and speculation and the derived negative characteristics of small 
investors and speculators seemed to have fostered was the idea that an ignorant, 
inexperienced, incompetent and gullible majority were actively influencing the course of 
security prices in financial markets. In this chapter I have shown how these debates fed 
into and gave shape to different discourses on financial markets and speculation. The 
psychologisation of the market discourse, as I have called it, was not solely found in the 
practical how-to book but was also discoverable across genre boundaries. In economics, 
sociology and even in reports by regulatory agencies, crowd psychology was being taken 
seriously and considered an unavoidable factor that influenced the behaviour of traders 
and the formation of prices in the financial markets. Social and crowd psychology 
provided a reservoir of ideas and a vocabulary that helped how-to book authors, 
financial journalists, academics and regulators to identify and respond to pertinent 
questions about the functioning of markets, such as these: What causes prices to move 
in a market? What makes market actors occasionally part with reason? Who causes 
market instability and how do they do it?    
As an increasing number of observers of finance became preoccupied with the 
psychology of markets – in particular, in the how-to literature – increasing emphasis was, 
as I have shown, placed on the allegedly incontrollable temper of the public and the 
irrationality that allegedly underpinned their actions. Consequently, psychology became 
at once explanatorily, descriptively and prescriptively relevant in the analysis of financial 
markets. More specifically, psychology and especially crowd psychology offered (a) a 
particular vocabulary for describing public investment decisions; (b) a default 
explanation of seemingly unfounded market movements; (c) a prescriptive basis on 
which most speculation and investment advice on how to exploit market movements 
was formulated. Instead of embarking on the Sisyphean task of filling the knowledge and 
experience gap between the amateur and the professional, authors of how-to books 
suggested that amateurs adhere to the realm of what was allegedly possible by focussing 
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their energy on not falling victim to waves of public sentiment. Self-preservation and 
mental fortification thus became central focus areas in the how-to literature. As I will 
further explain in Chapter 5, it became increasingly relevant to be attentive to the 
ambiguous relationship between the self and the crowd. Identifying how and when 
prices were driven by crowd psychology while steering clear of the rationality-impairing 
emotional contagion in the markets was increasingly being considered the recipe for 
successful speculation. The strong emphasis on crowd theory and crowd psychology in 
the how-to genre in the 1920s and 1930s laid the foundation for the popularisation of 
the so-called ‘contrarian approach’, which constitutes the primary object of inquiry in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: The contrarian market philosophy  
 
To ease and allay the fears of the mob, it is often necessary to act in an abnormal 
manner – often to disobey economic imperatives.  
 
Robert L. Smitley, Popular Financial Delusions, 1933, p. 278   
 
On 20 December 1916, while World War I was raging in Europe, the illustrious 
American financier Bernard Baruch sold thousands of shares of United States Steel in a 
daring yet, as it turned out, successful speculative operation. On the following day, 
President Woodrow Wilson issued a ‘peace note’ in which he requested the belligerents 
to state their peace terms. The peace note had an immediate effect on the stock market, 
where traders started selling at a rapid pace. As the dust settled, Baruch had allegedly 
made a substantial profit from his short-selling operation (Baruch, 1960, p. 28). In the 
days that followed, stories appeared in national newspapers connecting Baruch to a 
suspected ‘leak’ from the White House to Wall Street. To the press and the public, it did 
not seem likely that an immensely well-connected speculator like Baruch coincidentally 
happened to make a big sale shortly before the President’s call-to-peace sent stocks 
plummeting. The fact that Baruch was, in addition to being a speculator, an economic 
advisor to the Wilson administration only made it easier for journalists, politicians and 
the public to pass judgement (Baruch, 1960, pp. 26–33; Grant, 2012, pp. 145–155; Hill, 
1917).133  
The accusations led to a Congressional hearing in Washington, where Baruch 
delivered a testimony denying that he had traded on the basis of a leak from the White 
133 The President had appointed Baruch to the position of chairman of the Metals and Raw 
Materials Purchasing Committee of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defence 
in 1916 (Baruch, 1960, p. 25). Baruch’s double role had not been a problem until the ‘peace note’ 
debacle started to unfold. The accusations of insider trading were made by the Boston business man 
turned muckraker journalist Thomas Lawson whose colourful exposés of alleged fraudulence in 
high finance, published in the segment ‘Frenzied Finance’ in Everybody’s magazine (running for 
almost three years between 1904 and 1906), had made him famous among the American public and 
infamous among many finance professionals (Grant, 2012; Zimmerman, 2006, pp. 82–83). 
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House. Though Baruch was exonerated of all accusations of insider trading, it was only 
after he had been vilified in the people’s court due to the stories in the newspapers. 
From the stand, Baruch explained that paying attention to rumours had never been part 
of his investment practice. What he did instead was to carefully read the newspapers in 
order to grasp ‘the psychological effect of the news’ on the public, which would give him 
an indication of where the markets were heading. Baruch testified that the news had 
hinted of the possibility of peace prior to the issuing of the peace note and sensed that a 
‘public uneasiness over stocks’ was brewing – an uneasiness that he anticipated would 
cause the market to drop (Grant, 2012, p. 152; Hill, 1917, pp. 599–600). Hence, as part 
of his approach to stock trading, Baruch tried to anticipate price movements by reading 
the psychology of the public.     
Some sixteen years later in the fall of 1932, while the repercussions of the 1929 crash 
still felt insurmountable, Baruch wrote a foreword to a reissuing of MacKay’s Memoirs of 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of the Crowd, vol. I-II. In the opening 
sentence, Baruch boldly stated that ‘[all] economic movements, by their very nature, are 
motivated by crowd psychology’ (Baruch, October, 1932, p. xiii).134 The ‘market-
madness’ that had led to the disastrous crash of the U.S. stock market in October 1929 
was, in Baruch’s view, a paradigmatic example of this intimate relationship between 
impulsive ‘mass action’ and price fluctuations in the stock market (Baruch, 1932, p. 
xiv).135 The excessive speculation of the late 1920s thus confirmed Baruch’s belief that 
134 The significance of Baruch’s foreword to MacKay’s Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions in 
relation to crowd psychology in financial markets is also recognised by Stäheli (2013, pp. 98–99) and 
Robert Menschel (2002, pp. 37–39).  
135 In the second part of his memoirs, titled Baruch: The Public Year (1960), Baruch explained how he 
had sensed that the maniacal speculation and continuous rise in prices, dominating the U.S. stock 
market in the late 1920s, could not be sustained but would eventually result in a collapse (pp. 221–
224). In the preceding volume, Baruch: My Own Story (1957), Baruch described how he was 
introduced to MacKay’s Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions in the early 1900s (by the financial 
journalist John Grant Dater) and implied that reading it had made him aware of the danger signals 
with regard to such events and thus enabled him to anticipate what was about to dawn on the U.S. 
stock market towards the closing of the 1920s (pp. 242–245). However, what Baruch failed to 
mention in his memoirs was that he actually made a conflicting prediction in the summer of 1929. 
In the June 1929 issue of The American Magazine, Baruch was quoted saying that he was predicting a 
great forward movement in the global economy. He later made a turnaround of his own June 
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‘graphs’, ‘business ratios’ and even ‘theories of economics’ could not stand alone if one 
wanted a cohesive understanding of economic movements: Crowd psychology simply 
had to be acknowledged as a vital component of every market analysis (Baruch, 1932, p. 
xiv).136 The American economist William Howard Steiner went a step further than 
Baruch by arguing that due to the alleged fact that the majority of market actors based 
their decisions on impulses rather than reason, the professional speculator would be 
better off simply substituting ‘reasoned analysis of values’ for studies of ‘mob 
psychology’ (Steiner, 1933, p. 429). Introducing crowd psychology in market analysis was 
Steiner’s and Baruch’s response to a market that did not seem to abide by conventional 
economic laws. While Baruch believed that crowd psychology could positively 
supplement economics and compensate for some of the latter’s shortcomings, Steiner 
seemed to have thrown in the towel on behalf of his own discipline by simply 
repudiating the relevance of reasoned analysis of the financial markets. Hence, the crash 
had cast doubt as to whether the prevailing theories of economics – the theoretical 
bedrock of financial markets – were sufficiently able to describe and explain the 
functioning of as well as anticipate developments in a market that had proven, at least 
during the 1920s, to be completely unpredictable and seemingly malfunctioning.  
Similar responses to a seemingly malfunctioning financial market were found in 
abundance in the how-to genre. Advocates and the so-called ‘contrarian approach’ 
applied the dictums of crowd theory to market phenomena in order to describe the 
behaviour of speculators and essentially the movements of prices in the markets. Besides 
being adopted as a descriptive tool, crowd theory had a prescriptive role in the 
contrarians’ investment strategies. Contrarian approaches to investment and speculation 
prediction and offloaded his shares before the bottom dropped out of the market (Galbraith, 1975, 
pp. 95–96; Grant, 2012, p. 231).  
136 To Baruch, crowd psychology served as an indicator of future market fluctuations and as a 
means to make sense, post facto, of particular seemingly nonsensical occurrences in the market. In 
addition, he used crowd psychology as a compass of market conduct: It enabled him to navigate in 
the market with crowd action constantly in mind, yet without unknowingly and unwittingly falling 
victim to crowd psychology. In a memo dated 1930, Baruch reminded himself neither to ‘go against 
the mob’ nor to ‘go with it in it’s excesses’ but to always remain ‘fearful of too much company’ 
(Baruch in Grant, 2012, p. 245). 
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became prevalent in how-to books during the 1920s, but, as I have shown in Chapters 3 
and 4, authors of how-to books had presented counteracting popular trends in the 
markets as viable strategies since the late nineteenth century. However, it was only after 
the crash that the contrarian approach was formalised as the ‘theory of contrary opinion’ 
by the autodidact ‘socio-economic journalist’ Humphrey Bancroft Neill (Schultz and 
Coslow, 1966, p. 325).137 Neill had been active in Wall Street as an investor and 
investment consultant in the late 1920s before turning to financial writing in the 
beginning of the 1930s, which was also the time when he began to reflect upon the 
virtues of contrarianism. The wild speculation in the late 1920s and the subsequent crash 
had made an indelible imprint on his perception of the markets. Neill retrospectively 
claimed that the events had imbued him ‘with the spirit and practicality of ‘contrary 
opinion’’ (Mintz, 1994, pp. 99–103). In today’s financial markets, the term ‘contrarian 
approach’ covers a range of strategies which more or less share the same basic 
motivation: namely, to ‘trade in the opposite direction of the trend in prices or market 
sentiment’ (Poitras, 2011, p. 509).138 To Neill and other likeminded financial writers, the 
contrarian approach was more than simply an investment strategy. It represented a way 
of thinking and carrying oneself as a person, which was not confined to the financial 
market realm. Hence, it emphasised that being or becoming successful in the financial 
markets required a certain mental disposition as well as a certain worldview. The 
contrarian approach was, I will argue, an investment philosophy informed by dogmatic 
137 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, Neill coined the noun ‘contrarian’ in The Art of Contrary 
Thinking (1954), a book he dedicated to ‘Contrarians and Libertarians everywhere’. Though the term 
‘contrarian’ was not used until 1954, the ideas that shaped the investment philosophy were as I 
show in this chapter. I choose to use the term as a label for the rather heterogeneous group of 
financial writers whose contrarian impetus was reflected in their how-to books, market letters, 
pamphlets, articles etc. 
138 In contemporary finance literature, ‘contrarian strategies’ are often defined as strategies that are 
‘contrarian’ to ‘naive’ strategies that other investors follow. Contrarian investors and speculators 
assume that naïve or ‘noise’ traders overreact to either good or bad news, which leads to their 
overbuying or overselling. As a result of the excessive buying or selling, some securities become 
overpriced, i.e. overvalued, or underpriced, i.e. undervalued. By refraining from investing in 
overvalued securities while prioritising the ‘out-of-favour’, ‘unloved’ or undervalued securities, the 
contrarian strategies aim to outperform the market (Black, 1986; Chong and Tuckett, 2015, p. 15; 
De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, p. 1542). 
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perceptions of market actors ingrained in the Wall Street vernacular and, in particular, 
the precepts of crowd psychology.  
The contrarian market philosophy has been used as an example or has been more 
thoroughly analysed in sociological studies of: high frequency trader subjectivity (Borch 
and Lange, 2016a); crowd dynamics in automated markets (Borch, 2017); mimesis and 
anti-mimesis in behavioural finance (Borch and Lange, 2016b); crowd irrationality contra 
crowd intelligence in financial markets (Hansen, 2015); market rhythms in open outcry 
and automated markets (Borch, Hansen and Lange, 2015); the relationship between 
individual agency and crowd behaviour among market actors (Arnoldi and Borch, 2007); 
the notion of semiconscious suggestion and processes in economic life (Borch, 2007); 
and the ‘crowd syndrome’ in financial markets (Smith, 1999). Of these inquiries, Urs 
Stäheli’s historical study of the contrarian ‘investment school’ in Spectacular Speculation: 
Thrills, the Economy and Popular Discourse (2013) is arguably the most thorough and 
comprehensive (ch. 5, see also Stäheli, 2006). In his study, Stäheli primarily focusses on 
the self-techniques that the contrarians developed in order for them to stir clear of the 
mass suggestion and contagion of the ‘market crowd’ (Stäheli, 2013, p. 148). In 
describing the contrarians as an ‘investment school’, Stäheli (perhaps unintentionally) 
implies that it was a rather unified group of market participants and how-to book 
authors. However, the broad spectrum of texts I analyse in this chapter suggests that the 
how-to book authors, whom I subsume under the label ‘contrarians’, constituted a rather 
heterogeneous group, especially before the crash. Another implication of viewing the 
contrarians as a unified investment school can be that some of the differences between 
the individual approaches to speculation and investment become lumped and diluted.139 
139 For example, Stäheli argues that the contrarians thought that the market was a crowd, i.e. a 
‘market crowd’ (Stäheli, 2006, 2013, p. 147, pp. 149–151). If we look at the work of Thomas 
Temple Hoyne (whose work is, to be fair, not discussed by Stäheli), it becomes clear that he did not 
think that the market was a crowd. Hoyne argued that even though crowds were always in the 
markets, it was only rarely the case that a single crowd dominated the market (Hoyne, 1922, p. 137). 
Although understanding crowd dynamics was, in Hoyne’s opinion, crucial to the speculator, he 
simultaneously (as I will get back to later in the chapter) stressed the importance of accounting for 
the fundamental conditions of the market. The implication of perceiving the market as a crowd and 
not as influenced by numerous crowds is that everything but crowd psychology becomes obsolete 
to speculators and market analysts. When Stäheli points out that the contrarians were, en bloc, not 
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When studying the contrarians it is necessary to touch upon themes such as self-control, 
self-mastery and self-reliance, since the shaping of the self was an integral part of the 
contrarian approach. This means that there is an overlap in terms of focus between 
Stäheli’s study and the analysis I present in this chapter. However, besides focussing on 
the techniques, strategies and practices formulated by the contrarians, my objective in 
this chapter is also to explore the emergence of the contrarian approach as a way of 
thinking about and analysing markets. 
The chapter examines how the contrarians selectively adopted basic ideas from 
crowd theory in order to formalise a strategy that suited a financial market that they 
believed was greatly influenced by crowd psychology. The chapter is divided into two 
parts. In the first part, I analyse how-to books published in the 1920s and focus on how 
ideas from crowd psychology were adopted by how-to book authors in a response to a 
‘market situation’ in which the speculative public were perceived as having a great impact 
on the fluctuations of prices while, simultaneously, being profoundly disadvantaged.140 
From the crowd psychology precepts, the how-to book authors formulated rules of 
conduct and offered advice on how small speculators (the constituents of the public) 
should approach speculation in the best possible way. The overarching purpose of the 
contrarian approaches that were developed in the 1920s was, I will argue, simply to find 
ways to ‘beat the crowd’ or ‘beat the market’. The deployment of crowd theory 
terminology in how-to literature on financial speculation resonated, I further argue, with 
the popular, psychologised view of the financial markets and the dogmatic perception of 
the speculative public as inexperienced, incompetent and gullible (see Chapters 3 and 4). 
In the second part of the chapter, I examine how the contrarian approach became 
the least interested in elucidating the functioning of the financial markets, it only applies to some of 
the authors who disseminated contrarian ideas in the how-to book format during the 1920s and 
1930s (Stäheli, 2013, p. 150).  
140 In this first part of the chapter, I make one exception and include one how-to book that was not 
published in the 1920s, namely Thomas Temple Hoyne’s Wall Street Remodelling the World (1930). In 
the book, Hoyne reiterated and elaborated upon ideas that he had initially formulated in an earlier 
how-to book, Speculation: Its Sound Principles and Rules for Its Practice (1922). Thus, this deviation from 
the demarcation of the analysed literature has the purpose of providing a more comprehensive 
account of Hoyne’s crowd theory-informed and contrarian-leaned approach to speculation. 
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increasingly systematised and was turned into a ‘market philosophy’ in Neill’s early 
writings. I furthermore discuss the overlapping viewpoints of different financial writers 
who all shared a fundamentally contrarian approach to market analysis and trading. My 
ambition in this second part of the chapter is to show that the contrarian approach was 
both a critique of existing investment strategies and schools of market analysis as well as 
an attempt to turn market psychology into a supplement to existing approaches to 
market analysis. The post-crash contrarian market philosophy was, I will argue, a 
response to a collective psychology-void in market analysis that was highlighted by the 
collapse of the stock market.  
The overall argument in this chapter is that the contrarian market philosophy was not 
developed as a response to a dysfunctional market per se. Rather, it was a response to a 
market in which collective psychology had come to be seen as an indispensable factor in 
the formation of prices. The stereotyping of the speculative public and the 
psychologisation of the market discourse, which I described in Chapters 3 and 4, shaped 
the basis of the contrarian approach and the contrarian views of the market.  
Prophylactics against mob mind 
As increasing attention was given to the psychological factors that arguably influenced 
the acts of market participants and consequentially the formation of prices in the 
markets during the second and third decades of the twentieth century, the number of 
handbooks offering advice on how to deal with this psychologised financial market 
increased as well (see Chapter 4). In a financial market where the psychology of the 
crowd (i.e. the public) was considered to be one of the main causes of price fluctuations, 
becoming acquainted with so-called market psychology was, as some authors of how-to 
books suggested, a simple way of gaining an edge on those market actors who tended to 
unreflectively follow market trends. The contrarian approaches to speculation, promoted 
in a range of how-to books in the 1920s, were in most cases completely based on the 
precepts of crowd psychology. They reduced speculation to binary relations of either 
being in or outside of the crowd, having an independent judgement or being a victim of 
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mental contagion from the crowd and, ultimately, being successful or a dupe. The 
following part of the chapter explores the rules and practices that were supposed to keep 
the small speculator on the right side of the aforementioned binary distinctions. The 
examination of these simple contrarian approaches is then contrasted with a discussion 
of more complex crowd psychology-informed and contrarian-imbued approaches to 
speculation. A main point of contention between the simple and arguably more 
sophisticated contrarian approaches was whether or not the fundamental conditions at 
all mattered to the small-scale speculators and analysts. 
 
On the final page of his how-to book Beating the Stock Market (1921), the financial editor 
of the Boston Herald and founder of the Boston-based McNeel’s Financial Service R. W. 
McNeel concluded that successful speculation was ‘a problem of self-mastery and self-
discipline as much as one of finance’ (p. 155).141 McNeel’s view of stock speculation was 
shared by another financial writer, William C. Moore, who argued that ‘special mental 
equipment’ was required in order to win consistently in the game of speculation (Moore, 
1921, pp. 37–38).142 Picturing speculation in financial markets as a game that could only 
be won insofar as the speculator acquired specific competencies and qualities had been 
quite common in the how-to literature since the late nineteenth century.143 What both 
141 McNeel’s Financial Service described itself as an ‘Aristocracy of Successful Investors’ and used 
McNeel’s how-to book to advertise the firm. In an investment guide published by the firm, the 
headline read, ‘He made $70,000 after reading Beating the Stock Market’ (Galbraith, 1975, pp. 67–68). 
142 Moore discussed the prerequisites of successful speculation and how to play the game in his 
how-to book Wall Street: Its Mysteries Revealed – Its Secrets Exposed (1921). In the book’s introduction, 
Moore claimed that he was performing a much needed ‘public service’ that would help ‘fellow men 
to avoid losses and to make profits in their speculative and investment ventures’ (Moore, 1921, p. 
5). 
143 The popular history of finance is filled with these game metaphors. For example, Hoyle (whose 
‘small scale system’ of speculation is examined in Chapter 3) compared speculation to the game 
‘Whist’ (Hoyle, 1898, p. 5). A few years later in Wall Street Speculation: Its Tricks and Tragedies (1904), 
Franklin C. Keyes described speculation as a game ‘in which the vast majority of the outside public, 
who tamper with it, go to financial and often to physical and moral ruin’ (p. 5). In the small, 
cartoonish how-to handbook Playing the Game (1918), Zebediah Flint described speculation as the 
‘jolliest, the most fascinating and interesting game in the world’ (p. 7). In his popular science book 
Man, the Puppet: The Art of Controlling Minds (1925), the psychologist Abram Lipsky compared 
speculation to the game of poker in which ‘[e]ach man had to guess not only the eagerness or 
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McNeel and Moore saw as the impending risk threatening to obstruct especially the 
little-experienced speculators’ attempts at ‘winning’ in the financial markets was the 
mental influence of the crowd. Thus, what the ailing want-to-be speculators were 
prescribed in McNeel’s and Moore’s how-to books were what I term, following Edward 
A. Ross, ‘prophylactics against mob mind’. In chapter five of Social Psychology (1908), 
Ross outlined thirteen prophylactics against mob mind. The eleventh prophylactic was 
labelled ‘intellectual self-possession as an ideal’ by which Ross meant that in order not to 
be infected with ‘mob mind’, people should strive towards ‘intellectual individualism’ as 
expressed in the works of writers such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau 
and Walt Whitman. For persons who possessed ‘self-control’, ‘[s]elf-consistency, 
tranquillity, balance, [and] robust independence’, there was, Ross claims, only a minimal 
likelihood of being subjected to an irrational mental collective such as the crowd (Ross, 
1908, p. 90). It was, I will argue, an equivalent to this intellectual individualism that early 
contrarian voices such as McNeel and Moore somewhat incoherently sought to instil in 
their readers. Their advice was supposed to function as a guard against the mind-
distorting influence of crowd psychology and to ultimately enable the readers to ‘beat the 
market’.   
McNeel and Moore were both convinced that the public were fundamentally wrong 
and encouraged investors and speculators not to follow the crowd and instead oppose it. 
The ‘so-called crowd – i.e. the public’ were, Moore noted, not an assembly of rational 
individuals but a mass directed by a ‘crowd mind’ that was an ‘unthinking’ and thus 
highly suggestible mind (Moore, 1921, pp. 112–113, italics in the original). ‘The mind of 
the inexperienced in market affairs’ was, Moore condescendingly added, comparable to 
nervousness of his opposites, but also the probable action of his similar’ (p. 108). There were, 
however, different opinions about whether the market was a game that could be beaten. In The 
Psychology of Speculation: The Human Element in Stock Market Transactions (1926), the financial and fiction 
writer Henry Howard Harper argued that recipes for ‘Beating Wall Street’ simply did not work (pp. 
8–9). He found ‘beating the market-recipes’ to be fundamentally paradoxical: If the authors could 
provide a rather simple step-by-step guide to beating the market, Harper wondered, why they would 
share their knowledge instead of using it themselves? The ‘real secret of the stock market’, Harper 
emphasised, rested with a small group of people who were ‘too busy to write, and too rich to feel 
the need of writing’ (Harper, 1926, pp. 9–10). 
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‘that of the nine-year-old child in worldly affairs’, and the feeblemindedness of the public 
was, he assumed, caused by ‘unconscious mental suggestion’ brought about by brokers’ 
letters, advertisements, newspapers, financial periodical, circulars and rumours (Moore, 
1921, p. 47, 114). Hence, the overarching problem seemed to be, in Moore’s opinion at 
least, that the majority of people trading in financial markets were by nature highly 
susceptible to suggestion due to their alleged inexperience, lack of knowledge and 
incompetence. McNeel concurred by asserting that it had been scientifically proven in a 
study conducted by so-called ‘war authorities’ that the majority of people were prone to 
follow the crowd. The study had allegedly shown that ‘in an average company of men, 
20 per cent possess a certain amount of initiative, 60 per cent will follow the crowd, and 
20 per cent are cowards by heart’ (McNeel, 1921, p. 25).144 Hence, it was perceived and 
presented as a (scientific) fact that the majority of people in the markets would not 
follow their own independent discernment but instead would imitate other people’s 
actions. These were by no means controversial viewpoints in this branch of market 
literature in which the idea that the public was incompetent, credulous and suggestible 
had been firmly embedded for a couple of decades at least (see Chapter 3). 
Another aspect that McNeel and Moore both agreed upon was that speculation 
ought to be approached as a zero-sum-game in which someone had to lose in order for 
someone else to profit. Success in stock trading depended, as McNeel phrased it in 
simple terms, on ‘the dupes [the public] being carried away by their emotions at critical 
periods of the speculative cycle’ (McNeel, 1921, p. 26). Similar to Moore, McNeel 
assumed that specific personal qualities or special mental equipment were required in 
order for the individual speculator to be successful in the stock market. He listed five 
144 It was not uncommon to see authors of how-to books estimate the public’s inclination to herd in 
percentages. Without any substantiation whatsoever, Moore advanced the somewhat curious claim 
that the ‘crowd is always 75% wrong marketwise’ (Moore, 1921, p. 113). In The Cycles of Speculation 
(1907), Thomas Gibson had claimed that by studying a ‘large number of public accounts’, he had 
figured out that ‘80% of the participators lost money’ (pp. 7–8). Years later, the contrarian Garfield 
A. Drew asserted that ‘[e]very successful speculator and every student of psychology knows that the 
mass of people are less intelligent than the few. It has been said that only 5% of the population 
think for themselves, 10% copy the 5%, and 85% believe what they read and hear, and do what 
they are told’ (Drew, 1948 [1941], p. 170).  
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personal qualities that the successful speculator possessed and that the speculator who 
was aspiring to become successful ought to acquire: ‘self-restraint, self-control, courage, 
initiative, and power of independent thought’ (McNeel, 1921, p. 26).145  Speculators’ 
acquiring and exercising of these qualities was mainly important because they shielded 
the speculators’ sound and independent judgement against influences from the mental 
contagion emanating from the unthinking crowd. 
The process by which speculators lost the sound judgement in the stock market was 
perceived as being identical to the process by which people reacted in different forms of 
crowds. According to McNeel, by nature people were drawn towards the comfort of the 
crowd – they preferred companionship over solitude and had an inborn tendency to be 
gregarious (McNeel, 1921, p. 149).146 People were furthermore driven by ‘instincts’, 
‘inborn tendencies’ or ‘emotions’ (McNeel used all three terms) such as ‘unconscious 
imitation’ and ‘sympathy’, which caused them to ‘catch the feeling of others and act in 
accordance with it’ (McNeel, 1921, p. 150). It was, McNeel stressed, the ‘contagious 
enthusiasm’ (or depression) of the speculative public that tended to derail them mentally 
when participating in the markets (McNeel, 1921, p. 153). He described this process in 
the following way:  
 
145 Similar lists of qualities of the successful speculator were featured in several late nineteenth and 
the early twentieth century how-to books such as Hoyle’s The Game in Wall Street, and How to Play It 
Successfully (1898), C. H. Thorpe’s How to Invest and How to Speculate (1901), Samuel Armstrong 
Nelson’s The ABC of Stock Speculation (1902), Richard Wyckoff’s Studies in Tape Reading (1910) as well 
as Don Guyon’s One-Way Pockets: The Book of Books on Wall Street Speculation (1917). 
146 People’s alleged tendency or instinctual inclination to be gregarious had been a vividly discussed 
topic in social psychology. Sidis, for example, noted in the third part of The Psychology of Suggestion 
(1919 [1898]) that ‘[s]ociety and mental epidemics are intimately related; for the social gregarious self is the 
suggestible subconsciates self’ (p. 310, italics in the original). Later, the British surgeon Wilfred Trotter 
made an in-depth inquiry into the instinct of gregariousness in his seminal volume The Instinct of the 
Herd in Peace and War (1916) in which he drew on a variety of works by sociologists, psychologists 
and social psychologists. He mentioned Le Bon’s work on crowds and referred to it as ‘valuable’, 
yet he engaged more thoroughly with the work of Sidis (Trotter, 1916, pp. 26–28, 42–44). 
Furthermore, in the same year that both McNeel’s and Moore’s books were published, Sigmund 
Freud published his Mass Psychology and Analysis of the ‘I’ (1921) in which he, inter alia, discussed 
Sidis’ and Trotter’s work on the herd instinct (Freud, 2004, pp. 71–76).  
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As prices rise, as one, then another, and another is drawn into the market, as activity 
increases and the price movement becomes more violent, hope and optimism and 
excitement on the part of the many grow, just as fear increases with each additional 
drop in prices when they are falling. The instincts or emotions of sympathy and 
imitation, the inborn tendency to act in common with others, urge the purchase of 
more and more stocks instead of the sale of those already purchased. (McNeel, 1921, 
p. 152) 
 
The markets were, as presented by McNeel, abiding to the ‘laws’ of crowd psychology 
rather than to fundamental economic factors. Only ‘intelligent self-mastery’ could 
prevent speculators from succumbing to their innate irrational impulses and becoming 
one with the hapless public (McNeel, 1921, p. 151). 
The contrarian approaches of McNeel and Moore can be condensed to two mutually 
dependent practices of (a) self-mastery and (b) market analysis, both of which were fully 
based on and determined by crowd psychology. The self-mastery or self-shaping 
dimension of speculation was supposed to fend off mental contagion emanating from 
the crowd. The market analytical dimension was, in turn, only possible insofar as the 
individual speculator was able to exercise emotional control and restrain instinctual urges 
from colouring her or his judgement. McNeel’s and Moore’s approaches offered rules 
and advice on how to identify the crowd in the market, remain unaffected by its 
contagious emotionality and ultimately counteract it. Their contrarian approaches 
responded to a market they made appear as almost completely driven by the precepts of 
crowd psychology. Hence, speculation required a calibration of the body and mind to 
the swings in the emotional state of the speculative public.147 Additionally, it required 
what the financial journalist H. J. Wolf referred to as the ability to ‘read the action of the 
147 In a chapter devoted to ‘The Psychology of speculation’ in the how-to book The Facts about 
Speculation (1923), Gibson argued that emotions in the markets – out of which fear was perceived as 
the most contagious – had the greatest impact on those who had ‘no clear ideas as to values and 
economic prospects’ (p. 33). Knowing of and being able to detect the contagious emotions 
governing the public in the markets was, according to Gibson, the best possible way to identify the 
right time to buy, sell or keep out of the market. 
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market’, which involved reading the ‘psychology of the public’ (Wolf, 1966 [1924], p. 
29).148  
I mention Wolf, because his work represents a strict rule-following approach to 
speculation that had certain overlaps with McNeel’s and Moore’s approaches. In his 
how-to books Studies in Stock Speculation I–II, Wolf offered a range of rules speculators 
ought to follow and market laws they had to acknowledge and/or abide by.149 One of 
148 The basic rule that the trader, according to Wolf, should try to adhere to was not to get caught on 
the wrong side of the market together with the public. ‘[T]he correct way to trade’ was, he argued, 
‘to study the methods of the public and do the reverse’ (Wolf, 1966, p. 39). Wolf’s contrarian 
approach was shared by William D. Gann, who stressed, in Truth of the Stock Tape: A Study of the 
Stock and Commodity Markets with Charts and Rules for Successful Trading and Investing (1923), that ‘[f]or a 
trader to succeed, he must study human nature and do the opposite of what he finds the general 
public does’ (p. 11). The main problem of the public was, as financial writer Morrell W. Gaines 
argued in The Art of Investment (1924), that it intensified tendencies in the financial markets due to 
their over-confidence when prices were advancing and their unfounded pessimism when they were 
descending. This ‘contagious mob spirit’, as Gaines termed it, affected major parts of the business 
community (Gaines, 1924, p. 70). These alleged facts about the majority of the actors in the markets 
made the contrarian stance appear logical, even though it entailed disagreeing with the majority 
opinion.  
149 Like McNeel, Wolf made a list of qualities that the speculator had to possess or otherwise 
acquire. Wolf’s list included qualities such as self-reliance, good judgement, courage, prudence and 
pliability (Wolf, 1966, pp. 69–71). Besides outlining the qualities essential to the equipment of the 
speculator, Wolf listed four ‘laws absolute’ and six ‘conditional rules’ of speculation (Wolf, 1966, pp. 
71–76). In a second volume of Studies in Stock Speculation, Wolf summed up his rules and laws of 
speculation in ten fairly generic ‘cardinal principles of trading’ (Wolf, 1967 [1926], pp. 8–9). The 
first absolute law was ‘never overtrade’, while an example of a conditional rule was ‘[i]n forming an 
opinion of the market, the element of chance ought not to be omitted’ (Wolf, 1966, p. 71, 75). The 
former, as the remaining three absolute laws, were, according to Wolf, imperatives and thus 
inviolable, whereas the conditional rules were ‘subject to modification according to the 
circumstances, individuality and temperament of the operator’ (Wolf, 1966, p. 72). The qualities that 
Wolf took as being essential to the equipment of the speculator were the exact same as the ones 
Nelson had listed and described in The ABC of Stock Speculation (1902, pp. 108–110). Wolf had not, 
however, borrowed the outline of qualities from Nelson. Both Nelson and Wolf had taken the 
description of the qualities of the successful speculator from Dickson G. Watts, or ‘Old Dickson’, 
who had formulated them in Speculation as a Fine Art and Thoughts on Life – a short handbook 
ostensibly reproduced in The Magazine of Wall Street in August 1923 and later published by Traders 
Press in 1965 and Fraser Publishing Company in 1979. (I have not been able to identify the exact 
year Watts’ book was first published.) Watts was President of the New York Cotton Exchange 
between 1878 and 1880 and was himself a successful speculator, and Edwin Lefèvre mentioned 
Watts’ book in Reminiscences of a Stock Operator (Lefèvre, 2010 [1923], p. 292). The absolute laws and 
conditional rules that Wolf laid out were, as the aforementioned qualities, actually directly taken 
from Watts’ book (with due recognition, it has to be noted). Watt’s conditional rules and absolute 
laws of speculation also appeared in the first issue of the financial magazine The Ticker (November, 
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laws of the market that speculators had to account for when trading was ‘the law of 
suggestion’, which was, according to Wolf, the law of psychological influence and 
concomitant mental contagion (Wolf, 1966, pp. 26–27). Unlike McNeel and Moore, who 
presented crowd psychology as the law of the financial markets, Wolf noted that even 
though it was tremendously important to adapt to and make investment decisions on the 
basis of the psychological laws of the market, it was equally important to account for the 
fundamental conditions. Wolf perceived it as a cardinal principle of trading to ‘[n]ever 
ignore fundamental conditions’ (Wolf, 1967 [1926], p. 9). Although there was a 
contrarian impetus in his approach to speculation, Wolf stressed that success could not 
be reached in the markets insofar as the speculator was unable or unwilling to study the 
fundamental conditions as well as the technical element (i.e. the forecasting of the 
direction of prices on the basis of a study of past market data). Wolf’s approach to 
market reading is an example of a contrarian approach that is not indifferent to the 
functioning of markets, as Stäheli argues that the contrarians, en bloch, were (Stäheli, 
2013, p. 150). Whereas the ‘beat the market’ approaches of McNeel and Moore rightly 
presented the markets as irrational and the prophylactics offered in their how-to books 
served as a means to remain sane in the midst of the market madness, other contrarian 
approaches did not reduce the markets to a pure exhibition of crowd behaviour. Being a 
speculator in search of contrarian investment opportunities did not necessarily mean that 
the then prevailing types of market reading such as fundamental and technical analyses 
were rendered redundant because the markets were under the sway of irrational rather 
than rational forces.  
Psychological crowds and speculative force 
Thomas Temple Hoyne, the author of Speculation: Its Sound Principles and Rules for Its 
Practice (1922), clearly expressed his views about the psychology of the public, the market 
1907, pp. 9–10). The resuscitation of Old Dickson’s laws and rules of successful speculation shows 
how deep-seated the myth of the ideal speculator was in the popular discourse on financial markets. 
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and the crowd and its influence on speculative markets.150 Speculation was, as Hoyne 
made very explicit, not written for the successful speculator but rather with the purpose 
of being ‘of practical benefit to […] the average man’ (Hoyne, 1922, pp. 143–144). Like 
McNeel and Moore, Hoyne stressed that self-mastery was paramount in speculation, and 
he noted that self-control was, in fact, ‘the first lesson the speculator must learn’ (Hoyne, 
1922, p. 122). Insofar as the speculator was not able to exercise, what Hoyne termed, ‘an 
unrelaxing intellectual mastery of himself’, he would not be able to withstand the 
pressure from the ‘stream of emotional stimuli’ to which he was persistently being 
exposed (Hoyne, 1922, p. 143). When it came to the cause of mental impairment and 
emotional contagion in the markets, Hoyne was much clearer and more thorough than 
his contemporaries: The cause was crowd psychology, which he described as ‘the most 
important incident to speculative markets’ (Hoyne, 1922, p. 140). Hoyne drew 
extensively on insights from Le Bon’s The Crowd in order to structure not only the advice 
he provided to his readers but his entire account of speculative markets (Hoyne, 1922, p. 
140). Though understanding crowd psychology was of more practical value to 
speculators than any other kind of market knowledge they could acquire, Hoyne 
150 On the cover page of Is the Chicago Board of Trade a Gambling House? An Inquiry into Trading in Grain 
Futures (1921), which is another book written by Hoyne, it is stated that ‘the author is a recognized 
authority in speculation’ and a writer of articles on the topic in the Chicago Herald Examiner. (In 
1928, Hoyne became the financial editor of the newspaper.) In a review of Speculation in The Bankers 
Magazine, Hoyne was described as having had ‘wide experience in business and as a market reporter 
and financial writer, which, according to the reviewer, had made him an able critic of ‘academic 
knowledge of economics’ (Anonymous, 1922, p. 527). Besides being active in the markets and a 
vivid financial writer, as he explained in the introduction to yet another of his books, Wall Street 
Remodelling the World (1930), Hoyne also disseminated his thoughts on finance in ‘weekly radio talks 
on finance and the stock market’ (p. 14). Letters from listeners of the radio programme and readers 
of his articles and books had taught Hoyne to ‘look at the market from the public’s point of view’ 
and to ‘epitomize the specific information the public wants’ (Hoyne, 1930, p. 14). In the aftermath 
of the crash, Hoyne came out as a fiction writer with the science fiction novel Intrigue on the Upper 
Level: Crime, Love, Adventure and Revolt in 2050 A. D. (1934). In the novel, Hoyne painted a dystopian 
picture of Chicago in the year 2050. Everything that had happened to Chicago and the rest of world 
was somehow connected to the speculative boom leading up to the eventual cataclysmic bust on 24 
October 1929 and the subsequent depression, in the midst of which Hoyne was writing his novel. 
Hoyne’s affinity for crowd psychology was also evident in his novel. In the totalitarian regime ruling 
Chicago anno 2050, crowd control has become the key to social order. Interestingly, controlling the 
mood of the masses was most efficiently achieved, Hoyne envisioned, through the manipulation 
and artificial stabilisation of the global financial markets. 
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emphasised that it was not the only important force impacting the fluctuations of prices 
in speculative markets. 
In order to explain the functioning of markets and the role crowd psychology played 
in it, Hoyne developed the concepts speculative power and speculative force, which he 
described in the following rather tortuous manner: ‘Speculative power is not the same as 
speculative force; the latter is thought. Speculative power is the money representative of 
speculative force, but it is by no means commensurate with the strength or weakness of 
the latter’ (Hoyne, 1922, p. 132). Thus, speculative power was the expression of the 
individual speculator’s speculative force. The speculative force, to be clear, represented 
the individual speculator’s willingness to speculate or, phrased differently, the ‘thought’ 
inscribed into a particular speculative move. In the markets, Hoyne noted, there were 
multiple degrees of speculative force concretely represented by varying degrees of 
speculative power, i.e. the actual amount invested (Hoyne, 1922, pp. 132–133). It was 
important for Hoyne to emphasise that crowd psychology was a major influence on 
speculative force (Hoyne, 1922, p. 135). The whole point in describing the markets in 
terms of dynamic relationships between speculative forces and speculative powers was 
to stress that both (a) a rational-calculable dimension to speculative markets (i.e. speculative 
power) and (b) a subjective-psychological dimension (i.e. speculative force) existed. To fully 
grasp the functioning of speculative markets, it was necessary to comprehend the 
dynamic between these two entangled forces. 
Understanding how and under what circumstances the speculative force was 
influenced by crowd psychology constituted, in Hoyne’s opinion, a central part of being 
a successful speculator. Hoyne’s own knowledge of the psychology of crowds derived, as 
mentioned, from reading Le Bon’s The Crowd. If some of his readers were not acquainted 
with the work of Le Bon, they had no reason to despair since Hoyne informatively 
quoted, sentence by sentence, the first few pages of the first chapter of The Crowd in 
which Le Bon provided a general characteristic of the ‘psychological crowd’ (Hoyne, 
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1922, pp. 135–136; Le Bon, 1896, pp. 1–3).151 In drawing on Le Bon’s notion of the 
psychological crowd, Hoyne argued and attempted to demonstrate that the transmission 
of information in the financial markets resembled the way ideas, information, beliefs etc. 
were transmitted in psychological crowds:  
 
[O]bserve in regard to a psychological crowd about to become organized – in so far 
as the point has bearing on a speculative market – that it is not necessary for the 
simultaneous presence on one spot of the individuals who form the crowd. What is 
necessary is that the same emotions are aroused simultaneously in the individuals. 
[…] So excellently and so quickly are market news and price changes widely 
disseminated that the certain means for emotional contagion is always present; and 
under proper conditions individuals, isolated in thousands of different parts of the 
country, may be organized almost instantly into a psychological crowd. (Hoyne, 1922, 
p. 137)  
 
As Le Bon stressed in The Crowd, physical presence was not a prerequisite in order for a 
psychological crowd to emerge: Emotional contagion could act at a distance (see 
Chapter 2). According to Hoyne, crowds in the markets were thus not confined to the 
floor of the exchange, where traders were physically present. The emotional contagion 
that caused psychological crowds to emerge proliferated through the telegraph wires 
affecting the tape readers in the brokers’ offices, and it reached the public through stock-
indices and price-graphs in the newspapers’ financial pages.  
Thus, psychological crowds were following Hoyne’s outline of speculative markets. 
They were always present in the markets, and, for that particular reason, it was crucial 
for speculators to find ways to guard themselves against emotional contagion.152 Unlike 
151 As stated in Chapter 2, Le Bon defined the ‘psychological crowd’ as ‘a provisional being formed 
of heterogeneous elements, which for a moment are combined, exactly as the cells which constitute 
a living body form by their reunion a new body which displays characteristics very different from 
those possessed by each of the cells singly’ (Le Bon, 1896, p. 6). This definition was not featured in 
Hoyne’s book. 
152 In many cases when crowd psychology was mentioned in connection to markets, it was in an 
attempt to describe externalities that occasionally disrupted the market order. Hoyne, on the 
contrary, underlined that psychological crowds were present in the markets at all times rather than 
exclusively when an exceptional event, such as a panic, occurred. It only happened rarely, Hoyne 
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the successful professional, the average speculator was not, Hoyne stressed, a ‘paragon’ 
and thus not completely ‘impervious to crowd contagion’ (Hoyne, 1922, p. 216). The 
average speculator should try to emulate the successful professionals, who had the ability 
to do the following: 
 
keep themselves immune to the emotional contagion which leads the average 
individual to lose his own personality, temporarily, in a psychological crowd, and 
results in his action being directed by the lower collective intelligence of the crowd, 
instead of by his own intellect. […] They seldom lose themselves in crowd action, but 
rather take advantage of it, now acting with a crowd, now against one, with rare 
individual judgment that is founded upon a profound knowledge, conscious or 
unconscious, of the psychology of crowds, how those crowds act, why, when, and 
what brings about such action. (Hoyne, 1922, pp. 139–140) 
 
Therefore, the average speculator should try to become ‘immune’ to crowd contagion by 
taking ‘every reasonable precaution at the beginning of every speculative operation to 
minimize the first cause of such overpowering emotion’ (Hoyne, 1922, p. 146).153 
Furthermore, it was important that the speculator learned, as noted in the quote above, 
how to take advantage of the collective actions of the psychological crowds in the 
markets just as the successful speculators did.  
In order to figure out whether the individual speculator was able to exercise the 
needed amount of self-restraint and -control, Hoyne suggested that she or he took an 
abstinence-test. The test was supposed to reveal whether the speculator would be able to 
withstand the urge to plunge into a speculative endeavour if exposed to the contagious 
emphasised, that the great majority of market actors became caught up in a single crowd. However, 
when it did happen, a market panic was bound to unfold (Hoyne, 1922, p. 137). 
153 In Stock Movements and Speculation (1928), Frederick Drew Bond advanced an argument similar to 
Hoyne’s saying that if the speculator was not able to ‘conquer his latent suggestibility he simply 
cannot succeed in the stock market’ (p. 177). However, Bond also emphasised that this was a 
tremendously difficult task to accomplish, especially for the individual member of the speculative 
public, who he described as a ‘bewildered man’ whose ‘attitude towards the market can probably 
best be described as that of a man not yet fully awake’, as ‘he acts in a condition of intense suggestibility’ 
(Bond, 1928, pp. 176–177, italics in the original). Bond’s description of the public speculator as a 
person who is not fully awake is analogous to Tarde’s description of social man as a ‘somnambulist’ 
(Tarde, 1903, pp. 74–88). 
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atmosphere of the market. Specifically, Hoyne proposed that the speculators abstained 
from trading for a definite period of ‘thirty days’ during which they should ‘frequent 
brokers’ offices, keep themselves constantly in the speculative atmosphere and within 
the influence of market fluctuations and all the news and gossip concerning them’ 
(Hoyne, 1922, p. 217). Being exposed to the so-called ‘speculative atmosphere’ of the 
market, while refraining from speculating, was supposed to enable speculators to 
observe their own emotional reactions to the contagion emanating from the market. 
Taking such an abstinence-test would, Hoyne noted, reveal a potential lack of ‘self-
control’ and self-restraint (Hoyne, 1922, pp. 217–218). If the speculator was able to 
abstain from trading during the thirty day period, it meant that she or he was sufficiently 
immune to contagion and thus not at imminent risk of being carried away on a wave of 
irrational crowd action. 
Some years later, Hoyne reiterated parts of his programme formulated in Speculation in 
the slightly more polemic Wall Street Remodelling the World (1930). In the introduction, 
Hoyne explained that the primary incentive for writing the book had been an ambition 
of ‘aiding the public engaged in speculation to learn to think for itself’ (Hoyne, 1930, 14). 
What he wanted the public to know and what successful speculators and experts 
including himself already were aware of was that speculation was essentially a ‘struggle 
between reason and emotion in the speculative mass mind (Hoyne, 1930, p. 108). When 
speculators had become sufficiently knowledgeable of crowd psychology and knew how 
not to fall victim to its lures, they would be able to take advantage of the movements of 
the psychological crowds in the markets. Based on his reading of Le Bon’s The Crowd, 
Hoyne also learned that crowds were ‘little adapted to reason, but quick to act’, which he 
opportunistically saw as proof that even though it was not possible to outpace crowds, it 
was possible for the individual to avoid making the same mistakes that the impetuous 
crowds were making (Hoyne, 1922, p. 140, 1930, p. 114; Le Bon, 1896, p. xvii). This was 
the contrarian credo that Hoyne had at the very core of his crowd psychology-informed 
approach to speculation. In what appeared almost as an echo of his description of the 
successful professional speculator in Speculation (quoted above), Hoyne summarised how 
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speculators (professionals or amateurs) ought to conduct themselves in the financial 
markets:  
 
The constant self-training of the individual speculator should be directed toward 
making himself immune to psychological crowd contagion. He should keep himself 
at all times in intimate touch with psychological crowds acting in various issues, but 
he should never become part of one of these in the sense that he loses his own 
independence of decision. He should be sensible enough to feel quickly the 
development of emotional greed or fear in the market as a whole, or in a particular 
stock, but strong minded enough successfully to combat these emotions with reason. 
If he acts he should know that he is obeying his own will; not the rule of 
overpowering impulse suddenly born in a psychological crowd mind. This intellectual 
freedom he can attain only by doggedly thinking for himself, regardless of the 
opinion of others and the pressure of mass emotion. Often he should act in unison 
with a psychological crowd, but when he does he should do so consciously. (Hoyne, 
1930, p. 115) 
 
Hoyne’s approach to speculation was, in essence, contrarian, but it was a more dynamic 
contrarian approach than the more somewhat simplistic strategies that Moore and 
McNeel provided. Although the crowd could and occasionally should be counteracted in 
order for Hoyne’s approach to work, acting contrary to the public should never become 
a default option or a simple reflex. In the ‘beat the market’ approaches of Moore and 
McNeel, successful speculation was a matter of detecting public euphoria or depression 
with regards to a specific security and then taking the opposite position. It was a rather 
simple (at least simplified) game of “me against them”. Succeeding in speculation was, to 
Hoyne, much more difficult than that. In addition to the need for speculators to become 
immune to psychological crowd contagion, they furthermore had to be able to remain 
immune while being in ‘intimate touch’ with the crowds.  
 
The ‘beat the crowd’ recipes found in the work of Moore and McNeel advised amateurs 
aspiring to become successful speculators on how to become mentally equipped for 
speculative endeavours. Their diagnosis of the market and suggested strategy was 
extremely basic: Since the majority of participants in the financial markets acted 
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irrationally and were simply unable to make trading decisions on an informed basis, the 
most likely way to continuously make money was to do the opposite of what the public 
were doing. Fundamental economic factors were rendered less important and often 
almost completely disappeared in the beat the market approaches. Contrary to these 
strategies, whose main purposes were (a) to avoid the mind hampering contagion of the 
crowd and (b) to trade against the public, Hoyne showed that the functioning of 
speculative markets could only be fully grasped insofar as the analysis of fundamental 
factors was supplemented by an analysis of the psychology of the market. Not unlike 
Baruch, Hoyne emphasised that understanding and analysing the psychology of the 
market should not substitute for fundamental or technical analysis but should instead 
serve as a complementary analytical focus. Hoyne’s approach to speculation was, I argue, 
a forerunner to the contrarian ideas nascent in the aftermath of the crash in 1929. 
The art and practice of being intelligently contrary 
 
[G]entle reader, if you follow the crowd in 1931, you will lose.  
 
‘The Market Cynic’, If, As and When, January 1931, pp. 2–3. 
 
In the aftermath of the October 1929 collapse of the stock market, more and more 
writers of how-to books resorted to crowd psychology to find a vocabulary with which 
they were able to describe the market as they saw it and furthermore a theoretical basis 
on which they could substantiate their views. On the backdrop of the crash, 
understanding the human nature element in financial markets appeared more pertinent 
than ever.154 The financial writer who became the figurehead of crowd psychology-
154 Among the books dealing with collective psychology in the markets were Orline D. Foster’s 
Making Money in the Stock Market (1930), Edgar T. Brainerd’s How to Invest for Income and Profit (1930), 
J. George Frederick’s Common Stocks and the Average Man (1930), George L. Hoxie’s Stock Speculation 
and Business (1930), Frank J. Williams’ If You Must Speculate, Learn the Rules (1930), Ernest 
McCullough’s How to Spend Your Money (1931), Bernie Winkelman’s Ten Years of Wall Street (1932) 
and Garet Garrett’s A Bubble that Broke the World (1932). One of the more interesting post-crash 
reflections on the collective psychological influences on the financial markets is found in a 
supplementary chapter to Henry Howard Harper’s The Psychology of Speculation. In the supplementary 
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informed contrarian thinking in post-crash era was, as mentioned in the introduction, 
Humphrey B. Neill. Neill was attracted to crowd psychology for the same reasons that 
economists such as Wesley Clair Mitchell and John Maurice Clark had introduced ideas 
from psychology into debates about the presumptions of the prevailing theories of 
economics during the previous two decades of the twentieth century. Both Mitchell and 
Clark wanted to provide a more ‘realistic’ and therefore better basis for understanding 
economic action by adopting ideas from social psychology (see Chapter 4). In a similar 
vein, Neill assumed that introducing psychology into market analysis would make it 
easier to provide sound answers to the ‘why’-questions concerning financial markets 
such as the following: Why do people trade? Why do some people trade differently than 
others? Why do prices fluctuate? The following part of the chapter examines Neill’s 
formalisation of his contrarian market philosophy as well as some of the practices of the 
self that the philosophy imposed on the individual speculator and the crowd psychology-
informed market analysis programme it prescribed. In addition, I examine how 
likeminded financial writers formulated crowd psychology-informed contrarian ideas 
more or less concurrent to Neill’s development of his theory of contrary thinking. Neill’s 
market philosophy was, as I will demonstrate, not a response to a financial market that 
had completely succumbed to the psychology of crowds but rather an attempt at 
outlining an optimised configuration of market analysis to which the study of crowd 
psychology was inoculated.    
Crowd psychology and the contrarian approach 
In 1928, Neill became vice president and promotion manager for the investment 
consultancy Wetsel Market Bureau, Inc., which was a subsidiary of one of New York’s 
leading stock market advisory firms, Brookmire Economic Service. After the crash, Neill 
convinced Wetsel to publish a monthly magazine that he entitled If, As and When: Passing 
chapter titled ‘After the Stock Market Crash of October 1929’, Harper argued that the whole 
community had been ‘inoculated with the speculative germ’ which had caused the unreasoned 
boom in speculation (Harper, 1930, pp. 3–4). He further argued, as Baruch and Steiner would echo 
later on, that ‘economics had become subservient to the will of the speculative mob’ (Harper, 1930, 
p. 19). 
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Thoughts and Reflections on Human Nature in Finance. Under the pseudonyms ‘The Market 
Philosopher’ and ‘The Market Cynic’, Neill wrote about the dire state of the post-crash 
financial markets and began to develop his contrarian stance (Mintz, 1994, pp. 102–103). 
In retrospect, Neill described If, As and When as a mouthpiece he used to vent his 
thoughts on ‘human foibles as they appeared in finance’ (Neill, 2010b [1954], p. 18). 
Many of the thoughts on markets and speculation that Neill had disseminated through If, 
As and When were shortly thereafter reiterated in a more systematised and less polemic 
way in the how-to book Tape Reading and Market Tactics (1931). One of Neill’s basic 
claims in If, As and When as well as in Tape Reading and Market Tactics was that in order to 
succeed in the stock market, it was necessary to be familiar with the psychology of the 
market and of the public and to have a proven market philosophy (Neill, 1931, p. 131). 
Equipping his readers with knowledge about market psychology and insights to his 
market philosophy was Neill’s primary objective.155  
Neill’s contrarian market philosophy consisted of the same dual focus on (a) character-
building/-shaping and (b) market reading as found in the contrarian approaches of McNeel 
and Moore. However, Neill’s contrarian approach did not offer a recipe for how to ‘beat 
the market’; instead, it provided a market philosophy that could enable the speculator to 
look beneath or beyond majority opinion when it had solidified into a dogma (Pring, 
1993, pp. 110–111). More than being a tool used for prediction, contrary thinking was, 
according to Neill, a means to avoid wrong predictions and on that basis locate possible 
profitable investments.156 Like Wolfe and Hoyne proposed, Neill noted in an issue of If, 
155 Late in the 1930s, more precisely in 1939, Neill began to issue the bi-weekly market letter Neill 
Letters of Contrary Opinion in which he disseminated contrarian advice and market overviews to his 
subscribers. The market letter was published between 1939 and 1974. (I have only had access to 
issues from the period 1949–1974.) Over the years, Neill’s market letter managed to attract the 
attention of prominent names from the world of finance such as Roger Babson, Edson Gould (a 
leading technical analyst of the 1960s and 70s, who was greatly influenced by Le Bon’s The Crowd) 
and popular personal finance columnist Sylvia Porter (Mintz, 1994, p. 96, pp. 97–98). Another pair 
of devoted readers of Neill Letters of Contrary Opinion was the founder of the financial services firm 
Fidelity Investments Edward Johnson II and his son and successor Edward Johnson III. Neill’s 
market philosophy led to the development of The Fidelity Contrafund, established in 1967 (Neill, 
18 September 1963c).  
156 Years later, while reflecting on the proficiencies of his market philosophy in his Neill Letters of 
Contrary Opinion, Neill pointed out that the usefulness of contrary thinking resided in its ‘objective 
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As and When that speculators should perceive market psychology and hence crowd 
psychology as factors that had to be analysed in conjunction with studies of the 
fundamental conditions and technical factors of the market (Neill, April 1930, pp. 9–15). 
Thus, successful speculators had to, as the successful long-term investor and former 
reporter for the financial magazine Barron’s Philip Lord Carret stressed, ‘study the 
psychology of the stock market as well as the elements of real value’ (Carret, 2007 
[1927]). 
One of the people who had a great influence on Neill’s work and who helped him 
realise the importance of crowd theory was the Yale graduate and broker-turned-
financial writer Robert Lincoln Smitley.157 Apart from being a former member of the 
New York Stock Exchange who had turned to financial writing, Smitley was an authority 
on business and finance literature, which he sold from his New York-based Dixie 
Business Book Shop that opened in 1918 (Mintz, 1994, pp. 106–108). As a way of 
advertising his bookshop, Smitley published bibliographical articles in Forbes Magazine, 
which he later compiled into a monumental bibliographical publication comprising 2700 
business- and finance-relevant books (Smitley, 1922, 1923). The publication included an 
eclectic shortlist of fifty quintessential books for the modern businessperson (Smitley, 
1922, pp. 2–6). Besides books on economics, finance and business management, the list 
also included the fictional work of Emerson and H. G. Wells as well as philosophical 
treatises such as Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Ethics. Hoyne’s Speculation, MacKay’s 
and realistic approach’ (Neill, 28 December 1951). Hence, Neill believed he had proven that the 
realities of the financial markets called for contrarian thinking. However, he also noted that the 
contrarian approach was occasionally deployed for ideological purposes. Neill stressed that it was a 
great temptation for those utilising contrarian thinking ‘to force opposite viewpoints in order to 
support personal opinions’. In such cases, the person was only using contrarian thinking to 
legitimise her or his presumptions, which was, Neill stressed, not the purpose of his market 
philosophy (Neill, 28 December 1951). Summing up his approach, Neill emphasised that ‘[c]ontrary 
opinions are not, and cannot be taken as, predictions’. The theory’s value was rather, he added, ‘to 
question all general predictions’ (Neill, 17 October 1951). 
157 In an issue of Neill Letters of Contrary Opinion, Neill referred to Smitley as his ‘friend and mentor’ 
and implied that it had been Smitley who had introduced him to Le Bon’s The Psychology of Socialism 
and The Crowd (Neill, 15 May 1963). In the pamphlet It Pays to Be Contrary (1951), Neill further 
expressed his indebtedness to Smitley, writing, ‘I owe R.L.S. more than I can repay for his guidance 
and counsel through the years and for the reading and studies he advised’ (p. 39). 
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Extraordinary Popular Delusions and Le Bon’s The Crowd had also found their way into 
Smitley’s top-fifty list. About The Crowd, Smitley wrote that ‘[t]oo little attention has been 
paid to the psychology of nations and crowds. Le Bon writes clearly and what he says 
should be of practical assistance to everyone who desires to understand ‘why’ certain 
things happen which are unreasonable’ (Smitley, 1922, p. 5). Speculators would arguably 
benefit significantly from reading The Crowd, since speculation had, in Smitley’s opinion, 
as much to do with ‘emotional influences’ and ‘temperament’ as it had with ‘knowledge 
of fundamental economics’ (Smitley, 1922, p. 105).  
Le Bon’s influence on Smitley’s views on finance is most apparent in the book 
Popular Financial Delusions (1933) in which Smitley drew extensively on the former’s 
work.158 As a play on MacKay’s Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness 
of Crowds, the book’s title in itself implied the significance that Smitley attributed to 
crowds and crowd behaviour in the markets. In the opening of Popular Financial Delusions, 
Smitley quoted a passage from one of Le Bon’s final works, The World Unbalanced (1924 
[1923]), of which the two first sentences read as follows: ‘The destiny of nations is 
governed by psychological influences and economic necessities. The former engender 
the ideas and beliefs which regulate conduct. The latter fix the material conditions of 
existence’ (Le Bon, 1924, p. 157; Smitley, 1933, p. 1).159 Smitley applied Le Bon’s ideas 
about collective psychology and the influence it had on individual and collective action 
directly to financial markets. Just like Neill, he emphasised that it was equally paramount 
158 Prior to the publication of Popular Financial Delusions, Smitley had stressed that psychology played 
an important role in stock speculation (without resorting to Le Bon’s crowd theory). In What Every 
Investor Ought to Know (1918) – which comprised articles published in various issues of The Magazine 
of Wall Street written under the pen names ‘Arthur N. Slocum’ and ‘James Kennedy’ – he 
emphasised that in addition to analytical abilities, the speculator needed a ‘firm, brave temperament’ 
and nerves trained to withstand ‘sudden shocks’ (p. 5, 11, 14). (Neill wrote a foreword to a later 
edition of Smitley’s Popular Financial Delusions published by the Fraser Publishing Company in 1963 
(Neill, 15 May 1963).) 
159 Smitley regarded The World Unbalanced as insightful and described Le Bon’s words as ‘clear and 
pertinent’. He further stated that the book had inspired him to write Popular Financial Delusions 
(Smitley, 1933, p. 1). A review in the Journal of Social Forces described The World Unbalanced in less 
venerated phrases, calling it ‘a loose fabric of self-praise, national bigotry, historical misinformation, 
economic nonsense and political disgruntlement’ that, according to the reviewer, had only been 
published outside of France because of the sales value of the author’s name (Knight, 1924, p. 181). 
195 
 
                                                   
to view the psychology influencing market actors as understanding the fundamentals of 
the market. Successful speculation required familiarity with both dimensions. 
As Hoyne had emphasised, successful speculators were, following Smitley, ‘close 
students of economic theory and practice’ as well as ‘unconscious experts in crowd 
psychology and the technique of the stock market’s position’ (Smitley, 1933, p. 115).160 
The problem was, Smitley argued, that only a minority of market actors adhered to the 
class of successful speculator. The ‘casual speculator’, which was Smitley’s name for 
members of the speculative public, had, he argued, next to no knowledge of crowd 
psychology despite being almost constantly under its sway. As had been emphasised by 
numerous financial writers over the course of the previous three decades, the public’s 
credulousness and suggestibility to the influence of the psychology of the crowd had 
become an increasingly larger market problem as the assumedly inexperienced and 
incapable speculative public had increased in numbers (see Chapters 3 and 4). Smitley 
subscribed to the negative view of the public and added that the problem was 
accentuated because some market actors, whom he described as being ‘graduates in the 
knowledge of mob psychology’, were actively praying on the suggestibility and 
credulousness of the public via manipulation (Smitley, 1933, p. 119). Smitley described 
the public’s blind reliance on tips and news as the asymmetrical relation between the 
crowd leader and the crowd, as explained by Le Bon. He described casual speculators in the 
following way:  
 
[They have] absolutely no minds of their own. They are swayed and directed by the 
“tip.” The initiative of the “tip” is buried in obscurity. Manifestly it is tossed to the 
“lambs” by those who are directly interested in developing sufficient mob psychology 
to attain their purposes in connection with stock prices. Whether these propagandists 
study mob psychology or just intuitively adapt it, cannot readily be discovered. It 
would seem, however, that they are capable disciples of the great Frenchman, Gustav 
160 In an issue of his newsletter, the Thomas Gibson’s Weekly Market Letters, published on 29 April 
1921, Gibson had made a similar assertion arguing that ‘the greatest and most successful speculators 
in the Street are psychologists’. He explained that the great speculator-psychologists ‘know full well 
that the great majority of public speculators will be governed by what is visible and that they will fail 
to realize or keep in mind the important fact that the good or evil which is now plainly apparent to 
all has already been measured and discounted marketwise’ (Gibson, 29 April 1921a). 
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LeBon [sic]. We are told by him that the mystical (?) method for influencing the 
public mind is composed of four parts: Affirmation, Repetition, Prestige, and 
Contagion. (Smitley, 1933, p. 116)161 
 
Since the majority of speculators in the market rarely acted rationally it would, in 
Smitley’s opinion, be illogical to assume that the market at all times followed 
fundamental economic laws. This, Smitley asserted, made it necessary for the speculator 
161 In The Crowd (1896), Le Bon explained how the crowd leader used a three-stage seduction or 
persuasion strategy of (1) affirmation, (2) repetition and (3) contagion to hypnotise the crowd (Le 
Bon, 1896, pp. 125–132). Affirmation was, Le Bon stressed, ‘one of the surest means of making an 
idea enter the minds of crowds’ (Le Bon, 1896, p. 126). The affirmation of an idea had, however, 
but little influence if it was not repeated continuously. Via repetition, the affirmed idea fixed itself in 
the mind ‘in such a way that it is accepted in the end as a demonstrated truth’ (Le Bon, 1896, p. 
126–127). The two first stages of the persuasion process – affirmation and repetition – required the 
agitation and therefore the rhetorical proficiencies of the leader, whereas the last stage – contagion 
– occurred as a derived consequence of the repeated affirmation of the idea in question (Le Bon, 
1896, p. 128). When an idea had been repeated enough to a group of people, Le Bon believed that it 
would start to spread automatically via contagion from one person to the next until the crowd was 
one unitary, collective mind. In an issue of If, As and When, Neill could have alluded to Le Bon 
when writing that ‘PSYCHOLOGISTS tell us that a thought must be repeated again and again 
before the public as a whole retains it’ (Neill, March 1930, p. 5). I write ‘could have’ since Neill did 
not refer directly to scholarly work on the psychology of crowds or any other scholarly work for 
that matter in neither If, As and When nor Tape Reading and Market Tactics (with the exception of a 
quote from Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620)). It was only later that Neill began to cite Le 
Bon’s and Tarde’s work in particular. For example, Neill mentioned Le Bon’s crowd psychology in 
his historical account of the booms and busts of the New York Stock Exchange in The Inside Story of 
the Stock Exchange: A Fascinating Saga of the World’s Greatest Money Market Place (1950). Here, he 
explained that Le Bon’s The Crowd was of value to anyone who wanted to understand mass hysteria 
and crowd behaviour in financial markets as well as any other possible social setting (Neill, 1950, p. 
306). Aligned with the way he perceived markets in general, Neill emphasised that his historical 
study of the stock exchange was also a ‘fascinating psychological study’ and noted that the ‘human 
nature viewpoint’ (‘that is to say, the stock market as it reflects crowd psychology, public and 
executive thought’) was one of the three viewpoints guiding the historical narrative of the study 
(Neill, 1950, pp. viii–x). Neill further utilised Le Bon’s crowd theory as well as Tarde’s imitation 
theory to substantiate his theory of contrary opinion in The Art of Contrary Thinking (1954) in which 
he also briefly drew upon Trotter’s Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War and William James’ The 
Principles of Psychology. Neill had discussed Tarde’s notion of imitation and Le Bon’s notion of the 
crowd in his market letter prior to the publication of The Art of Contrary Thinking, but it was in the 
latter that he emphasised that his theory of contrary opinion was based on three ‘laws’ of sociology 
and psychology: (a) a crowd ‘yields to basic instincts which an individual acting alone represses’; (b) 
‘[p]eople are gregarious; instinctively they follow the impulses of the “herd”’; (c) [sic] ‘[c]ontagion 
and imitation of the minority (follow-the-leader [sic]) make people susceptible to suggestion, to 
commands, to customs, to emotional motivation’; (d) ‘[a] crowd never reasons, but follows its emotions; it 
accepts without proof what is “suggested” or “asserted”’ (Neill, 19 September 1951, 2010 [1954], p. 
10, italics in the original).  
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to occasionally ‘disobey economic imperatives’ and ‘act in an abnormal manner’ (Smitley, 
1933, p. 278). Thus, Smitley argued that sometimes crowd psychology trumped 
economic imperatives, and knowing exactly when to disobey or go against a trend in the 
market was the question that puzzled all contrarians.  
Thinking and trading against the norm was exactly the approach to the market that 
Neill advocated. In an issue of If, As and When, Neill noted that someone had told him 
that if he traded ‘opposite’ to his ‘snap conclusions’ and ‘contrary to what appears logical’, 
he would consistently make money (Neill, August 1930, p. 16, italics in the original). This 
someone could in principle have been the stalwart contrarian Fred C. Kelly, who just like 
Smitley and Neill, was a former Wall Street professional turned financial writer. Kelly’s 
how-to book Why You Win or Lose (1930) was, in Neill’s opinion, incredibly interesting 
and inspiring because it thoroughly dealt with the ‘human side of the market’ (Neill, 
September 1930, p. 16).162 Like the person who had advised Neill to trade contrary to 
what appeared logical, Kelly argued that being illogical would greatly enhance the 
speculator’s chances of success, by which he meant that following the common-sensual 
‘surface logic’ of the public would be tantamount to failure (Kelly, 1930, pp. 17–18).163 
The ideas and suggestion brought forward by Kelly in Why You Win or Lose (1930) were 
all aligned with the single guiding maxim that ‘[t]he crowd always loses because the 
crowd is always wrong’ (Kelly, 1930, pp. 1–2). In order to ‘win’, speculators had ‘to do 
exactly the opposite from what nearly everybody else is doing’ and actively try to follow 
Kelly’s mantra and ‘be contrary!’ (Kelly, 1930, p. 1, italics in the original). Hence, being a 
162 Previous to his work on the ‘human side’ of speculation in financial markets, Kelly had written a 
how-to book on the related but broader topic of human nature in business. In Human Nature in 
Business: How to Capitalize Your Every-Day Habits and Characteristics (1920) Kelly, among other topics, 
discussed people’s habit of following the crowd and suggested that there were certain ways in which 
business people could abstain from this inclination (pp. 42–58). The irrational crowd behaviour that 
Kelly associated with urban life in Human Nature in Business was directly applied to the financial 
markets in Why You Win or Lose. 
163 Financial writers often argued that the public’s massive presence in the markets tended to 
obfuscate the idea of what was and what was not ‘logical’ in a market context. Gibson, for example, 
noted that the public’s ‘imperfect logic’ caused ordeals in the markets (Gibson, 1907, p. 22). 
Tortuously, Richard Wallace Schabacker reasoned that since the public’s logic was in fact illogical, 
acting contrary to what seemed to be logical was the only logical way to act in the market 
(Schabacker, 1934, pp. 126–127). 
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contrarian meant, following Kelly, to anticipate what the crowd, i.e. the majority of 
market actors, were likely to do and to ‘outwit’ or ‘outplay’ them (Kelly, 1930, p. 33, 35). 
Unlike Moore and McNeel, Kelly did not suggest for people to attempt to beat the 
market; rather, he recommended that they realise how important it was to know when to 
get in and out of it at the right time and thus beat the crowd (Kelly, 1930, pp. 58–59).
  
Whereas Kelly stressed that it was paramount to be contrary at all times because the 
crowd was wrong at all times, Neill had a less damning verdict on the speculative 
competencies of the public, arguing that they were not wrong all of the time while 
stressing that at ‘important turning points’ they tended to be (Neill, 1931b, p. 153, italics in 
the original). Instead of being contrary out of principle, Neill suggested that the investor 
or speculator be contrary when necessary. Like Hoyne, who argued that the successful 
speculator knew when to follow, stay away from and counteract the crowd (i.e. the 
public), Neill suggested that his readers should strive to act ‘intelligently contrary’, which 
was an approach he had also encouraged his clients to adopt when assuming the role of 
investment consultant.164 The contrarian market philosophy prescribed certain modes of 
conduct as well as a particular mode of analysis. Though the analytical dimension and 
the rules of conduct aspects of the contrarian approach were intertwined, it is possible to 
discuss them separately. In the following section, I examine Neill’s tripartite approach to 
market analysis and then discuss the influence market information (news, noise, tips, 
gossip etc.) ostensibly had on the average speculator and how Neill thought that the 
contrarian should deal with it. 
164 In the beginning of the 1930s, Neill (together with his colleague Buck Tyson) opened the 
investment consultancy Neill-Tyson Inc. In 1932, the consultancy published the short booklet or 
brochure Neill-Tyson Service: Including an Explanation of the Neill Safety Plan for Market Trading in which 
the firm’s services and approach to investing and speculation were described (Neill and Tyson, 
1932). Under the header ‘It Pays to be Contrary’, it was stated that ‘[w]e have learned – and losses 
have been our teacher – that being intelligently contrary is the safest market rule to follow’ (Neill 
and Tyson, 1932, p. 4). The second half of the brochure was entitled ‘The Neill Safety Plan for 
Market Trading’, and it comprised an outline of the human factors and frailties that investors and 
speculators ought to be aware of insofar as they were planning on profiting from their ventures into 
the stock market (Neill and Tyson, 1932, p. 8). 
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Fundamental, technical and sentiment analysis: Crossing the public at the psychological moment 
There was, Neill argued, a ‘constant tug of minds’ between proponents of fundamental 
and technical analysis (Neill, April 1930). Instead of arguing for one or the other or 
proposing a third contrarian way, Neill advocated for a combination of technical and 
fundamental analyses and for supplementing them with the study of market 
psychology.165 In a somewhat simplistic way, Neill explained how the three forms of 
market analysis supplemented each other. Analysing fundamental factors such as the 
content of companies’ financial statements, interest rates, employment and production 
would, he argued, reveal which stocks were attractive for investment. The study of past 
and current action of a particular stock – the technical factors – would reveal when to sell 
or buy. However, it was the study of the psychology of the market and an in-depth 
understanding of crowd psychology that revealed why other people were following this 
or that trend in the markets (Neill, April 1930, pp. 9–15). Since market action was, Neill 
concluded, a ‘reflection of the public’s opinion of fundamentals’, it simply did not make 
sense to separate fundamental analysis and technical analysis (Neill, April, 1930, pp. 14–
15, italics in the original).166 Following Neill, it also would not make sense to avoid 
taking into account the sentiment of the public that had a tendency to amplify or 
dampen the intensity of speculation in the markets. Hence, conducting fundamental and 
technical analyses in conjunction and supplementing these analyses with a study of 
market psychology was, according to Neill, the optimal way of detecting if and when the 
public should be opposed or, to put it in technical terms, ‘crossed’. 
165 In an issue of If, As and When, Neill advocated for what he termed a ‘three point focus’ on (1) 
fundamentals, (2) ‘market psychology as reflected in technical action and technical market positions’ 
and (3) ‘the analysis of daily market action from the ticker tape as all buying and selling orders pass 
in review’ (Neill, February 1930, p. 11). This three-point focus corresponds, to some extent, to the 
following three-steps of successful speculation Neill outlined in the preface to Tape Reading and 
Market Tactics: The speculator had to ‘first, familiarizing himself with the power and the methods of 
the professional speculative groups which operate “behind the tickers;” second, learning the 
principles whereby he may interpret the maneuvers of those groups and the actions of the public; 
and third – and most important – attaining a mastery of himself: of his temperament, emotions, and 
the other variables that go to make up human nature’ (Neill, 1931b, p. ix). 
166 In Tape Reading and Market Tactics, Neill made the same argument, phrased somewhat differently, 
when stating that market action was ‘a reflection of fundamentals and of speculative and investment 
sentiment’ (Neill, 1931, p. 195, italics in original). 
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The practice of crossing the public was described and praised for its effectiveness by 
the financial editor of Forbes Magazine Richard Wallace Schabacker.167 In Stock Market 
Profits (1934), Schabacker explained that crossing basically meant trading against the 
public, which meant trading ‘contrary to current reasonable stimulus, but’, he added, 
‘exactly in consonance with the dictates of psychology’ (Schabacker, 1934, pp. 193–194). 
The most important aspects of crossing were to ‘anticipate public desire’ and to know 
when to buy and sell (Schabacker, 1934, p. 190). Neill explained crossing as the practice 
of selling ‘before the public on the signal of the increased volume and price activity which 
mark turning points, and not wait to go in the opposite direction at the first signs that 
the public is selling’ (Neill, 1931, p. 154, italics in the original). The ideal situation, Neill 
added, was a result of the following: 
 
[of having] timed your actions so that you precede the public in buying – that is, but 
when stocks are being accumulated – then you can go along with the majority during 
the major portion of the advance, and can part company at definite signs of increased 
public participation without corresponding progress in the movement of the stock. 
The greatest public participation is near and at the tops, because, as we have learned, 
rising prices attract a following. (Neill, 1931, p. 156) 
 
The intricate part of the operation was to detect these definite signs of increased popular 
participation in due time. The best way to figure out the right time to cross the public 
was by simply observing the public. Schabacker argued that the right ‘psychological time’ 
(i.e. the psychological moment (see Chapter 4)) to cross the public occurred: 
 
[when] bullish news is featured in the press over a considerable period of time, when 
“bull tips” are circulating swiftly, when everyone (even the crowd in the subways) is 
reading the financial section of the newspapers, when you can get market advice from 
your barber or your elevator boy, when there is “standing room only” in the board-
room of your broker’s office. (Schabacker, 1934, p. 65) 
 
167 Neill was fond of and inspired by Schabacker’s work on technical analysis. It also happened that 
Schabacker read and commented on the manuscript for Tape Reading and Market Tactics (Neill, 1931, 
p. 11, 150). 
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What Schabacker essentially argued was that studying the psychology of the public was, 
at least to some extent, an anthropological endeavour. It was anthropological in the 
sense that the analyst had to observe people in various social settings in which they were 
exposed to and engaged with market information in order to arrive at some sort of 
conclusion as to the emotional state of the public mind. In addition to this 
anthropological angle on the study of the psychology of the public, the analyst could 
browse the newspapers for indications of the mood of the market public. Detecting the 
right time to cross the public through an analysis of the newspapers was, as I have 
examined in Chapter 4 and which I will return to towards the end of this chapter, a 
perilous strategy that could allegedly cause an obfuscation of the boundary between the 
observer and the observed, i.e. the analyst and the crowds in the market.  
Neill encouraged his readers to internalise his triadic perspective on market analysis. 
Schabacker did something similar, asserting that the operator needed to practise 
technical and fundamental analyses as well as study market psychology until they became 
‘second nature’. When the three dimensions of market analysis had become second 
nature to the operator, she or he would, according to Schabacker, have ‘emerged from 
the state of study into that of experience’ (Schabacker, 1934, p. 319). Like Hoyne had 
pointed out, the successful speculator was thus someone who was knowledgeable of and 
constantly observing the psychology of the crowds in the markets, while remaining 
impervious to its influence. Whereas Hoyne suggested that the speculator should at all 
times keep in ‘intimate touch’ with the psychological crowds in the market, Neill 
suggested that the speculator maintain mental as well as, on occasion, physical distance 
from the crowds in the market. 
To prevent becoming part of crowds in the market, while still being able to study 
their psychology, Neill advised his readers to ‘trade alone’ (Neill, 1931b, p. 146). 
Explaining more precisely what he meant by trading alone, Neill addressed the aspiring 
speculator or investor in the first person:  
 
Close your mind to the opinions of others; pay no attention to outside influences. 
Disregard reports, rumors, and idle boardroom chatter. If you are going to trade 
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actively, and are going to employ your own judgment, then, for heaven’s sake, stand 
or fall by your own opinions. If you wish to follow someone else, that is all right; in 
that case, follow him and do not interject your own ideas. He must be free to act as 
he thinks best; just so must you when trading on your own initiative. (Neill, 1931, p. 
146) 
 
The speculator should shy away from sharing opinions with others and should never ask 
anyone for her or his opinion. She or he should, Neill recommended, become ‘a clam, an 
unpleasant cynic’ (Neill, 1931, p. 147). Failing or refusing to comply with these 
suggestions meant that the speculator was letting down her or his mental guard and 
exposing her- or himself to mental contagion.168 Thus, what Neill meant by trading 
alone was that the speculator should trade independently and not let suggestions, 
opinions and other stimuli influence her or his decision-making. One technique that 
Neill suggested for the speculator to make use of was to occupy the mind and 
concentrate one’s attention by using a ‘pad and pencil’ (Neill, 1931, p. 147). Another way 
speculators could shield themselves from the destructive influences from news, rumours, 
chatter and the overall contagious atmosphere of the brokerage office or exchange was 
by keeping a physical distance from the financial markets and becoming a so-called ‘out-
of-town trader’.169 These ‘techniques of isolation’, as Stäheli labels them were, he adds, 
168 In Common Stocks and the Average Man (1930), J. George Frederick emphasised how important it 
was for the speculator to guard or ‘insulate’ her or his mind against various forms of stimuli. In the 
second of twelve principles of common stock buying, Frederick, like Neill, addressed his reader in 
the first person, telling her or him: ‘You should insulate yourself absolutely from all “crowd 
psychology” or “follow-the-sheep” feeling, and from all “impulses,” “hunches” and hearsays which 
would tend to make you act without reason and analysis’ (Frederick, 1930, p. 210). Although Neill 
encouraged his readers to disregard all kinds of outside influences in Tape Reading and Market Tactics, 
he was slightly ambiguous when it came to emotions in the market. Stäheli claims that the 
contrarians rejected the idea that emotions could serve a purpose in speculation and instead 
committed themselves to an emotionless approach (Stäheli, 2013, pp. 158–159). However, Neill did 
not seem to advocate a fully emotionless approach. In an issue of If, As and When, Neill noted that 
even though the emotion of fear – which he perceived as the emotion that had the greatest 
influence on the markets – ‘paralyzes sound reasoning’ he insisted that a healthy amount of fear 
could be a good thing: ‘[A] certain form of fear’, Neill argued, ‘is a wonderful safety valve’ (Neill, 30 
October 1930, p. 10, italics in the original). Hence, if it was not overpowering, the emotion of fear 
could, Neill thought, generate caution and counterbalance the feeling of enthusiasm in the 
individual speculator.  
169 Already in the beginning of the twentieth century, Nelson argued that there were certain 
advantages to being a so-called ‘out-of-town trader’ who only occasionally was physically present in 
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strategies of ‘communicative isolation’ that were supposed to mitigate the risk of mental 
contagion from the markets by either occupying the mind so that external affectations 
were kept at bay or by decoupling oneself physically (Stäheli, 2013, pp. 161–163). As 
Stäheli notes, it was important for the contrarian speculator to create communicative 
isolation, since physical distance could not in itself prevent the contagion emanating 
from the market from reaching the individual speculator (unless the isolation was 
complete with all communicative lines to the outside world shut).   
The evolution of communication technology in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries meant that presence was, as had been pointed out by Le Bon and 
later Ross, no longer a prerequisite of contagion and mass suggestion.170 For this exact 
the market (Nelson, 1902, pp. 65–68). Nelson contested that proximity to the financial markets, in 
his case the stock market on Wall Street, was not always an advantage in trading. The out-of-town 
trader had, Nelson noted, one great advantage over the ‘office trader’ and that was that she or he 
‘did not hear the rumors and see sudden movements in prices’ (Nelson, 1902, p. 66). To distance 
oneself from the market was, Nelson pointed out, also something large operators were fond of 
doing: As Nelson argued, they liked to ‘work from Newport or Saratoga or other distant points in 
order to look at the trading with an unbiased mind’ (Nelson, 1902, p. 68). (Charles H. Dow’s 
Scientific Stock Speculation (1920) contains a chapter on the out-of-town trader that is identical to the 
one found in Nelson’s The ABC of Stock Speculation (Dow, 1920, pp. 67–72).) Selden was another 
financial writer who stressed that it was sometimes necessary for the speculator ‘to close all 
commitments and remain out of the market for a few days’ (Selden, 1912, p. 114). In Studies of Stock 
Speculation (1966 [1924]), Wolfe stressed that even though out-of-town or ‘long-distance’ traders 
were generally more successful than office traders, it was nevertheless the case that office traders 
could ‘show results far exceeding any that are within the reach of out-of-town speculating’ (Wolf, 
1966, pp. 87–88). Therefore, out-of-town trading allegedly had its advantages and disadvantages. 
When it came to remaining clearheaded while trading, out-of-town traders had, Wolf noted, a clear 
advantage over ‘those who hang over the ticker or frequent the board-room’ (Wolf, 1966, p. 155). 
Bond held the same opinion about the virtues of out-of-town trading as Wolf. He argued that the 
trader ‘who cannot watch the ticker from hour to hour, is less unsuccessful than his apparently 
better equipped co-speculator in Wall Street’ (Bond, 1928, p. 174). 
170 Inspired by insights from Le Bon as well as Tarde’s discussion of the press and the public, Ross 
eloquently explained this development towards ‘another presence’ in the following excerpt from 
Social Psychology (1908): ‘PRESENCE is not essential to mass suggestion. Mental touch is no longer 
bound up with physical proximity. With the telegraph to collect and transmit the expressions and 
signs of the ruling mood, and the fast mail to hurry to the eager clutch of waiting thousands the still 
damp sheets of the morning daily, remote people are brought, as it were, into another presence. 
Through its organs the exited public is able to assail the individual with a mass of suggestion almost 
as vivid as if he actually stood in the midst of an immense crowd’ (Ross, 1908, p. 63). Ross’ analysis 
of the derived consequences of the proliferation of new communication technologies coincides 
with the propositions Weber made in his research proposal for a sociology of the press that I briefly 
touch upon in Chapter 2 (see Weber, 1998 [1911]). 
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reason, Neill believed it was paramount to understand the influence financial news had 
on the public and further how members of the public should act in order to prevent 
being unconsciously swayed by the stories detailed in the papers. The simple solution 
was, according to Neill, to imitate the big operators and simply ignore the financial news 
circulated in the papers: 
 
I am told that many big operators scarcely ever read the financial pages of 
newspapers because they wish to draw their own conclusions and formulate their 
own judgments from cold statistics, realizing that unconsciously they may be swayed 
by publicity releases and financial writers’ opinions. (Neill, August 1930, p. 13) 
 
The problem of the press was allegedly that it both succumbed to and induced 
unconscious imitation.171 One additional concern Neill had with the proliferation of 
financial news in the newspapers was that the myriad of short and often polemical 
stories could impair the individual’s ability to concentrate and remain adamant (Neill, 
1931, p. 146). Hence, newspapers were accused of creating and to some extent 
encouraging imitation and herding behaviour. Instead of informing the public, the 
different outlets of financial news were allegedly leading the public to financial misery 
(Neill, March 1930, p. 7). In his prescription of prophylactics against mob mind in Social 
Psychology (1908), Ross argued that people often became victims of mental contagion 
through what they read in the columns of sensational newspapers. The reader of 
newspapers did, according to Ross, often catch what he called ‘paragraphesis’ by which he 
meant the ‘inability to hold the mind on a subject for any length of time’ (Ross, 1908, p. 
86, italics in the original). In order to avoid being infected with paragraphesis, Ross 
suggested that people completely shun the ‘dithyrambic press’ (Ross, 1908, p. 86). Neill’s 
171 In Physics and Politics (1873), Walter Bagehot explained how writers writing for different 
newspapers tended to succumb to unconscious imitation of the style of the newspaper for which 
she or he was writing. ‘[I]nvariably’, Bagehot claimed, the author ‘catches the tone of each paper 
while he is writing for it, and changes the tone of another when in turn he begins to write for that’ 
(Bagehot, 1873, pp. 32–33). This stylistic isomorphism was what Neill argued was happening on the 
macro level when newspapers were swayed by financial writers’ opinions and publicity releases. 
Additionally, as examined in Chapter 2, Le Bon claimed in The Psychology of Socialism (1899) that the 
newspaper functioned as a medium for the incitement of public excitement and collective action. 
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suggestion not to consult the financial pages for sound market knowledge resonated 
with Ross’ mob mind antidote. However, even though Neill advised his readers not to 
make up their minds about the financial markets on the basis of what they read on the 
financial pages of the newspapers, he still insisted that news had a tremendous impact on 
‘public sentiment’ (Neill, February 1930, p. 6).172 Ambiguously, to Neil, the newspapers 
were a source of distraction and mental contagion, yet at the same time they were a 
channel through which it was possible to detect public sentiment.    
 
To recapitulate, two composite dimensions constituted Neill’s theory of contrary 
opinion: a market analytical dimension and a conduct-oriented dimension. Neill’s tripartite 
market analysis was supposed to enable the analyst to single out which stocks to invest in 
(via a study of the fundamentals), when it was the right time to buy, sell or stay out of the 
market (via an analysis of the technical factors) and finally why the speculative public 
were taking the positions that they did at a given time (via a study of the psychology of 
the market). The prophylactics against mob mind, constituting the conduct-oriented 
dimension of Neill’s contrarian market philosophy, were supposed to enable the 
individual contrarian to undertake the aforementioned tripartite market analysis. The 
contrarians self-techniques did, following Stäheli, make it possible to observe the crowd 
without being absorbed by it (Stäheli, 2013, p. 162). It is true, as Stäheli notes, that the 
self-techniques and self-practices of the contrarians were supposed to enable them to 
have a clear mind when analysing the markets. However, the approach to market analysis 
proposed by Neill was not one that ‘abandoned external sources such as fundamental 
data’, as Stäheli argues that the contrarians’ did in their market analysis (Stäheli, 2013, p. 
152). It was only some of the rather heterogeneous group of contrarian-imbued financial 
writers who based their market analysis completely on the study of crowd psychology.  
172 In Breaking the Backbone of American Industry (1933) – a book that aimed to ensure that the public 
was not hit as severely by future financial crises as had been the case in 1929 – the author Walter T. 
Beveridge gave an explanation as to the causal relationship between media coverage of financial 
stories and public buying. The public, Beveridge argued, ‘always buy on the top of the market, 
during the distribution period because they read the glaring articles in the newspapers. Then again, 
they always sell the market short on the bottom, because they read the bearish news’ (Beveridge, 
1933, p. 107).  
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As just mentioned, despite the overlaps, Neill’s contrarian approach differed from the 
more simplistic beat the market and beat the crowd approaches of the likes of Moore, 
McNeel and Kelly in the sense that it did not neglect the importance of the fundamental 
factors, but rather suggested that the collective psychological dimension of market actors 
should be an integral part of every analyst’s approach to trading. Whereas the beat the 
market/crowd approaches seemed aligned with Steiner’s suggestion to substitute 
reasoned analysis for studies of mob psychology (as presented in the chapter’s 
introduction), Neill’s market philosophy was akin to Baruch’s approach to trading and to 
the views he presented in the foreword to MacKay’s Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular 
Delusions. Like Baruch, Neill’s application of crowd psychology was a response to what 
he perceived as the realities of the stock market. When active on Wall Street in the late 
1920s, Neill experienced at close quarters how unpredictable the stock market could be 
at times of excessive speculation. The crash was, according to Neill (as it was to Baruch), 
a reminder that there were certain behavioural patterns and innate human tendencies 
influencing the conduct of market participants. Accounting for these influential factors 
when conducting market analysis was not, in neither Neill’s mind nor Baruch’s mind, a 
plea for a radical rethinking of the discipline of economics. Instead, it was a pragmatic 
response to the actual dynamics of a stock market as they experienced them as observing 
partakers.  
Conclusion 
The contrarian approach to speculation in the financial markets, which is still employed 
by investors and speculators in today’s markets, was historically, as I have shown in this 
chapter, inextricably connected to the how-to literature. Although there are examples of 
how-to books advising readers not to follow the public and in some cases trade in the 
exact opposite direction of general trends in the markets dating back to the late 
nineteenth century, it was only during the early 1920s that more elaborate accounts of 
contrarian approaches emerged in the how-to literature. While financial advice on how 
to trade wiser than the hapless public and on how to avoid being subjected to the mental 
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contagion of the public was found in many how-to books published in the 1920s, the 
formalisation of an actual market philosophy based on contrarian thinking first appeared 
in the aftermath of the stock market crash in October 1929. While the contrarian way of 
approaching business in the financial markets was informed and influenced by the 
popular perceptions of the speculative public (see Chapter 3) and the psychologisation of 
the market actor and the markets as such (see Chapter 4), the market collapse in 1929 
served as a reminder to the how-to book authors of how important it was not to blindly 
follow the crowd. 
The contrarian approaches disseminated in how-to books in the 1920s and 1930s 
were presented as help for ailing small speculators and investors – the primary 
readership of books in the how-to genre – who did not desire to share the destiny of 
their fellow members of the speculative public. The main aims of the how-to guides to 
contrarian speculation were to provide (a) rules of conduct that would help the 
individual speculator to avoid the mental contagion that the inexperienced were so often 
infected by and (b) a crowd psychology-informed approach to market analysis that 
would enable the speculator to trade contrary to the public at the right moment. These 
two elements or dimensions of the contrarian approach were inextricably connected: It 
was perceived as impossible for the speculator to conduct an accurate market analysis let 
alone determine the right moment to counteract the public if her or his intellectual 
faculties were numbed by the contagion from the crowd. Intellectual self-mastery was 
therefore a prerequisite of successful speculation, and it was emphasised as crucial in all 
the crowd psychology-informed how-to books disseminating contrarian advice, which 
have been examined in this chapter. However, when it came to the market analytical 
dimension, the rather heterogeneous group of how-to book authors whom I have 
referred to as contrarians were divided in two ‘camps’: those who based their market 
analysis entirely on the precepts of crowd psychology and those who perceived crowd 
psychology as a factor in the market that ought to be given the same attention as the 
fundamental and technical conditions.  
The first of the two ‘camps’ offered readers advice on how to beat the market, and 
the only way for a small speculator to beat the market was by beating the crowd. The 
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rationale behind the beat the crowd approach was that since the small speculator did not 
have access to the same market information and did not possess the same level of 
experience and competence as the professional speculator, the only viable strategy for 
the small speculator was to base her or his investment decisions on the psychology of 
the market. Since the psychology of the market was perceived as being more or less 
identical to the psychology of the crowd, the contrarians beat the market strategies 
reduced speculation to a game of identifying and trading contrary to the public, i.e. the 
crowd, while making sure not to become one with the crowd. These contrarian 
approaches were responses to a practice, i.e. speculation in financial markets, to which 
the average person was by default disadvantaged compared to the seasoned professional. 
By reducing speculation to a practice of studying crowd psychology or human nature in 
the market and counteracting the public, who were always wrong, the beat the market 
approaches provided the means to make a profit in the markets without possessing the 
competences, market knowledge or experience of the professionals. Market psychology 
was, in these approaches to speculation, perceived as the single most important factor 
for the small speculator to understand. Fundamental conditions were for others to think 
about.  
The main difference between these rather simple contrarian approaches and the 
contrarian market philosophy that Neill started to formalise in the beginning of the 
1930s was that Neill and other how-to books authors who shared his contrarian views 
did not think that a study of the psychological factors in the markets could nor should 
replace examinations of fundamental or technical factors. On the contrary, market 
psychology should be integrated in a tripartite approach to market analysis that 
accounted for the fundamental, technical and psychological conditions influencing 
market movements. Neill’s theory of contrary opinion was, as I have shown, not a call 
for a radical rethinking of what the market was but rather an attempt to introduce a 
neglected dimension – the crowd-psychological dimension – to the study of markets. 
Hence, the market was not a crowd as most proponents of the beat the market strategies 
proposed, but it was, according to Neill and likeminded contrarians, vital not to neglect 
that crowd psychology played an increasingly important role in the financial markets 
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because of the increase in public participation. The contrarian market philosophy, as 
conceived by Neill, was a response to a “reality-void” in the general perceptions of and 
approaches to financial markets. Taking the psychology of the market seriously and 
accounting for it in analyses of market constituted, following Neill, the only way to fully 
grasp the reality of the financial markets. Through selective reading and a slight bending 
of notions, the contrarians showed how crowd theory could be mobilised as a theoretical 
legitimation of contrarian approaches to speculation. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding remarks and perspectives  
This dissertation has analysed forms of problematisations of crowd phenomena in the 
U.S. financial markets as expressed in practical, popular and academic financial writing 
between 1890 and 1940. The analysis has explored how certain market processes, 
practices and developments were problematised and responded to as crowd problems 
(i.e. problems concerning some form of collective action and crowd psychology) and 
what influence these critical interventions had on perceptions of financial markets and 
approaches to trading. In other words, the dissertation has examined a particular period 
in the history of American finance with an emphasis on the market disorder and 
instability that financial writers saw as being caused by forms of collective behaviour and 
crowd mentality among market actors. The overall aim of the dissertation has been to 
demonstrate that the way crowd phenomena in financial markets were reflected upon, 
debated and responded to had influence on perceptions among advocates as well as 
critics of financial markets. This overarching aim boils down to the following three 
objectives: A first objective was to illuminate the market conditions, contexts and 
specific developments in relation to which crowds were increasingly becoming objects of 
concern, controversy, and conflict. A second objective was to outline the ways in which 
terminology and tropes from late nineteenth century crowd theory were employed and 
began to proliferate in various genres of financial writing. Finally, a third objective was to 
establish that the increasing attention crowd phenomena were given by financial writers 
led to reconfigurations and alterations of approaches to the practice of analysing markets 
as well as trading in them. Instead of summarising all the themes and discussions taken 
in the dissertation, this conclusion draws attention to the, in my opinion, most central 
aspects, contributions and implications of the present historical exposition.  
First, as the nineteenth century was coming to a close the scholarly interest in crowds 
was reaching a highpoint, especially in academic milieus in France and Italy. Soon 
thereafter, the sociological and psychological inquiries of crowds, developed in 
continental Europe, were taken up and critically assessed by American psychologists and 
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sociologists. The figureheads of the academic field of crowd psychology were Le Bon 
and Tarde, whose ideas about the distinctive social and psychological characteristics of 
crowds had a significant influence on sociology, social psychology as well as social 
thought more broadly in the late nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. 
While the crowd theorists’ penchant for referring to various examples of social unrest 
such as revolutions, workers protests and political rallies (when explaining the 
psychological characteristics of crowds) has been covered in great detail in the existing 
literature on the history of crowd psychology, this dissertation has dealt with an aspect 
of crowd theory that has largely been overlooked. The specific aspect or dimension of 
crowd theory that I am referring to here is the ways in which crowd theorists explained 
and empirically anchored their theoretical ideas by applying them in critical accounts of 
financial market phenomena. With specific focus on the work of Le Bon, Tarde and 
Sidis, the analysis has demonstrated how these crowd theorists applied their ideas and 
concepts to the financial context.  
Though Le Bon did not pay a lot of attention to the way financial markets worked 
and how trading was conducted in them, he did reflect on the implications of what he 
perceived as the manipulative and almost autocratic behaviour of leading figures in the 
world of finance. Le Bon presented the debacle surrounding Joseph Leiter’s failed 
attempt to corner the wheat market at the Chicago Board of Trade in 1897 and 1898 as 
an emblematic example of the disastrous socio-economic consequences that the actions 
of powerful, self-interested and seemingly scrupulous financiers tended to have. By 
reducing finance to an uneven relationship between powerful ‘cosmopolitan financiers’ 
and a more or less hapless public, Le Bon allowed himself to identify the leader-crowd 
relation as an organising principle in the markets. Thus, Le Bon turned to the 
manipulations and excessive speculation in American finance in order to substantiate his 
idea that modern Western societies were in decay and moving towards becoming 
ochlocracies.  
Contrary to Le Bon, Sidis made a rather lengthy discussion of financial markets and 
especially the panics and crazes that had marred them for centuries. The way Sidis 
approached his examination of financial markets was aligned with Le Bon’s, in the sense 
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that he simply transposed his theoretical ideas about social suggestion to different 
empirical cases of panics and crazes, which he by the way borrowed from Charles 
MacKay’s Extraordinary Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Inspired by his teacher and 
colleague William James, Sidis claimed that there was a direct connection between the 
freedom to move physically and the ability to think independently. If an individual’s 
voluntary movements were limited, the person in question would, according to Sidis, slip 
into a state of suggestibility (a mental state in which the ‘waking’, rational self was 
subverted by the subconscious self). In the market context, Sidis’ rationale meant that 
the closer traders were pressed against each other on a trading floor of an exchange, the 
more likely was it that the entire mass of traders would enter into a state of pathological 
collective suggestibility. The consequence would then be that the traders, en masse, 
succumbed to irrational mob action.  
Compared to Le Bon’s and Sidis’ rather polemical and little substantiated reflections 
on financial market phenomena, there was a stronger academic gravity to Tarde’s way of 
dealing with the trading conducted in the stock exchanges. What Tarde attempted to do 
was to carve out an economic psychology that encompassed his ideas about the social as 
organised by imitation dynamics and crowd psychology. He argued that the markets and 
the persons acting in them were subjected to the same inclinations, vices and habits as 
they were in every other social setting. One of the central points that Tarde made about 
the modern commercial exchanges was that despite the fact that they were highly 
rationalised institutions in which everything seemed carefully quantified, subjective 
factors such as prestige, contagion and imitation nevertheless greatly influenced the way 
trading was conducted, how prices were formed and thus how market prices fluctuated. 
Pointing his critical crosshairs at economists’ understanding of markets, Tarde not only 
claimed that the business conducted in financial markets simply could not be completely 
quantified; he also proposed that the aid of socio-psychological theory was required in 
order to fully comprehend the functioning of markets.  
In their critical reflections on financial market phenomena Le Bon, Sidis and Tarde 
all conflated market and crowd dynamics as well as market and crowd problems. That is 
not to say that they perceived the market as a crowd, but rather that the inter-social and 
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inter-mental processes and dynamics characteristic of crowds were considered influential 
factors in the functioning and malfunctioning of markets. Comprehending how prices 
were formed in a market and the reason why people acted as they did was, according to 
Le Bon, Sidis and Tarde, therefore considered conditional on understanding social 
action and collective psychology.  
Second, and related, the developments that made the crowd phenomena seemingly 
pertinent to writers concerned with the functioning of the markets in the stock and 
commodity exchanges were the popularisation of and increased public participation in 
the financial markets. In the late nineteenth century and in particular in the beginning of 
the twentieth, public participation and its possible consequences for the prevailing 
dynamics and institutionalised practices in the exchanges became a hot topic among 
financial writers. As has been thoroughly discussed in the dissertation, the debates about 
public participation and ‘the public’ in the markets tended to evoke questions about the 
competencies and qualities required of market actors. Some of the rather intangible 
qualities that a speculator or investor ought to possess, according to specific observers, 
included independent judgement, self-restraint and self-control. Often doubts were cast 
as to whether the newcomers possessed the mental strength (the poise) needed in the 
financial markets. They surely lacked experience and practical knowledge, which, 
according to the conventional market wisdom, made them highly suggestible to all sorts 
of influences from individual market actors or from the accumulated mass of actors 
cramped together on trading floors or in broker’s offices. Public participation thus 
brought the problems that crowd theorists and others ascribed to the masses into the 
financial markets. The public’s assumed general lack of competence in market matters 
and alleged propensity to become overly excited or depressed made ‘the public’ a crowd 
problem. The public participating in the markets came to constitute the antithesis to 
successful speculation and the idea of ‘the public’ was in many respects almost 
synonymous with the idea of ‘the crowd’ as expounded in crowd theory.  
The popularisation of finance furthermore made financial writers draw a sharp 
distinction between professionals and amateurs in order to separate those who were 
familiar with the processes and practices of the market from those who apparently were 
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not. The distinction between professional and amateur was reiterated as a distinction 
between participator and spectator (even though the market public were more than mere 
inactive observers). The drawing of these distinctions contributed to the stigmatisation 
of the small investor or speculator as constituents of a participating audience, who were 
swayed by the emotions, sign, gestures and rumours swirling around in the markets. The 
public were perceived as unable to see through the commotion and spectacle in the 
markets and conduct a thorough assessment of the technical or fundamental conditions 
of the market and on that basis decide whether to buy, sell, hold the position or stay out 
of the market.  
Third, as financial writers, during the second and third decades of the twentieth 
century, became gradually more aware of the allegedly important role the public played 
in the financial markets, writers began to focus more systematically on the psychology of 
the public and the psychology of the market. Especially in how-to books, psychology 
was presented as an intangible element in markets that defied and meddled with the 
common assumptions about what factors made market prices move. It was, however, 
not exclusively authors of handbooks to prospective investors and speculators who 
ascribed importance to market psychology. The psychological factors in the markets 
were also, as has been discussed throughout the dissertation, vividly discussed in 
academic texts by economists who were open minded to frontier research in social 
psychology and the then still popular crowd theories of the likes of Le Bon and Tarde 
(as well as American successors in the crowd psychology tradition such as Ross and 
Giddings). The proliferation of ideas, tropes and terminology from lay perceptions of 
psychology as well as actual theoretical work within the field of psychology was so 
significant that I dared to term it the psychologisation of financial writing.  
Across genres of financial writing, theoretical ideas, tropes and terminology from the 
discipline of psychology (social and crowd psychology) were, as it has been elucidated in 
the dissertation, employed for descriptive, explanatory and prescriptive purposes. 
Collective psychology was drawn upon in order to describe certain forms of market 
behaviour especially on the part of the public. It furthermore provided some – in the 
eyes of several how-to book authors, some economists and a couple of regulatory 
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agencies – plausible explanations of why it was mainly constituents of the speculative 
public who tended to act in seemingly irrational ways. In relation to this, crowd 
psychology was, according to the sceptics, becoming an almost default explanation of 
unfounded fluctuations in prices and of why market actors occasionally “lost their 
heads” and acted in what seemed to be complete discord with their own interest. 
Psychology was, as mentioned, also utilised for prescriptive purposes. Some economists 
suggested that insights from psychology could be valuable in formulating more ‘realistic’ 
theories of economics than the ones dominating the discipline at the time. Federal 
regulatory reports on the grain trade in the futures markets suggested that crowd 
psychology ought to be taken seriously and thus into consideration in legislative matters. 
In how-to books, crowd psychology was basically functioning as an indicator of what the 
speculator or investor should attempt to avoid and as the basis on which rules of 
conduct and techniques of self-restraint and self-control could be formulated. The 
dissertation has demonstrated that (crowd) psychology was not just a popular label 
attached to market phenomena that seemed to defy conventional modes of explaining 
crowd phenomena in markets. The proliferation of psychologised representations and 
explanations of financial market practices had indirect and direct influences on, for 
instance, how approaches to speculation and market analysis were formulated. 
Finally, and pertaining to the abovementioned utilisation of crowd psychology for 
prescriptive purposes, the analysis has shown that the problematisations of crowd 
phenomena in the financial markets not only shaped perceptions of markets, but that 
they also influenced approaches to investment and speculation as formulated in the how-
to literature. The dissertation has not provided evidence that the way business was 
conducted in the markets and the way people invested in securities in general 
fundamentally changed due to the increased emphasis on crowd problems and market 
psychology in the examined literatures. What has, however, been thoroughly analysed is 
the way the concerns with the public’s role in the markets and the increased use of 
crowd theoretical terminology and ideas influenced the advice offered in how-to books 
and thereby arguably the investment strategies of some of the readers of such books. In 
the case of the emergence of contrarian approaches to market analysis and speculation, 
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crowd psychology and the assumption that the public mostly acted in a crowd-like 
manner played crucial roles. Contrarian ‘market philosophies’ were informed by the 
dictums of crowd theory and the psychology of crowds in the markets were considered 
as important as (and in some instances more important than) market fundamentals. The 
contrarians perceived the exchanges and broker’s offices as contagious, rumours and 
news as viral and market actors (at least those who fell into the category ‘the public’) as 
suggestible and prone to imitation. Because of these alleged ‘facts’ of financial markets, 
an approach to speculation had to include rules of conduct that would shield the 
individual market actor against her or his own inclination to follow the crowd and all the 
external affectation that lured them towards the majority. The analysis of contrarian 
market philosophies have demonstrated that approaches to speculation and market 
analysis circulating in the how-to literature were informed by crowd theory and the 
assumption that financial markets were, to some extent at least, under the influence of 
the psychology of crowds. Before the small investors and speculators even thought 
about attaining knowledge about market fundamentals, they had, according to several 
authors of how-to books promoting contrarian approaches, to familiarise themselves 
with the psychology of the market. Only then would they be able to withstand the 
mental strain of the market and keep a clear head, which was considered the main 
prerequisite of successful speculation. 
Although the present historical exploration of problematisations of crowd 
phenomena in the U.S. financial markets has not extended further than 1940, the 
problems and central topics examined in the dissertation should not be regarded as 
outdated and thus irrelevant to contemporary discussions of financial markets. As 
intimated in the dissertation, concerns about crowd behaviour in the financial markets 
have not completely vanished from the practical, popular and academic discourses on 
markets. I will end this dissertation with some thoughts on crowd phenomena in 
modern financial markets.  
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Perspectives on the study of crowds in financial markets 
When crowd phenomena and crowd psychology in the financial markets are being 
discussed today it is most often in the context of some sort of disruption of the 
established market order. In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, 
several commentators turned to the crowd psychology vocabulary in order to describe 
the markets as they crashed. In a column in The New York Times, the Nobel Laurate Paul 
Krugman stated that economists ought ‘to face up to the inconvenient reality that 
financial markets fall far short of perfection, that they are subject to extraordinary 
delusions and the madness of crowds’ (Krugman, 2 September 2009). (Note the close 
resemblance between Krugman’s wording and the title of MacKay’s Memoirs of 
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds.) Exactly one year after Krugman 
had described markets as subjected to crowd madness, the market analyst Robert 
Prechter told the online news media International Business Times that ‘[a] hundred percent’ 
of today’s financial markets are driven by crowd psychology and further claimed that 
crowd behaviour had been the sole cause of the crisis (Li, 2 September 2010).173 While 
Krugman and Prechter refer to crowd madness and psychology in attempts to argue the 
irrationality of financial markets (or at least that markets are not perfectly rational), I 
think that there are other more intriguing and more thorough ways in which crowd 
phenomena are being discussed in the context of today’s financial markets. In the 
following final sections of this chapter I shall briefly reflect on two perspectives on 
crowd phenomena in contemporary market contexts. The first perspective discusses the 
‘wisdom of crowds’ argument. The second attends to the concept of ‘herding’ in 
behavioural finance and argues that the field would benefit from a serious engagement 
with the history of the concept.  
173 Prechter is perhaps best known for his reinvigoration of and devotion to the so-called ‘Wave 
Principle’, which is an unorthodox form of price forecasting comprising insights from crowd 
psychology as well as pattern and fractal recognition. The wave principle was conceived by the 
American accountant Ralph Nelson Elliott in his book The Wave Principle (1938). 
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The wisdom of crowds argument174 
As it has been demonstrated in the dissertation, many of the discussions of crowd 
phenomena in financial writing between 1890 and 1940 touched upon themes such as 
the reliability (or lack thereof) of the public opinion and the assumed lack of knowledge, 
competencies and qualifications on part of the market public. Informed by a Le Bon-like 
perception of the psychology of the masses (or crowds), the public were generally 
understood to be unknowledgeable in market matters and known for accentuating their 
ignorance collectively via processes of contagion and imitation. With respect to the 
production of knowledge in crowds, Le Bon assertively argued, ‘[i]n crowds it is stupidity 
and not mother-wit that is accumulated’ (1896, p. 9). More than a century later, in his 
popular science bestseller The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few 
(2005), the financial journalist and author James Surowiecki turned Le Bon’s dictum on 
its head when claiming that crowds were indeed intellectually superior to isolated 
individuals and thus not inferior as Le Bon had argued (pp. xvi–xvii, cf. Le Bon, 1896, p. 
41). The wisdom of crowds argument that Surowiecki has popularised basically says that 
the average of a group’s judgments provides a more reliable and thus precise measure 
than that of an individual expert.  
The wisdom of crowds argument has been tested in and substantiated by several 
recent studies of the stock-price prediction capabilities of various online communities, 
i.e. online crowds (Bollen, Mao, and Zeng, 2011; Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang, 2014; 
Gottschlich and Hinz, 2014; Hill and Ready-Campbell, 2011; Nofer and Hinz, 2014; 
Zhang, Fuehres, and Gloor, 2011). At first glance, the wisdom of crowds argument 
appears to completely turn upside down the general understanding of crowds, as 
expressed in late-nineteenth-century crowd theory. However, taking a closer look at the 
recent studies of the wisdom of crowds argument reveals that central ideas from classical 
crowd theory nevertheless seem to be percolating the rationale and challenging the basic 
174 The discussion of the wisdom of crowds argument has previously appeared in my article 
‘Contrarian investment philosophy in the American stock market: On investment advice and the 
crowd conundrum’, Economy and Society, 44(4) (2015). With slight modifications, exemptions and 
additions, the discussion of the wisdom of crowds argument appears here as it does in the article. 
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assumptions of the argument. The following reflections on the wisdom of crowds 
argument demonstrate that discussions of crowd phenomena in financial markets remain 
pertinent and that some of the ideas that have been examined in the dissertation can 
inform contemporary debates.  
To substantiate his claim, Surowiecki opens The Wisdom of Crowds by telling the story 
of how the British polymath Francis Galton came to realise that popular judgement 
could be trusted, in some cases, even to a greater extent than individual judgement. 
Galton came to that conclusion after having conducted an analysis of the results of an 
ox-weighing competition at the 1906 annual West of England Fat Stock and Poultry 
Exhibition in Plymouth. What he had discovered was that the vox populi (measured as the 
mean of all the 787 guesses of the ox’s weight) was much closer to the actual weight of 
the ox than the individual estimates (Galton, 1907). Surowiecki sees Galton’s study as a 
proven case of crowd wisdom (Surowiecki, 2005, p. xv). In other words, it showed that 
‘averaging all judgments will lead to a more accurate judgment than that of the average 
judge’ (Gottschlich and Hinz, 2014, p. 52). The recent studies, which have affirmed 
Surowiecki’s hypothesis, are not significant solely because they support the wisdom of 
crowds argument, but because, in the process, they cast doubt on the reliability of expert 
verdicts – which are, under the right circumstances, trumped by the crowd. By 
implication, small investors and speculators cannot be reduced to mere erratic noise 
traders who provide liquidity simply by virtue of being wrong, but allegedly have to be 
recognised as part of a potentially rich reservoir of aggregated market knowledge.   
The studies of the alleged wisdom of crowds have shown that the precision of the 
crowd’s predictions relies on, among other preconditions, the individual members’ ability 
to make independent judgments and on group heterogeneity (Ray, 2006, p. 4). Although 
the different studies clearly indicate that under the right conditions the crowd can be 
proven “wise”, it is questionable whether the alleged wisdom of crowds can be 
systematically and strategically employed in investing and forecasting, because a context 
such as the financial market seldom allows for the right conditions. For instance, it is 
exceptionally difficult to know whether traders act on the basis of their own private 
information or follow other traders. If the crowd is to be considered wise, ‘crowd 
220 
 
members should primarily rely on private information and follow their own beliefs 
instead of trusting other market participants’ (Nofer and Hinz, 2014, p. 325), but since 
prices in the financial markets are not static and traders are, to some extent at least, able 
to observe the actions of others (contrary to Galton’s study, in which there was one right 
answer and where the participants were not able to see each other’s guess), there is an 
imminent risk of imitation.     
An important problem regarding the wisdom of crowds is therefore the imminent 
risk of social influence, which has the negative consequence of diminishing the accuracy 
of the crowd’s judgments. Lorenz et al. (2011) have shown (in an experiment in which 
the estimates of others were disclosed within the crowd, free from ‘group leader effects, 
persuasion, or any other kind of social psychological influence’) that a little social 
influence is enough to cause ‘herding behavior and negative side effects for the 
mechanism underlying the wisdom of crowds’ (p. 9024). The convergence of opinions 
often happens qua imitation or mimicry, which is considered the main driver in a so-
called ‘informational cascade’. Informational cascades occur ‘when it is optimal for an 
individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of 
the preceding individual without regard to his own information’ (Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992, p. 992). Thus, ‘once a cascade starts, the private 
information of subsequent investors is never included in the public pool of knowledge’ 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000, p. 286). One problem with the informational cascade 
is, as mentioned, the fact that private information does not count once the cascade is 
rolling, which makes it fragile and highly vulnerable to mass behaviour initiated by only 
the slightest external shock. The fragility of informational cascades indicates that the 
borderline between crowd wisdom and irrational crowd behaviour is exceptionally thin 
and difficult to comprehend. All in all, whether you land on one side or the other 
depends on ‘who is interacting with whom’ as well as ‘the level and mode of interaction 
and interdependence’ (Felin, 2012, pp. 289–290).    
Ultimately, the wisdom of crowds heavily depends on the exclusion of imitation from 
the collective sphere, but it is difficult to imagine a situation in the financial market 
where any form of social influence on participants is annulled and everyone acts as 
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atomistic individuals (assumed the actors are not algorithms). The obsession with purely 
independent judgments and opinions is a common denominator between the wisdom of 
crowds proponents and the contrarians. In order to explicate the intricacy of 
speculation, Hoyne (see Chapter 5) wrote that ‘[t]o speculate successfully is the most 
difficult of all human activities, and the ability to do it is not to be acquired by any mere 
monkey-like mimicry of the doings of others, but only by the development of high 
qualities of intellect, including iron self-control’ (Hoyne, 1922, p. 165). So for Hoyne, 
although mimicry was not a recommended speculation strategy, it was nonetheless 
tempting for the less well-informed small speculator to follow the lead of more 
experienced and seemingly more well-informed investors. Thus, the most crucial and 
daunting task for contrarian investors and speculators was, as demonstrated in the 
dissertation, to shield themselves from their own propensity to throw individual 
judgment to the wind and uncritically rely on imitating others. The contrarian approach 
was, in itself, a response to what was considered a basic human inclination to affect and 
be affected by others – a predisposition that was more pronounced in an intense 
environment such as the financial market.  
The danger of having your mental machinery thrown out of gear was imminent 
according to the contrarians as well as to advocates of the wisdom of crowds argument. 
Imitation, whether due to seemingly irrational forces derailing the individual investor’s 
mental scheme or due to a deliberate rational choice to imitate, thus seems to be 
considered an inevitable condition of investment and speculation. From this, I definitely 
do not draw the conclusion that traders are, by definition, irrational and therefore that 
markets are too, but rather stress that the early-twentieth-century popular finance 
discourse, especially the writings on contrarian investing, had a sensibility towards the 
dynamics of the social in which the market and its participants were embedded. From a 
sociological perspective, it is interesting how the emphasis on the importance of 
autonomous decision-making (as a prerequisite for the crowd to be wise) is 
simultaneously accentuating the influence of inter-subjective dynamics on market 
movements. Although their bleak diagnosis of the market was perhaps questionable, the 
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contrarians’ concern with the ramifications of collective behaviour in financial markets 
remains to this day a recurrent concern that is yet to be fully comprehended. 
While crowds may proof accurate in their predictions in a highly organised and 
controlled experimental setting such as, for instance, a ‘prediction market’ (Ray, 2006), 
the idea seems to implode in the context of a “real” market in which people do interact 
with, influence and imitate one another. The following reflections attend to the way 
questions about social and psychological influence in markets are addressed in literature 
on herding in financial markets.   
On the concept of herding 
One of the concerns that financial writers were most preoccupied with between 1890 
and 1940 was, as emphasised several times in the dissertation, that market actors would 
unintentionally begin to follow other market actors without exercising any form of 
appropriate judgement. Such concerns about crowd following were, according to the 
majority of financial writers whose work I have examined, inextricably connected to 
public participation. More specifically, crowd following in markets was generally 
perceived as a logical consequence of the public’s alleged incompetence and inability to 
restrain themselves emotionally. As discussed in Chapter 3, the public repeatedly 
followed fads without thinking or, as the financial journalist Colin Armstrong expressed 
it during an address delivered at The Congregational Club of New York City and 
Vicinity in January 1903, the public did what everybody else were doing, because of their 
‘susceptibility to the influence of the crowd’ (Armstrong, 1903, p. 10). The public’s 
supposed lack of experience and therefore lack of practical knowledge about market 
matters allegedly made them unable to withstand their inclinations to imitate and to 
control their gregarious instincts. In other words, many financial writers, at the time, 
assumed that the public followed the crowd because they did not have the sufficient 
amount of market knowledge to make decisions independently and therefore succumbed 
to their alleged natural inclinations to imitate or be gregarious. 
These conceptions of market actors, information and imitation bear a similarity to 
ideas found in the present literature on herding (see Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani and 
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Sharma, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Shiller, 1995; Spyrou, 2013). Herding is 
basically understood in this literature to be an act of imitation that an actor makes on the 
assumption that other persons are better informed. While herding behaviour can be 
associated with perfectly rational action, it entails the risk that it might lead to 
informational cascades and thereby irrational behaviour (as discussed in the reflections 
on the wisdom of crowds argument). Yet and arguably due to the incessant 
preoccupation with rational action in contemporary economics, the distinction between 
rational and irrational action is often sharply drawn in the present herding literature. 
Comparatively, in discussions of imitation and crowd behaviour in the historical period 
examined in this dissertation the distinction between rational and irrational action was 
often less pronounced. The historical conception was thus able to establish a continuum 
(rather than a dualism) of rational and irrational behaviour.   
In most studies of herding in financial markets, herding is considered to involve 
deliberation and intent on the part of the actor (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000, p. 281). 
The assumption that herding is intentional and therefore based on rational action 
(although the decision to herd may prove to be irrational in economic terms) does not 
resonate with most of the historical accounts of crowd following and imitation explored 
in this dissertation. For example, one of the main assumptions of Tarde’s influential 
theory of imitation was that deliberate intentionality was not a prerequisite or necessary 
condition of imitation. According to Tarde, imitation could be deliberate and therefore a 
result of a conscious decision, but it could just as well be an outcome of unconscious 
suggestion, that is, to paraphrase Sidis, the intrusion on the mind of an idea that is 
realised unreflectively and almost automatically (Sidis, 1919 [1898], p. 15; Tarde, 1903). 
Though these are ideas formulated in the academic realm and, in Sidis’ case, empirically 
tested in the psychological laboratories at Harvard University, they were, as the 
dissertation has shown, also employed rather liberally by financial writers. In other 
words, these academic ideas proliferated and were often used in popular and distinctively 
practical discussions of financial market between 1890 and 1940. In summary, the 
discussion of herding behaviour was, at that time, based on a quite different theoretical 
framework and used with quite different practical implications than it is in contemporary 
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herding literature. While I do not want to argue that late-nineteenth-century crowd 
theory holds the key to an all-encompassing explanation of why herding behaviour 
occur, I do think that a historical exploration of the theoretical underpinnings of the 
concept of herding and of the circulation of imitation and suggestion theory in academic, 
popular and practice accounts of financial markets can contribute to a broader 
understanding of herding behaviour. By ‘broader’, I mean a historical contextualisation 
of herding in financial markets that is not limited to a narrow focus of academic 
literature, but one that also examines the impact these theoretical considerations had on 
discussions in vernacular finance.175 
Another way to engage with the herding literature from a critical historical 
perspective is to attend to the relation between imitation, herding behaviour and 
technology (see Beunza and Garud, 2007; Gemayel and Preda, 2015; Lange, 2016). 
Daniel Beunza and David Stark (2012) have argued that the ideas of informational 
cascades and herding ‘do not account for the existence of technology in the decision-
making process’ and further suggest that a situation in which actors subjugate themselves 
to ‘the dictates of the mass’ is unrealistic and unviable within modern computerised 
finance (p. 387). Following Beunza and Stark’s argument, the question is then if herding, 
informational cascades and crowd following are still important phenomena in financial 
markets moving towards automation. Yet seen in a historical perspective, I would be 
hesitant to affirm the claim that technology eliminates irrational herding behaviour in the 
financial markets. On the basis of the analysis made in the dissertation, it would, on the 
contrary, be possible to venture and argue the opposite claim, namely that technology 
may equally accelerate processes of imitation and thereby crowd behaviour. In the late 
nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth many financial writers perceived the 
proliferation of communication technologies such as the telegraph, the stock ticker and 
175 I am only aware of a single contemporary study that attempts to give a historical account of the 
concept of herding in economic life (see Rook, 2006). The study is, however, quite limited in its 
scope and does not account for the ‘migration’ of ideas from social psychological theories on herd, 
imitative and crowd behaviour to the field of economics. It furthermore does not account for the 
great extent to which terminology and tropes from such social psychological theories were 
employed in practical literature on financial markets and in business more broadly (see, e.g., N. Hill, 
1928). 
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the printed press as intensifying imitative behaviour and mental contagion among market 
actors. Although the ticker, to give one example, rationalised the dissemination of 
quotations and fundamentally changed trading, it was simultaneously seen as a source of 
‘mental intoxication, which foreshortens the vision by involuntary submissiveness to 
momentary influences’ (Harper, 1926, p. 10). Today’s financial markets are obviously 
and in many respects – in particular in terms of the amount and character of technology 
involved – completely different from the ones I have studied in this dissertation, so a 
claim of equivalence between different technologies used in the markets (then and now) 
would be almost absurd. The modest point, derivable from the historical examination, is 
rather that the influence of technology on imitation must be carefully considered and 
empirically examined for each kind of technology. Accordingly, the historical material 
urges us to question the conversely immodest conclusion that the influence of 
technology is uniform and that it somehow eliminates all processes of imitation.  
*** 
In summary, the purpose of the above reflections has been to briefly elucidate and 
specify the connections, overlaps and frictions between contemporary discussions of 
crowd phenomena in financial markets and the historical problematisations examined in 
the dissertation. This purpose coalesces with the overall aim of undertaking this 
particular analysis in the first place, which was to attempt to shed light on ways in which 
crowd phenomena in the financial markets were debated, reflected upon and responded 
to by a variety of financial writers between 1890 and 1940.   
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